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Foreword
While there is considerable interest and concern about the 
use of robots in the workplace, most public awareness has 
been shaped by the popular press in the last year or two. In a 
context of serious concern about high levels of unemploy 
ment, there has been a growing need for thorough investiga 
tion and sound estimates and projections of the labor market 
effects of robotics. Nowhere is that need greater than in 
Michigan, where the auto industry is one of the nation's 
heaviest users of industrial robots.
This study was initiated at the request of the Michigan 
Occupational Information Coordinating Committee as an 
examination of the human resource implications of robotics 
for the State of Michigan. It was later expanded to focus on 
the impact of robots on the entire U.S. In the course of the 
study, many fears have appeared to be unfounded. There are 
also many areas of legitimate concern to human resource 
planners and policymakers who need to understand the im 
plications of robotics for economic development, job crea 
tion, job displacement, training and retraining.
Facts and observations presented in this study are the sole 
responsibility of the authors. Their viewpoints do not 
necessarily represent the position of the W. E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research.
Jack R. Woods 
Acting Director
March 1983
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Executive Summary
The human resource implications of the so-called robotics 
"revolution" are explored in this monograph. Specifically, 
we estimate the job creation and job displacement potential 
of industrial robots in the U.S. and Michigan by 1990. The 
study is targeted for policy makers and social researchers, 
particularly those involved in employment and training ques 
tions associated with robotics.
Given the intense media hyperbole and the lack of hard in 
formation about robots, it is necessary to develop a broader, 
more objective perspective of the coming changes before 
proceeding. First, we submit that robots are simply one more 
piece of automated industrial equipment, part of the long 
history of the automation of production. We also argue that 
the introduction of any new manufacturing process 
technology is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. There 
are physical, financial and human constraints on the rate of 
change in process technology as it is actually applied.
Second, there appears to be a significant lack of 
understanding that one of the consequences of a growing, 
dynamic economy, one that makes more goods and services 
available to all of us through the productivity gains of its 
workers, is job displacement or the elimination of some jobs 
through technological change. Concomitantly, we know that 
other jobs are being created, sometimes in the very same 
firms that adopt new technologies and sometimes in 
altogether new sectors of the economy.
In view of the level of interest in robots, it is surprising 
that so few industries are actually using robots today and
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that the proven industrial applications are so limited. Vir 
tually all robots can be found in manufacturing firms, with 
the primary user being the auto industry. The proven in 
dustrial applications of robots are welding, painting, and 
various pick-and-place operations, while assembly tasks hold 
promise for the future.
We estimate that sales of robots by U.S. producers in 1982 
approximated or slightly exceeded the 1981 sales level of 
$150 million or 2,100 units. By the end of 1982 that implies a 
total of 6,800 to 7,000 robots were operating in U.S. fac 
tories. We also estimate that employment in U.S. robot 
manufacturing today is roughly 2,000 workers nationwide. 
This should make it clear that most of the employment im 
pacts of robotics are in the future.
We expect strong growth in the utilization of industrial 
robots in the decade of the 1980s. By 1990 the total robot 
population in the U.S. will range from a minimum of 50,000 
to a maximum of 100,000 units. Given our estimate of the 
year-end 1982 population of about 7,000 units, that implies 
an average annual growth rate of between 30 and 40 percent 
for the eight years of the forecast period, or roughly a seven- 
to fourteenfold increase in the total population of robots.
In terms of gross displacement (the elimination of job 
tasks rather than actual layoffs of workers) we estimate that 
robots in the U.S. will eliminate between 100,000 and 
200,000 jobs by 1990, with roughly one-fourth of that total 
in the auto industry. In relative terms, job displacement rates 
due to robots will not be a general problem before 1990 in 
the U.S., although there will be particular areas that will be 
significantly affected. Chief among these is the auto industry 
where from 6 to 11 percent of all operatives and laborers will 
be displaced by 1990. The results are particularly striking in 
occupations such as painting and welding for which today's 
robots are so well adapted. We project that 15 to 20 percent
of auto welders and 27 to 37 percent of auto painters jobs 
will be displaced. Geographically, states such as Michigan, 
especially the southeastern quadrant with its heavy 
dependence on autos, will suffer greater displacement than 
other states or regions.
We do not believe that this job displacement will lead to 
significant job loss among the currently employed, however. 
Even in the auto industry, voluntary turnover rates 
historically have been sufficient to handle the reduction in 
force that might be required, and the new GM-UAW agree 
ment appears to provide adequate job security measures. 
However, new labor market entrants may find more and 
more factory gates closed. Therefore, if there is an increase 
in unemployment as a result of the spread of robotics 
technology, we fear the burden will fall on the less experienc 
ed, less well educated part of our labor force.
In terms of job creation, we foresee the direct creation of 
about 32,000 to 64,000 jobs in the U.S. by 1990 in four 
broad areas: robot manufacturing, direct suppliers to robot 
manufacturers, robot systems engineering, and corporate 
users. The largest single occupational group of jobs created 
by robotics will be robotics technicians those persons with 
the training or experience to test, program, install, 
troubleshoot, or maintain industrial robots. The next most 
important occupational group is graduate engineers. These 
will be mostly electrical and mechanical engineers. Together, 
engineers and technicians account for over one-half of the 
jobs created.
We anticipate that most robotics technicians will be train 
ed in community college programs of two years duration. 
The exception is in the auto industry where this requirement 
will continue to be met through retraining existing members 
of the UAW Skilled Trades Council without substantial out 
side hiring. The extent to which other industries will follow a
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retraining strategy is unknown today. There does not appear 
to be a supply problem for robotics technicians, as the com 
munity college system gives every indication that they will be 
ready and willing to train whatever numbers are needed. In 
fact, our current concern is that they may, in some instances, 
be increasing the supply too rapidly.
The supply of engineers may be more of a problem 
because there is already a clear shortage of engineers nation 
wide, so we start from a deficit position. In addition, we face 
the challenge of other likely engineering demand increases as 
well as the historical instability of engineering enrollments. 
Thus it is quite likely that a shortage of engineers could com 
promise the expansion of robotics technology.
The most remarkable thing about the job displacement 
and job creation impacts of industrial robots is the skill-twist 
that emerges so clearly when the jobs eliminated are com 
pared to the jobs created. The jobs eliminated are semi 
skilled or unskilled, while the jobs created require significant 
technical background. We submit that this is the true mean 
ing of the so-called robotics revolution.
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"The Robots are Coming"
Introduction
In the past year or so there have been cover stories or 
special reports about robots in Time, Newsweek, Fortune, 
Business Week, and The Wall Street Journal, among others. 
Indeed, the existence of a robot "revolution" in our fac 
tories appears to be treated as a fact in the popular media. 
Yet there is surprisingly little information available about the 
possible social and economic implications of robots. How 
many robots are toiling in our factories today? Which jobs 
and how many will be done by robots that were once done by 
human workers? What new jobs and how many will be 
created by robots? In such an information vacuum it is easy 
to exaggerate or to misunderstand the few facts that are 
available; possible even to inadvertently mislead 
policymakers and the general public as to the impact of 
robots.
A recent study by Pat Choate warns of the imminent 
robotization of American factories. He says "the speed and 
force of this change will be awesome." (Choate, p. 13) He 
concludes, "As the economy robotizes and domestic jobs are 
lost to foreign production, 10 million to 15 million manufac 
turing workers and a similar number of service workers like 
ly will be displaced from their existing jobs. Much of this
l
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displacement will occur in the mid- to late 1980s." (Choate, 
p. 2) Yet nowhere in the study does Choate really say how 
many jobs will be specifically lost to robots.
On the other hand, Cetron and O'Toole, in their publica 
tions on the jobs of tomorrow, predict that millions of new 
jobs will be created by these same robots. According to 
them, "there will be as many as 1.5 million robotics techni 
cians on the job in the U.S. alone by 1990. ..." (Cetron and 
O'Toole, 1982a, p. 12 and 1982b, p. 259) These technicians 
will be needed for maintenance of robots for the most part. 
In a recent issue of Newsweek, which highlighted the growth 
industries and jobs of the future, the work of Cetron and 
O'Toole and others was referenced. That article included an 
estimate of total employment in industrial robot production 
in 1990 of 800,000. ("Growth Industries of the Future," p. 
83) If these numbers are believable, then over 2 million U.S. 
workers will be building or maintaining robots by 1990. At 
the same time, millions of other workers could be displaced 
by those robots.
Policymakers, lacking adequate information, must make 
do with whatever is available. Under these circumstances, 
even the Secretary of Labor can be misled. In a speech to the 
Productivity Advisory Committee, Secretary Donovan said, 
". . .there will be a major shift from production-line 
workers to versatile workers able to program, repair, and 
service the array of robots on the factory floor. In fact, by 
1990, half of the workers in any factory may well be 
engineers and technicians and other white collar specialists, 
rather than the current blue collar workers." (emphasis add 
ed)
This small sampling of currently available hyperbole 
about industrial robots contrasts sharply with the facts, in 
our judgment. The Robot Institute of America, the industry 
trade association of robot manufacturers and users of
' The Robots are Coming'' 3
robots, predicts that there will be 75,000 to 100,000 robots in 
U.S. factories by 1990. (Robot Institute of America, p. 30) 
Indeed, even the most optimistic robot industry experts 
foresee no more than 150,000 robots by 1990. In interviews 
that we conducted, robot manufacturers were certainly en 
thusiastic about the growth prospects for their industry, but 
they deplored the "off-the-wall" predictions appearing in 
the popular media.
In any case, the application of as many as 150,000 in 
dustrial robots will not support cataclysmic employment im 
pacts, either in terms of job creation or job displacement. It 
is not reasonable to think that 1.5 million technicians are 
needed to maintain 150,000 robots, nor is it reasonable to 
suppose that 150,000 robots will displace millions of 
workers. Perhaps it makes interesting reading to claim that 
by 1990 employment in robot manufacturing will approx 
imate 800,000 people. But such a figure would surpass cur 
rent U.S. employment in the motor vehicle industry. Even 
more startling, a figure of 1.5 million robotics technicians by 
1990 would surpass current U.S. employment of all engineer 
ing and science technicians. While these and other wild 
claims about the impacts of robots may attract considerable 
media attention, they do not square with the facts, as we 
shall demonstrate in this monograph.
We agree that the robots are coming, but the near term 
employment impacts will not be overwhelming by any 
means. The impact of robots will be felt gradually and 
cumulatively through the years, an evolutionary rather than 
a revolutionary process. While these statements may not 
make headlines, we believe they can be shown to be accurate. 
In our opinion, the recent intense media attention on 
robotics may have seriously confused the issues and the 
policymakers.
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Scope and Purpose of the Study
This monograph will explore one aspect of the evolution 
of technology, the application of industrial robots to the 
manufacturing process. We focus on the human resource im 
plications of the industrial utilization of robotics technology 
rather than on the technology itself. More specifically, we 
estimate the job creation and job displacement potential of 
industrial robots in the U.S. by 1990. We also derive 
estimates of the impacts of robotics on one state in the na 
tion, the State of Michigan.
Robotics technology is important to Michigan for at least 
two major reasons. First, Michigan has traditionally relied 
on the "metalbending" business for a large share of its 
manufacturing exports. In particular, the dependence of the 
Michigan economy on auto and auto-related manufacturing 
is well-documented. This focus has led to a major concentra 
tion on manufacturing process technology as well. Thus 
Michigan already has a very substantial commitment to 
manufacturing and to manufacturing process technology.
Second, in 1981, Governor Milliken designated robotics 
technology as the highest priority in the drive to rebuild the 
Michigan economy with a high technology base. (Milliken, 
1981a, pp. 14-15; Milliken, 1981b, p. 13) Of course, the 
established stake in manufacturing process technology had a 
role in the selection. So did the circumstance that the auto in 
dustry, upon which Michigan has depended for so long, is 
the leader in the application of industrial robots to the 
manufacturing process. It was fairly obvious that industrial 
robots constituted a threat to the Michigan employment 
base. It was also obvious that the domestic auto industry had 
been facing intense competitive pressure from the Japanese, 
and that part of the Japanese cost advantage was emanating 
from their superior productivity. This in turn could be at 
tributed to the Japanese use of industrial robots, among 
other factors.
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In the face of this situation, the Governor's High 
Technology Task Force elected to try to make Michigan a 
world class center of excellence in manufacturing process 
technology, including but not limited to robotics technology. 
The centerpiece of this effort has become the development of 
the Industrial Technology Institute as an independent non 
profit corporation designed (1) to foster basic and applied 
research in manufacturing process technology, including the 
social and economic implications thereof, and (2) to provide 
practical assistance to Michigan manufacturers in both 
adopting and producing new manufacturing process 
technology. (Industrial Technology Institute, p. ii)
Because of the various initiatives of the State of Michigan 
and the belief that robotics technology might significantly 
affect the state's economy, the Michigan Occupational In 
formation Coordinating Committee (MOICC) asked the W. 
E. Upjohn Institute to look at the labor market implications 
of robotics in order to provide a base upon which human 
resource planning could proceed. The present monograph 
contains much of the information reported to MOICC in the 
Michigan study, but the major focus is on the national 
estimates. Thus, we regard the present volume as an exten 
sion of the earlier work.
This study is specifically targeted for policymakers and 
social researchers, particularly those involved in employment 
and training questions associated with robotics. No prior 
knowledge of industrial robots is assumed or needed. 
Technical questions about industrial robots are discussed on 
ly to the extent necessary.
There are precious little hard data about industrial robots 
today. Our data were gathered through published sources 
and through interviews with robot manufacturers, corporate 
users of robots, and other experts. While some judgment was 
undeniably necessary, we attempted to maintain objectivity
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throughout our efforts. Our methodology and judgments are 
explicitly stated in the study. This reflects our hope that this 
study will lead to other efforts to improve the understanding 
of the social and economic impacts of industrial robots.
A consistent framework is utilized in the study to evaluate 
the social and economic implications of industrial robots, 
particularly the job creation and job displacement caused by 
industrial robots. That means, for instance, that our projec 
tions of the population of robots in 1990 are consistent with 
our estimates of job displacement and job creation in that 
same year. Actually, we provide a range for the estimates 
because of the uncertainties involved, but the point is that 
the projections are consistent and comparable. This is very 
helpful in avoiding unrealistic or exaggerated conclusions.
The outline of the study is as follows. In chapter 2 we pre 
sent a selective review of other forecasts and then our 
forecast of the U.S. robot population in 1990. The chapter 
concludes with the derivation of the 1990 projected Michigan 
robot population. In chapter 3 we discuss the jobs to be 
eliminated by the robot population projected in chapter 2. 
That includes not only the number of jobs involved but also 
the specific occupations. In addition to this examination of 
job displacement, there is also a discussion of the possible 
unemployment impacts of robots. Chapter 4 is organized 
similarly but discusses the jobs that will be created as a result 
of industrial robots. In both chapters, the focus is on the 
United States and the State of Michigan. The conclusions of 
the study are presented in chapter 5.
Given the current lack of information about industrial 
robots, an annotated bibliography is also provided as part of 
the study. It is not necessarily complete, nor does it include 
the popular news magazines or many of the technical jour 
nals. However, it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first 
compilation of an annotated research bibliography on the
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social and economic impacts of industrial robots. We hope 
the interested reader can use the annotations to identify 
items of interest; they cover a broad range, from the highly 
technical and mathematical economic literature of 
technological change to simple descriptions of robot 
characteristics.
In this introduction, the basic facts of robots are discussed 
first: What is a robot? What work can a robot do? Where are 
they currently being used? Then the place of robots in pro 
duction technology is assessed. Since robots are new 
technology, we discuss the development of two other related 
technologies, digital computers and numerically controlled 
machine tools. Next some historical antecedents, including 
the automation scare of the early 1960s, are considered. 
These suggested analogies will hopefully lead to some com 
mon ground upon which to develop a more dispassionate 
view of today's new technology industrial robots. Finally, 
we conclude chapter 1 with a discussion of a major study 
which has examined the job displacement effects of robots in 
great detail: the Carnegie-Mellon study. We believe misinter 
pretation of that study is responsible for some of the 
misunderstanding about industrial robots in the popular 
media.
What is a Robot?
Complete data on current installations of robots in the 
U.S. are not available. In part, that can be accounted for by 
confusion in defining exactly what constitutes a robot. A 
very broad definition originated with the Japan Industrial 
Robot Association, while the narrower definition used 
throughout this study originated with the Robot Institute of 
America (RIA) in 1979. The RIA definition was adopted by 
the llth International Symposium of Industrial Robots held 
in Tokyo, Japan in October 1981. However, it should be 
understood that international comparisons are still
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treacherous, and RIA and others have had to reevaluate the 
U.S. robot population. There is still not total agreement 
about U.S. installations of industrial robots and no one can 
be certain exactly how many robots there are in the U.S. to 
day.
The official RIA definition, now accepted internationally, 
is as follows:
A robot is a reprogrammable multifunctional 
manipulator designed to move material, parts, 
tools, or other specialized devices through variable 
programmed motions for the performance of a 
variety of tasks. (Robot Institute of America, p. 1)
The key to this definition is that a robot is a reprogram 
mable, multifunctional manipulator. A robot can perform 
the same task on identical workpieces repetitively; it can per 
form different tasks on the same workpiece; or it can be 
reprogrammed to perform entirely new tasks.
Unlike R2D2 and C3PO of the movie Star Wars, however, 
robots of today are essentially "dumb machines." They are 
generally immobile, they usually lack any visual or tactile 
sensory perception, and they cannot adapt to their environ 
ment in any way whatsoever. Generally they are no faster 
than human workers, but they are tireless. In layman's 
terms, that means a robot can reproduce a specific range of 
motions for which it has been programmed, but it does not 
know if it is really holding the part it is supposed to be or if 
the work was done correctly. Because of the robot's limita 
tions, it must be carefully interfaced with other equipment 
using mechanical and/or electrical switches to prevent 
disasters, and procedures must be established to verify the 
performance of the robot.
Essentially, then, robots are stationary machines with a 
manipulator arm that can perform motions repetitively and
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tirelessly. Unless the workpiece arrives at the exact location 
for which the arm is programmed, however, the robot will 
fail. If the workpiece is not of the size expected, or is 
oriented in the wrong position, the robot will fail. The bot 
tom line is that today's robot can only operate in a carefully 
structured and oriented world. Furthermore, although the 
literature makes much of the reprogrammability of robots, 
relatively few robots today are truly reprogrammed. Minor 
alterations may be made in the path of the manipulator of a 
welding robot, but most of today's robots perform the same 
program over and over and over again.
RIA's 1981 survey reports 4,700 robots in the U.S. by 
functional application area. (Robot Institute of America, p. 
3) By the end of 1982 we estimate that 6,800 to 7,000 robots 
were operating in U.S. factories. This should make it clear 
that most of the employment impacts to be discussed are in 
the future. The growth in application of industrial robots 
and the implications of that growth both have to be pro 
jected because of the very limited empirical base to date.
Robots perform a great variety of tasks today, but most 
are simple pick-and-place maneuvers such as loading or 
unloading machines, palletizing, etc. A common sequence 
might be as follows: the robot picks up the workpiece at a 
predetermined location, reorients it, places it in a machine 
tool for processing, removes it after processing, reorients it 
once again, places the item at a second predetermined loca 
tion and returns to the beginning. There are also 
sophisticated welding robots in which the manipulator (arm) 
can be programmed to follow a continuous path through 
space instead of simply going to various predetermined 
points. Control of the entire path of the arm also facilitates 
spray painting or application of other finishes.
In the auto industry, welding applications of robotics 
dominate today because auto production is particularly
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amenable to spot welding robots. There are only a limited 
variety of auto bodies, the assembly line can pre-position the 
parts precisely, and the environment can be perfectly 
organized because the nature of the work does not change. 
In short, it is a dull, repetitive, hazardous task that is ideally 
suited to today's robots. For these reasons, automakers are 
robotizing assembly line welding operations as normal 
retooling is done.
There are also pilot applications of robots for assembly 
tasks. However, assembly is generally a very complex task 
for today's "dumb" robots that cannot tell when the task is 
done correctly and must operate in a perfectly oriented and 
organized environment. Suffice it to say here that assembly 
robots are viewed as the number one growth application of 
the future. There are considerable ongoing research and 
development efforts in this area, but presently robots cannot 
perform most assembly tasks with consistency in an in 
dustrial environment at a reasonable cost. The trade 
literature implies that all of the problems will be solved very 
soon, and assembly robots will shortly thereafter proliferate 
in factories all over the world. Others are not so certain.
In sum, the proven applications of robots today are 
welding, painting, and various pick-and-place operations, 
while assembly tasks hold promise for the future. Given all 
of the media attention to robots, it is surprising that there are 
so few actually in operation. Part of the reason is to be 
found in the limited industrial applications perfected so far. 
For a more thorough technical (yet accessible) discussion of 
robot applications and capabilities, the interested reader 
should consult the book listed in the bibliography by Joseph 
L. Engelberger, generally acknowledged as the father of 
robotics.
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Robots in the Productive Process
The auto industry is the primary user of robots today. In 
fact, the auto industry pioneered many of the current robot 
applications and continues considerable research and 
development efforts in the industrial application of robots. 
Virtually all robots today are utilized in manufacturing 
firms, and the bulk are located in what might loosely be call 
ed metalcutting or metalbending industries (sometimes refer 
red to as the metalworking sector fabricated metal pro 
ducts, machinery, transportation equipment) and, to a lesser 
extent, in instruments and related products. Again, the sur 
prise is that so few industries are actually using robots, but it 
is also true that these industries are particularly concentrated 
in the five Great Lakes States.
Robots should be viewed as another form of automated 
equipment. Generally, we can think of two extremes: custom 
production or dedicated automation. In custom production, 
general purpose machines are usually hand operated by skill 
ed workers to produce a single item or small lots of that item. 
Capital equipment costs may be low but total unit costs are 
high because set-up time can be considerable, individual 
machining can be a demanding and time-consuming task, 
and all of the costs must be spread over a very small number 
of units produced. At the other extreme stands dedicated (or 
hard) automation, where the initial fixed capital investment 
can be quite high but total unit costs are typically very low 
because the automation of production increases speed and 
insures constant quality. The highly specialized equipment 
(dedicated automation) is set up once and thereafter produc 
tion of a single product can flow continuously.
Robots are not identified with either of these extremes. 
Set-up time for a robot exceeds that of a human operator in 
custom production, and the speed of a robot is no match for 
dedicated automated equipment. Instead, robots are a com-
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promise between these two extremes in terms of cost, flex 
ibility and capability. The fixed capital costs of a robot in 
stallation exceed that for custom production but are less than 
dedicated automation; total unit costs are likewise between 
the two extremes. In terms of capability, robots are no match 
for the subtle skills of a precision machinist, nor can a robot 
repeat a single task as perfectly as highly specialized 
automated equipment.
In terms of flexibility, the robot once again is no match for 
a skilled human operator that can adjust a workpiece, cor 
rect a minor flaw, and carefully check each and every piece 
as it is produced. On the other hand, the robot can do dif 
ferent tasks (if it is preprogrammed for those tasks), unlike 
dedicated automation which is capable of producing a single 
product only. Specialized hard automation sometimes must 
be scrapped when the product is changed, whereas in theory 
the robot can be reprogrammed to perform a new task at any 
time.
Despite the fact that robots represent a compromise be 
tween the extremes of custom production and dedicated 
automation in terms of cost, capability and flexibility, 
robots today are being applied primarily in mass production 
facilities where the human worker or the type of work itself 
already limits the speed of the overall facility. Thus they are 
serving primarily as a less expensive alternative to dedicated 
automation rather than being applied to automate batch pro 
duction facilities. The robot, once installed, appears to be 
just an extension of the dedicated automation.
Frequently, one robot that operates alone in the sense that 
it is not interfaced with other robots but only with the plant 
equipment which it services is termed a stand-alone unit or 
robot. In this lexicon, a robot system, then, is simply two or 
more robots that are integrated with each other and the plant 
equipment as necessary. Neither stand-alone robots nor
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robot systems require central computer control over the en 
tire operation, although sufficient limit switches are needed. 
Stand-alone robot installations dominate today and will con 
tinue to do so, at least through the mid-1980s; but robot 
systems will likely become more important later in the 
decade.
Some experts think that the greatest potential for robots in 
the future is the automation of small batch production 
facilities. (Ayres and Miller, 1981-82, p. 42) This encom 
passes the ability to reduce batch sizes in production that 
now require mass production or very large batch facilities 
(i.e., dedicated automation). The concept appears to pro 
mise a capability of production of a family of parts or pro 
ducts as the need arises. 1 Such systems are usually called flex 
ible manufacturing systems, but there is no universally ac 
cepted definition. It is unclear how the dedicated machinery 
for fabrication of manufactured articles would be designed 
for these new systems, but computer control appears para 
mount because the automation would require off-line pro 
gramming of robots and possibly other plant equipment to 
switch from batch to batch. Ultimately, the individual flexi 
ble manufacturing systems would be linked together and lead 
to the completely automated factory, what some people ap 
parently mean by the term "factory of the future." 2
However, flexible manufacturing systems will not 
dominate immediately and the completely automated factory 
is even farther in the future. Bela Gold, an economist at Case 
Western Reserve who has studied technological change for 
over 25 years, stresses the many human and economic prob-
1. The forerunners of these systems are machining centers in which one or more robots ser 
vice various numerically controlled machine tools to produce precision-cut metal parts. 
Such machining centers are available today.
2. The terms factory of the future, flexible manufacturing systems and others are en 
countered frequently in the popular media and trade literature, but they have no consensus 
definitions at this point.
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lems in moving toward the factory of the future. (Gold, 
1981a, pp. 30-32, pp. 37-38; and Gold, 1979, pp. 298-302, 
310-314) But there are also numerous technical problems. 
Computer memory systems today are quickly exhausted in 
controlling even a small manufacturing cell, let alone an en 
tire factory. (Albus, pp. 65-67; Alexander, p. 145; and 
Wisnosky, p. 22) The integration of individual automated 
systems in factories involves very complex problems of coor 
dination and transfer. Finally, among the technical problems 
in robots we note that there are no universal grippers, and 
off-line programming has not yet been perfected. (Gevarter, 
p. 37) Today's continuous path robots, for the most part, are 
"taught" their work task by physically moving the 
manipulator through the desired sequence of motions.
Our study is focused on the development and introduction 
of industrial robots and robot systems in manufacturing in 
dustries by 1990. Flexible manufacturing systems, the fac 
tory of the future, etc., are beyond the scope of the study 
because their impacts lie beyond 1990, except on an ex 
perimental basis. We simply do not find that this technology 
is sufficiently close to routine implementation to make ac 
curate predictions of its extent or its impact at this time.
Technological Analogies
Since the robot industry is very young today but does have 
a bright future, it is useful to compare it to other analagous 
technologies. Such analogies do not prove anything, but they 
can provide a perspective with which to assess the likely 
development and diffusion of industrial robots. We briefly 
review the development of digital computers, certainly one 
of the most significant technologies of several decades, and 
numerically controlled machine tools, the most closely 
related capital equipment to industrial robots.
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Before beginning, an important distinction is needed be 
tween product technology and process technology. As the 
names imply, product technology is the specific technology 
that is embedded in a final product, such as calculators or 
TV's, whereas process technology is the technology that is 
embedded in the capital equipment that makes the final pro 
ducts. Robots are definitely process technology and will like 
ly remain so in the foreseeable future. We do not see an early 
development of an extensive home market for robots. This 
distinction is important because there is ample evidence that 
new product technology tends to diffuse more rapidly than 
new process technology. (Gold, 1979, pp. 183-184; 
Mansfield, 1971b, pp. 77 and 84; and Sahal, p. 312)
The growth of digital computers from 1961 to 1979 is 
presented in table 1-1. The year 1961 was selected because 
that was the first year in which shipments of computers ex 
ceeded 2,000 units, roughly the position in which the robot 
industry finds itself today. The annual percentage increase in 
the total population of digital computers averaged 26 percent 
throughout the 19-year period. There were only three years 
in which annual shipments declined from the prior year level: 
1965, 1967, and 1975. Not surprisingly, relative growth was 
slightly higher in the earlier years when the total population 
of computers was smaller, but even in the most recent 
10-year period, 1969-1979, the annual growth in the popula 
tion of computers approximated 24 percent.
What does the growth of computers suggest for the growth 
of industrial robots, if anything? Digital computers can be 
classified as process technology in that the computer is not a 
direct part of the final product (microcomputers for the 
home market are excluded from the data). Rather, the com 
puter provides information processing cost accounting, 
recordkeeping, etc. that in turn supports the production of 
a final product. The revelation is that computers, widely 
heralded as the most significant technological innovation of
16 "The Robots are Coming''
the 1960s and 1970s, expanded at a growth rate of about 25 
percent. Yet some are implying vastly higher growth rates for 
industrial robots.
Table 1-1 
Growth in Digital Computers in the U.S., 1961-1979
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Annual 
shipments 
(thousands)
2.2
2.3
3.0
5.3
5.0
7.9
5.9
9.5
10.3
11.5
14.9
20.8
29.3
37.9
37.4
45.0
68.7
82.1
87.0
Total 
digital 
computers 
(thousands)
7.6
9.9
12.9
18.2
23.2
31.1
37.0
46.5
56.8
68.3
83.2
104.0
133.3
171.2
208.6
253.6
322.3
404.4
491.4
Percentage 
increase in 
total 
population
30.3
30.3
41.1
27.5
34.1
19.0
25.7
22.2
20.2
21.8
25.0
28.2
28.4
21.8
21.6
27.1
25.5
21.5
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Productivity and the 
Economy: A Chartbook, Bulletin 2084, October 1981, p. 100.
There are important differences between computers and 
robots that must be mentioned. It was realized almost from 
the beginning that computers were widely applicable in both
"The Robots are Coming'' 17
business and government, but robots have only limited ap 
plications in the manufacturing sector today. An individual 
firm can potentially use many more robots than computers; 
however, robots are directly applied to the firm's production 
technique. This necessitates careful design, application and 
integration with the existing production process, while com 
puters are really an adjunct to the production process. There 
are obviously many differences between computers and 
robots that make comparisons hazardous, but the fact re 
mains that the growth of the most significant recent innova 
tion in process technology spread or diffused at a rate of 
about 25 percent annually.
The growth of numerically controlled machine tools is ex 
amined because they are more closely related to industrial 
robots. In fact, robots themselves can be regarded as 
machine tools. There is also an interesting parallel to 
robotics technology in the batch production mode. As with 
robots, numerically controlled machine tools were billed as 
capable of bringing mass production cost levels to batch pro 
duction processes because of their great flexibility through 
reprogramming.
Originally, numerical control meant that the machine tool 
(lathe, drill press, milling machine, etc.) was controlled by 
instructions contained on paper tape or cards, while today 
microprocessor control is becoming more common. The air 
craft industry, with research support of the U.S. govern 
ment, developed numerically controlled machine tools to im 
prove the precision of aircraft parts. This new process 
technology became available commercially in the mid-1950s; 
it was widely heralded as applicable in industry anywhere 
metalcutting was done. By the early 1960s, growth in 
employment of machine tool operators was thought to be 
seriously threatened. (Macut, pp. 1-6)
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The actual growth of numerically controlled machine tools 
from 1965 to 1981 is presented in table 1-2. Except for the 
years 1966-68, the growth of numerically controlled machine 
tools remained under 20 percent annually. In fact, in 7 of the 
16 years in the table, annual shipments declined from prior 
year levels. The annual growth rate was about 15 percent for 
the entire period, but averaged only 12 percent for the most 
recent 10-year period. After 25 years, only 3 to 4 percent of 
all metalcutting machine tools are numerically controlled. In 
short, the growth of numerically controlled machine tools 
has been much less than predicted.
There are many reasons why the growth of numerically 
controlled machine tools fell far short of expectations, but 
only three will be mentioned here. First, the applicability of 
numerical control technology to other industries was 
significantly overestimated. It appears to have no advantage 
over conventional machine tooling unless great precision or 
moderate sized batch production (but less than that needed 
for justification of dedicated machine tools) is required. 
(Nabseth and Ray, p. 45; and Mansfield, 1971a, p. 201) 
Clearly, there must be an opportunity to recover the increas 
ed capital investment costs of such technology if it is to be ef 
ficient.
Second, there was a significant lack of knowledge about 
numerical control, and the new technology not only altered 
the basic production structure but also required the new skill 
of programming. (Nabseth and Ray, p. 52; and Mansfield, 
197la, p. 201) Thus the human resource limitations were im 
portant as well. Third, the price of numerical control 
($150,000-$200,000 today for just the hardware) was perceiv 
ed by many small firms as too high. Many small shops sim 
ply do not have the capitalization to afford such in 
vestments. Even as recently as 1978, in a survey done of 
small machine tool firms of 50-100 employees who were 
nonusers of numerical control but likely candidates for
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utilization of the technology, it was found that over 72 per 
cent of the surveyed firms had not even evaluated numerical 
control. (Putnam, p. 100)
Table 1-2
Growth of Numerically Controlled Machine Tools 
in the U.S., 1965-1981
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
Annual 
shipments 
(thousands)
2.1
2.9
3.0
2.9
2.4
1.9
1.2
1.6
2.7
4.2
4.0
3.9
4.5
5.7
7.2
8.9
7.9
Total NC 
machine tools 
(thousands)
8.1
11.0
14.0
16.9
19.3
21.2
22.4
24.0
26.7
30.9
34.9
38.8
43.3
49.0
56.2
65.1
73.0
Percentage 
increase in 
total 
population
35.8
27.3
20.7
14.2
9.8
5.7
7.1
11.3
15.7
12.9
11.2
11.6
13.2
14.7
15.8
12.1
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, "Current Industrial Reports, Series MQ-35W, 
Metalworking Machinery," Annual Summaries, 1965-1980, and Quarterly Summaries, 
1981.
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Once again, too much can be made of the comparison be 
tween numerically controlled machine tools and robots, and 
there are substantial differences as well as similarities. 
However, the growth and diffusion of numerical control il 
lustrates the general obstacles to the rapid diffusion of pro 
cess technology in general. 3
Historical Analogies
The purpose of the foregoing discussion was to develop a 
more rational perspective of technological change by briefly 
looking at two earlier new technologies related to robots, 
whereas the purpose of this section is to briefly discuss 
economic change in general. The fear of unemployment and 
massive displacement caused by labor-saving technology is 
not new. Such fears began with the dawn of the industrial era 
in the late 18th century; they continue today with the growth 
of industrial robots.
For example, the U.S. economy recovered very slowly 
from the deep 1958-59 recession and then experienced 
another recession in 1961. The "automation problem" was 
of urgent national concern, and in 1962 the U.S. Congress 
passed the Manpower Development and Training Act to ad 
dress the retraining needs of technologically displaced 
workers. Then, in 1964, the President appointed a National 
Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic 
Progress to determine the impact of automation and 
technological change on the U.S. economy.
But the economy was already beginning to recover 
significantly in 1964, and by the time the Commission 
rendered its final report in 1966, the economy was near full 
employment. Historical events ultimately obviated the need 
for and impact of the Commission; the problem seemed to
3. The interested reader should consult the recent works of Sahal and Gold listed in the 
bibliography for a review of this literature.
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have gone away. To no one's surprise, the Commission's 
conclusion was that a sluggish economy was the major cause 
of unemployment rather than automation. (Bowen and 
Mangum, pp. 3-4)
The recessionary phase of any business cycle is difficult 
and traumatic for workers, particularly in a state like 
Michigan with its durable goods-oriented economy. The 
clear danger is that we may wrongly attribute the short run 
cyclical problem to other factors, such as automation. 
Walter Buckingham issued a grim forecast at the time of the 
1961 recession: "There are 160,000 unemployed in Detroit 
who will probably never go back to making automobiles, 
partly because the industry is past its peak of growth and 
partly because automation has taken their jobs." (Buck 
ingham, pp. 117-118) Subsequently, however, the auto in 
dustry set new employment peaks in the middle of the 1960s, 
and the auto-dominated Michigan economy boomed once 
again. (Verway, p. 1) We suffered through another such cy 
cle, although attenuated, with the 1974-75 recession. Yet the 
auto industry went on to its all-time peak employment in 
1978.
The general comparison between the early 1960s and the 
early 1980s appears compelling in our judgment. History 
does not and will not repeat itself, but history can provide a 
more objective perspective within which to judge the current 
(new) situation. Employment in the auto industry may not 
recover to its 1978 peak, but employment gains will be 
significant during the recovery phase of the business cycle.
Automation is not the cause of the U.S. or Michigan's 
unemployment today any more than it was in the early 
1960s. That is not to imply that we should take a "rah rah 
robots" approach to the coming technological change; 
however, neither should we adopt a doomsday attitude that 
attributes most or all unemployment during major recessions
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to automation. In fact, one might plausibly argue that some 
of our basic industries suffer more today from a lack of 
automation and the rational organization of that automation 
vis-a-vis our European and Japanese competitors than from 
too much automation.
It is possible to develop a more dispassionate view of 
technological change, or more specifically, of the introduc 
tion of industrial robots. First, let us admit that most 
technological change throughout American history has been 
labor-saving, and that means job displacement. By job 
displacement we mean the elimination of job tasks, not 
necessarily implying worker unemployment. As will be 
discussed later, they are not the same thing by any means.
The powerful job displacing effect of technological change 
is illustrated in table 1-3; it lists hypothetical job displace 
ment in manufacturing in the U.S. and Michigan from 1979 
to 1990, assuming a fixed output and a continuation of the 
slow annual growth in output per worker experienced in the 
late 1970s of 2.1 percent. (U.S. Department of Labor, 1981c, 
p. 24) The base year employment for the calculations is 1978. 
Under the unrealistic assumption of constant output, if the 
annual growth in output per worker of 2.1 percent continues 
throughout the decade of the 1980s, then cumulative job 
displacement by 1990 will approximate 4.6 million in the 
U.S. and 265,000 jobs in manufacturing in Michigan.
Stated in relative terms, 22 percent of all existing jobs in 
manufacturing could disappear by 1990 as a result of in 
creases in productivity. Of course, worker productivity gains 
are not solely the result of new labor-saving technologies, 
but the total effect is the same; gains in productivity, 
whatever the source, can cause considerable and sometimes 
dramatic displacement effects on the existing job base if they 
are examined in isolation.
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Table 1-3
Illustrative Displacement Impact of General 
Productivity Gains, Michigan and U.S. Manufacturing
Cumulative displacement
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Michigan
24,772
49,023
72,765
96,009
118,764
141,042
162,852
184,204
205,107
225,571
245,606
265,220
U.S.
430,605
852,167
1,264,876
1,668,919
2,064,477
2,451,728
2,830,847
3,202,004
3,565,367
3,921,099
4,269,361
4,610,309
NOTE: The 1978 base year employment figures are 1,179,600 for Michigan and 20,505,000 
for the U.S., as found in U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employ 
ment and Earnings, May 1981, pp. 39 and 125.
Second, the dramatic job displacing effects of 
technological change have not caused massive unemploy 
ment in the American economic system because in normal 
times they have been accompanied by significant economic 
growth, i.e., output has not been constant. Displaced 
workers are reemployed in other sectors of the economy, or 
they may gain new jobs in the same firm if demand increases 
sufficiently after the introduction of new technology. The 
heart of the problem appears to be the perception that there 
is only a constant amount of work to be done, so a machine 
or robot eliminates not only the job task but also the need 
for that worker. Historically, this has not generally been 
true.
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Third, the association of technological change and 
economic growth is not just a coincidence; the two are inter 
twined and inseparable. That is not to imply that adoption of 
new technologies necessarily insures economic growth, or 
that displaced workers will always find new jobs. However, 
it does mean that we all have a vital stake in productivity 
gains (i.e., in displacing jobs) because that is what allows the 
possibility of economic growth. The price of a growing, 
dynamic economy that raises incomes and makes more 
goods and services available to all of us is job displacement, 
or the elimination of jobs through technological change.
Fourth, although the long-run impact of technological 
change has been favorable on the American economy, job 
displacement in the short run can be traumatic for the 
workers involved, who usually are concentrated 
geographically and occupationally. Displaced workers may 
find it difficult to learn new tasks. Severely impacted regions 
may not have the resources to cope with those displaced. Job 
displacement in the short run may require significant public 
and/or private retraining efforts. Furthermore, the public 
education system must insure that entry-level workers 
possess the requisite new skills and not old, obsolete skills.
Finally, we must guard against the temptation to view 
technological change as revolutionary; the fear that tomor 
row we will awaken to the unmanned factory and a world of 
robots without workers. Technological change tends to be 
evolutionary, especially in process technology. There are 
physical, financial, and human constraints on the rate of 
change of process technology. While no one would dispute 
that computers have changed our world, this has taken a 
quarter of a century.
In summary, industrial robots are simply one more piece 
of automated industrial equipment, part of the long history 
of automation of production. Robots will displace workers
''The Robots are Coming'' 25
in the same way that technological change has always 
displaced workers. There is a possibility that this job 
displacement will be a significant problem, particularly in 
given occupations, industries, or geographical areas. These 
questions are examined later in the study. There is also the 
certainty that robots will create jobs, and that also is examin 
ed later in the study. Robots will not guarantee economic 
growth and we cannot be assured that displaced workers will 
be reemployed, although there is reason for some optimism 
historically. In the short run, there will likely be some worker 
dislocation, and that dislocation may be concentrated 
geographically. Policy issues raised by these changes will be 
addressed after their magnitude is determined.
The Carnegie-Mellon Study
We conclude this chapter with a discussion of the only 
study which has examined the job displacement impacts of 
robots in great detail, the Carnegie-Mellon study. Actually 
the Carnegie-Mellon study is not one published document, 
but several that originated from a project in which Robert 
Ayres and Steven Miller were the principal investigators. 
(Ayres and Miller, 198la)
The fundamental basis of the job displacement estimates 
of Ayres and Miller is a survey of corporate users of robots 
(with 16 respondents) that asked them to provide estimates 
of potential job displacement in 32 occupations by today's 
commercially available robots (Level 1) and tomorrow's 
robots that would be sensor-based with rudimentary tactile 
and/or visual perception (Level 2). The occupations were 
chosen by Ayres and Miller as those most likely to be 
robotized. The responses were weighted by size of firm (six 
classes) to obtain a weighted average response. These sam 
pled occupations were then combined with other nonsampl- 
ed occupations (based on similarity) and job displacement
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estimates were derived for the metalworking sector and for 
all manufacturing.
Perhaps Ayres and Miller best summarize their conclu 
sions in a Technology Review article:
Based on these results, we estimate that Level 1 
robots could theoretically replace about 1 million 
operators, and Level 2 robots could theoretically 
replace 3 million of a current total of 8 million 
operators. However, this displacement will take at 
least 20 years. By 2025, it is conceivable that more 
sophisticated robots will replace almost all 
operators in manufacturing (about 8 percent of to 
day's workforce), as well as a number of routine 
nonmanufacturing jobs. (Ayres and Miller, 1982b, 
p. 42)
According to Ayres and Miller, 4 million manufacturing 
operative jobs are subject to robotization over the next 20 
years or more, and all operatives in manufacturing may be 
replaced by 2025. The emphasis is clearly on theoretical 
displacement in the indefinite future rather than actual or 
probable displacement by some specific date.
We doubt that production techniques, even theoretically, 
are as homogeneous across manufacturing as Ayres and 
Miller imply; by industry, by size of firm, or by type of pro 
duct. But those doubts are minor in the context of theoretical 
estimation of the unbounded future. As Ayres and Miller 
themselves point out, their estimates are really only rough 
guesses to obtain "a feeling of how many people will be in 
volved in 'first order' adjustment processes." (Ayres and 
Miller, 1981a, p. 100)
Ayres and Miller go on to conclude that their study has 
highly significant policy implications. They talk of an "in 
stitutional failure" in that our public education and training
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programs reflect obsolete rather than emerging needs. (Ayres 
and Miller, 198la, pp. 22-23) They are particularly critical of 
CETA, vocational schools and government occupational 
forecasters, none of which in their opinion recognize the 
future employment needs of society. (Ayres and Miller, 
1982a, p. 21) Ayres and Miller conclude, "the transition to 
the factory of the future is occurring now. ... If ap 
propriate measures are not taken, the nation will experience 
unnecessary economic distress and lost opportunities." 
(Ayres and Miller, 1982b, p. 46)
We do not concur with Ayres and Miller that their 
estimates of theoretical displacement by occupation at some 
undefined point in the future are proof that our public in 
stitutions today are training their clientele in obsolete skills. 
Furthermore, Ayres and Miller offer no evidence whatsoever 
about the emerging occupations, so their criticism in that 
regard is especially puzzling. In our judgment, if policy 
responses to the challenges of the future are to be for 
mulated, including the possible effects of robotics 
technology, then the assessment must proceed based upon 
the most likely or probable events that are expected to occur 
within a definite time horizon. That is what we will endeavor 
to do in the remainder of the study.

2
Forecasts of the 
Robot Population
Unlike the Carnegie-Mellon study, the projections of oc 
cupational displacement in this study are the result of first 
forecasting the U.S. robot population by industry and ap 
plication areas within those industries. This approach con 
strains the displacement estimates to reflect the actual ex 
pected sales of robots. In this way, a consistent economic 
framework is established within which it is possible to 
estimate not only the population of robots and job displace 
ment but also the job creation resulting therefrom. The job 
displacement and job creation aspects of the development of 
robotics are discussed in chapters 3 and 4 respectively.
In this chapter, various other forecasts of the robot 
population which are inputs to our forecasts are discussed 
first. Then, the specific methodology of this study to 
forecast the population of robots is developed. That includes 
selection of the projection date, robot application areas, user 
industries, and alternative growth scenarios. Next, our 
forecast of the U.S. robot population is discussed. Finally, 
the link of our forecast of the U.S. robot population and the 
Michigan robot population is established and the resultant 
estimates presented.
There are quite a few forecasts of the growth in the robot 
population available today. Some of the more prominent
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overall forecasts are discussed first. Then, three forecasts 
that provide more detailed information about application 
areas and/or user industries are examined: the General 
Motors corporate forecast, the University of 
Michigan/Society of Manufacturing Engineering Delphi 
forecast, hereafter shortened to the UM/SME Delphi 
forecast, and a forecast of the impact of robots on the U.S. 
auto industry by William R. Tanner and William F. 
Adolfson.
General Forecasts of the Robot Population
There are no official U.S. government statistics on the 
robotics industry. The Robot Institute of America (RIA), the 
trade association of robot manufacturers and corporate user 
firms, estimated the U.S. robot population at the end of 
1981 to be 4,700 units, approximately 20 percent of the 
worldwide total. (Robot Institute of America, p. 2) Laura 
Conigliaro, one of the leading investment analysts of the 
robotics industry and author of a continuing newsletter 
about robotics, estimated 1981 unit sales at 2,100 with a 
dollar value of $150 million. (Conigliaro, June 19, 1981, p. 
8) Conigliaro points out that the sales revenue of robot 
manufacturers includes robots and related items such as con 
trols, software, applications engineering, and sometimes 
other peripheral hardware systems. The data problems are 
even more complicated because robot manufacturing may be 
only a small division of a much larger firm, leading to a lack 
of accounting uniformity in any robot sales estimates. In 
fact, Conigliaro stresses that past sales of robots are 
themselves only estimates, such as her figure for 1980 of 
1,450 units with a dollar value of $100 million. (Conigliaro, 
June 19, 1981, p. 2)
Sales expectations for robots in 1982 were originally quite 
high for a number of reasons. First, the sales growth rate in 
terms of revenue was approximately 50 percent in 1981. Sec-
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ond, attendance at the industry trade show, Robotics VI, 
held in Detroit in March 1982, surpassed even the most op 
timistic projections. (Jablonowski, pp. 163-178) Third, there 
had been a flurry of announcements by major firms planning 
robot production General Motors, General Electric, IBM, 
United Technologies, Westinghouse, and Bendix Corpora 
tion, to name only a few of the potential entrants. Not sur 
prisingly, the industry also has captured considerable media 
attention in the last year, which may have fueled public ex 
pectations even further.
The media attention notwithstanding, most 
knowledgeable industry people were not misled. In our inter 
views, robot manufacturers, robot users, and other robotics 
experts indicated considerable dismay at the media focus and 
concern that the industry had caught the public's fancy at the 
very moment that sales were lagging. As early as March 19, 
1982, shortly after the Robotics VI conference, Iron Age, a 
respected trade journal of the metalworking sector, 
presented an analysis of the robotics industry as one that had 
indeed been popularized, but one which was short on orders. 
(Obrzut, pp. 59-83) It is also true that the lack of a signifi 
cant economic recovery anytime in 1982 and continued 
weakness in the domestic auto industry surprised most of 
American industry, including robotics, and may have caused 
unexpected cancellation of some robot orders, delay in 
others, and failure to close many prospective sales.
We believe 1982 robot sales were approximately the same 
as those in 1981, or perhaps slightly higher. If this is correct, 
then the U.S. robot population at 1982 year-end was about 
6,800-7,000 units, utilizing RIA's 1981 base of 4,700 units. 1 
Actual 1982 robot sales may appear disappointing to some, 
but in our judgment, flat sales or modestly rising sales in the 
face of a longer than expected recession reflects economic
1. The RIA estimate is not universally accepted, but it is representative.
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strength. The lesson of 1982 is that robotics, as part of the 
capital goods sector, cannot expect to be immune from reces 
sions. The vulnerability of the robotics industry to recessions 
will likely increase as robotics expenditures become a more 
important (and postponable) part of the capital investment 
plans of user firms.
Overall forecasts of the growth of the robotics industry 
usually terminate in 1990. For the convenience of the reader 
and due to the importance of 1990 in our projections, 
selected estimates of 1990 sales, average annual growth rates, 
and the cumulative population of robots in 1990 are 
presented in table 2-1. They are representative of public 
sources frequently quoted and respected in the industry. 2 
Since there is not universal agreement on the current popula 
tion of robots, comparison of average annual growth rates 
may be less meaningful than looking at the expected popula 
tion of robots.
The available estimates of robot sales and population are 
roughly similar. Conigliaro forecasts a 1990 market of over 
$2 billion, 31,350 unit robot sales, and a population of U.S. 
robots of approximately 122,000. Paul Aron of Daiwa 
Securities, a leading American expert on the Japanese 
robotics industry, forecasts a 1990 market in the U.S. of 
21,575 units worth about $1.9 billion. (Aron, 1981, p. 60) 
Aron's 1980-1985-1990 sales figures can be extrapolated to 
obtain 1990 U.S. robot population of 94,000-95,000. The 
UM/SME Delphi forecast, details of which are discussed 
later, foresees a 1990 or 1991 market of approximately 
33,333 units which implies a U.S. population of robots of
2. There are other forecasts available, primarily private market studies by such firms as 
Frost and Sullivan, International Resources Development, Predicasts, and others. We did 
not have primary access to these documents and did not wish to possibly unfairly 
characterize them by quoting secondary sources. Suffice it to say that these private market 
studies tend to be optimistic and project 100,000 or more units installed by 1990.
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well over 100,000 in 1990 or 1991. 3 Joseph Engelberger, the 
father of robotics and president of Unimation, Inc., the na 
tion's leading robot manufacturer, predicts an average an 
nual industry growth rate of 35 percent, with possibly 40,000 
unit market sales in 1990. (Engelberger, p. 115) Finally, the 
RIA, in its own survey, foresees a U.S. robot population of 
75,000-100,000 units in 1990. (Robot Institute of America, 
P. 30)
The overall forecasts of the development of the robotics 
industry are informative and valuable. However, more 
specific information is needed to provide occupational and 
industrial specificity for our study. For that reason the GM 
corporate forecast, the UM/SME Delphi forecast and the 
forecast by Tanner and Adolfson are presented.
General Motors Forecast
The GM corporate forecast is presented in table 2-2. 
General Motors plans to increase the number of robots in use 
from its 1980 total of 302 to 14,000 in 1990 for an average 
annual growth rate of 47 percent. As of April 1982, General 
Motors reported a total of 1,758 robots available (in house 
or in use). Unfortunately, it is not possible to determine ex 
actly how many are actually in operation, but the goal of 
1983 would appear to be well within reach.
Beyond 1983, the GM goals may be more challenging. In a 
government report about the status of the U.S. auto industry 
released in late 1981 in which three agencies participated, it is 
suggested that the length and severity of the slump in the
3. The Delphi estimates are derived from information in the study. Robot sales in 1990-91 
are nearly $2 billion, the average price is $30,000 in terms of 1980 dollars, 40 percent of all 
robot sales are a part of systems, and the robot is 30 percent of the cost of the systems. 
Thus, the nearly $2 billion in robot sales consists of $.6 billion in stand-alone units, $.4 
billion packaged for systems, and $933 million of other systems hardware. The $1 billion in 
sales of robots only (excluding the other systems hardware) can then be divided by the 
average price of $30,000 to obtain 33,333 units sales in 1990-91.
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auto industry has resulted in a serious erosion of the finan 
cial strength of the auto firms. (U.S. Department of Com 
merce, pp. 1 and 7) Postponement of some modernizing in 
vestments for purposes of increasing productivity (such as 
robots) may be necessary in order to preserve the industry's 
liquidity. (U.S. Department of Commerce, p. 8)
Table 2-1
Selected Estimates of 1990 Sales, Population 
and Growth Rates of Robots in the U.S.
Source
Conigliaro3 
Aronb
UM/SME
Delphi0 
Engelbergerd
RIAe
Unit
sales 
1990
31,350
21,575
33,333 
40,000
-
Value
(billions) 
(1980 $)
2.0 + 
1.9
2.0 +
-
1980-90
annual
growth rate 
(percent)
38 
36
45 
35
35-39
Cumulative 
population
122,000 
94-95,000
150,000 
150,000
75-100,000
NOTE: The 1980-90 annual growth rate and the cumulative population in 1990 are not 
necessarily stated directly in all of these studies but can be calculated from data that are 
provided.
a. Laura Conigliaro, Robotics Newsletter, Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., January 15, 
1982, p. 7 and June 19, 1981, p. 8.
b. Paul Aron, "Robots Revisited: One Year Later," in Exploratory Workshop on the 
Social Impacts of Robotics: Summary and Issues, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, July 1981, p. 34.
c. Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast of 
Markets and Technology, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan, 1982, 
pp. 47-51, and Donald N. Smith, Peter G. Heytler, and Murry D. Wikol, "Sociological Ef 
fects of the Introduction of Robots in U.S. Manufacturing Industry," Industrial Develop 
ment Division, Institute of Science and Technology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan. Unpublished paper presented at the CAMPRO '82 Conference on Computer 
Aided Manufacturing and Productivity, October 1982, p. 7.
d. Joseph L. Engelberger, Robotics in Practice, American Management Association, 
AMACOM Press, New York, 1980, p. 115.
e. Robot Institute of America, RIA Worldwide Survey and Directory on Industrial Robots, 
Dearborn, Michigan, 1981, p. 30.
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Table 2-2 
Projected Robot Applications in General Motors
Number of robots in use
Application
Welding (Arc and Spot)
Painting
Assembly
Machine Loading
Parts Transfer
Total
1980
138
47
17
68
32
302
1983
1,000
300
675
200
125
2,300
1985
1,700
650
1,200
1,200
250
5,000
1988
2,500
1,200
3,200
2,600
500
10,000
1990
2,700
1,500
5,000
4,000
800
14,000
SOURCE: GM Technical Center, Robotics Display, April 1982.
In 1982 there have been media reports of a slowdown in 
robot acquisitions at GM and other auto firms due to the 
lack of financial capital, ("A Robotics Mecca in Michigan? 
Car Sales Must Rebound First") yet GM must more than 
double yearly acquisitions from 600-700 to almost 1,500 to 
meet its 1985 goal. If GM is to meet its robot installation 
goals, the need for some recovery in the auto industry is ap 
parent. From a slightly different vantage point, near term 
goals are aided by a major retooling effort that GM commit 
ted itself to several years ago, while long term efforts require 
an increasing share of available financial capital and 
therefore both a larger management and manpower commit 
ment to robot applications.
Insofar as the details of GM's forecast of their robot 
population are concerned, GM anticipates a significant and 
dramatic shift in specific application areas. Welding robots 
represent almost two-thirds of GM's installations today, 
while they will be slightly less than one-fifth of the installa 
tions in 1990. In contrast, assembly robots, an almost in 
significant portion of the total now will grow to over one- 
third of the total by 1990. The growth in painting and
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machine loading is more steady. However, new installations 
of both painting and welding robots will level off well before 
1990, while almost one-half of the new installations in that 
same year will be assembly robots.
There are a number of important implications of the GM 
plans. First, notice that of the 14,000 robots GM expects to 
have by 1990, approximately 64 percent will be installed after 
1985. This fact alone should emphasize the uncertainties and 
conditional nature of these plans. Second, early arguments 
for robots have concentrated on elimination of dirty and 
dangerous tasks. That argument will carry less weight as 
robots diffuse to assembly operations and become even more 
important in machine loading. Third, given that GM expects 
to install 76 percent of its assembly robots after 1985, it ap 
pears that successful application of assembly robots in large 
numbers awaits technological developments and/or 
reorganization of the factory floor.
UM/SME Delphi Forecast
The UM/SME Delphi forecast of industrial robots, 
authored by Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson 
represents another important contribution to our under 
standing of robotics. The current UM/SME Delphi forecast 
reports results of three rounds of questioning on many 
technical, marketing, and sociological aspects of the 
development of industrial robots. Over 200 questions were 
asked in round one, while rounds two and three repeated 
some questions of round one as well as adding supplemental 
questions suggested by the experts. The total number of par 
ticipants ranged from 36 to 60, with as many as 90 percent 
from corporate user firms.
The Delphi technique itself is an iterative forecasting pro 
cess in which experts independently input their own forecasts 
of the future by responding to a consistent series of ques-
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tions. The objective of the Delphi methodology is to gain 
consensus through iterative polling. The assumption is that 
the collective opinion of the group is better than that of any 
single person. It should be mentioned that the current 
UM/SME Delphi forecast is an interim report and does not 
yet meet the usual Delphi requirements for consensus and 
precision.
One pertinent aspect of the UM/SME Delphi forecast for 
our study is a ranking of the importance of various robot ap 
plication areas by industry for 1980, 1985, and 1990. Tables 
2-3 and 2-4 summarize these rankings for all industry and for 
autos. Once again, the growth in importance of assembly ap 
plications is clear, particularly in autos.
It is even more interesting to examine the percentage or 
relative usage of robots by application areas and industry. 
Since the percentage shares remain more or less stable, table 
2-5 presents the results for 1990 only. However, it does in 
clude all of the industries specified in the UM/SME Delphi 
forecast autos, casting/foundry, heavy manufacturing, 
light manufacturing, electrical/electronic, and the aerospace 
industry. Although the UM/SME Delphi forecast defined 
the robot application areas differently here from in the rank 
ings just discussed, it is apparent that welding and painting 
are more important in autos than elsewhere, while machine 
loading, press loading, and drilling, routing, and grinding 
are slightly less important in autos.
Finally, the UM/SME Delphi estimates of the total 
relative market shares by industry, i.e., the percent of total 
robot shipments to each of the industrial sectors, are 
presented in table 2-6 for all of the years reported in the 
UM/SME Delphi forecast. The auto industry is expected to 
remain a stable part of the market with slightly less than one- 
fourth of all shipments. Light manufacturing is expected to 
have a somewhat larger share, although the UM/SME
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Table 2-3
Delphi Forecast: Rank Importance of Robot Application 
Areas in All Industry, 1980-1990
_______Application_________1980 1985 1990
Pick-and-Place 1 1 1
Machine Loading 2 1 1
Continuous Path (e.g., paint, weld) 331 
Manufacturing Processing
(e.g., drilling) 455
Assembly 544
Inspection 666
SOURCE: Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast 
of Markets and Technology, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan, 
1982, p. 52. 
NOTE: Ranked from most frequent (1) to least frequent (6).
Table 2-4
Delphi Forecast: Rank Importance of Robot Application 
Areas in the Auto Industry, 1980-1990
_______Application_________1980 1985 1990
Pick-and-Place 334 
Machine Loading 222 
Continuous Path (e.g., paint, weld) 1 1 1 
Manufacturing Processing
(e.g., drilling) 455 
Assembly 42 
Inspection ____ __________6_____6_____6
SOURCE: Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast 
of Markets and Technology, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan, 
1982, p. 53. 
NOTE: Ranked from most frequent (1) to least frequent (6).
Table 2-5
Delphi Forecast: Relative Importance of Robot 
Application Areas by Industry, 1990
Percentage of robots within industry
Application
Gas/Metal & Arc Welding
Resistance Welding
Machine Loading
Painting
Press Loading/Unloading
Drilling, Routing, Grinding
Other
Total
Automotive
11
17
23
14
11
11
11
100
Casting/
foundry
6
6
33
6
22
16
11
100
Heavy
manu 
facturing
12
6
23
12
23
12
12
100
Light
manu 
facturing
9
11
23
11
17
11
17
100
category
Electrical/
electronic
9
4
27
9
13
16
22
100
Aerospace
5
21
16
11
11
21
16
100
SOURCE: Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast of Markets and Technology, Society of Manufactur 
ing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan, 1982, pp. 56-58. 
NOTE: Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding.
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Table 2-6
Delphi Forecast: Percent of Total Robot Shipments 
by Industry
Industry
Automotive
Casting/Foundry
Heavy Manufacturing
Light Manufacturing
Electrical/Electronic
Aerospace
Other
All Industry
1979
17.8
21.3
9.9
36.6
11.1
0.9
2.4
100.0
1980
20.0
19.4
9.7
33.3
11.1
1.1
5.4
100.0
1981
22.2
20.0
8.9
33.3
9.8
1.3
4.5
100.0
1982
23.3
20.0
8.3
33.3
11.7
1.7
1.7
100.0
1983
23.3
14.0
8.1
27.9
9.3
2.1
15.3
100.0
1984
23.3
13.3
7.5
31.7
10.0
2.1
12.1
100.0
1985
22.5
11.3
6.3
25.0
8.1
2.0
24.8
100.0
SOURCE: Donald N. Smith and Richard C. Wilson, Industrial Robots: A Delphi Forecast of Markets and Technology, Society of Manufactur 
ing Engineers, Dearborn, Michigan, 1982, p. 51.
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Delphi forecast does not provide a specific definition for this 
industry. Notice also the small market shares expected for 
aerospace and the electrical/electronic industries.
Tanner and Adolfson Forecast
William R. Tanner, a robotics expert and engineering con 
sultant, and William F. Adolfson have conducted a study of 
the application of robots in the North American motor vehi 
cle industry for the U.S. Department of Transportation. The 
report presents a wealth of information about robots in the 
auto industry not obtainable from any other source.
The estimates by Tanner and Adolfson of the North 
American robot population in autos for various years are 
presented in table 2-7. These projections are classified ac 
cording to various assumptions about conditions in the auto 
industry and the nation. The "minimum effort" estimates 
assume continuation of the status quo which includes lagging 
auto sales and strong foreign competition, at least through 
the mid-1980s. The "moderate effort" estimates assume a 
modest recovery in the domestic auto market and some 
decline in interest rates. The "strong effort" estimates in 
clude the moderate effort assumptions and add assumed im 
provements in general investment incentives such as tax 
credits and accelerated depreciation allowances. They also 
anticipate advances in robotics technology which might in 
clude low-cost sensory feedback systems. Finally, the "max 
imum effort" estimates assume, in addition to the foregoing, 
direct investment incentives for robots and government pro 
vision of retraining/relocation assistance for displaced 
workers. In sum, Tanner and Adolfson forecast a 1990 robot 
population in the North American auto industry ranging 
from a low of 18,500 units to a high of 35,700 units.
Tanner and Adolfson also present representative cost 
breakdowns for a single robot installation for machine
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loading and for a major robot welding system. These detail 
ed estimates are presented in tables 2-8 and 2-9, respectively. 
The single installation carries a price tag of $125,000, while 
the major system of 12 robots costs $2.5 million. The specific 
cost estimates are not as important as the fact that even in 
the case of a single robot installation (frequently called a 
stand-alone robot), the robot itself represents less than one- 
half of the total cost of the installation. That percentage 
shrinks to one-third or less in the case of a major robot 
system. Tanner and Adolfson project the auto industry may 
have a cumulative investment in robots of $2.3 to $4.0 billion 
by 1990.
Table 2-7
Tanner and Adolfson: Projected Industrial Robot Population 
in North American Automobile Industry, 1980-1990
Assumption 1980 1983 1985 1988 1990
Minimum effort
Moderate effort
Strong effort
Maximum effort
1,065
1,065
1,065
1,065
2,600
4,050
4,500
4,500
4,700
7,500
10,000
11,200
10,800
16,200
20,000
25,000
18,500
22,600
28,000
35,700
SOURCE: William R. Tanner and William F. Adolfson, Robotics Use in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacture, Report to the U.S. Department of Transportation, February 1982, p. 100.
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All of the available forecasts were valuable aids in the 
development of our methodology and forecasts. Not surpris 
ingly, however, none were exactly compatible with our need 
to project application areas with specific occupational and 
industrial content. This was especially true in view of the 
need to apply those estimates to the State of Michigan. Fur 
thermore, it is clear, regardless of the desire of policymakers 
and others for detailed information about the future of 
robots, that only general and tentative information is possi 
ble today.
Table 2-8
Tanner and Adolfson: Cost Elements of Typical 
Single Robot Installation for Machine Tending
Element
Robot
System design
End-of-arm tooling
Conveyors and part orienters
Controls and interfacing
Safety devices, guard rails, etc.
Rearrangements and site
preparation
Equipment relocation
and revision
System installation, robot
programming and debugging
Personnel training
Efficiency and production
losses during start-up
Total
Representative
cost
(thousands)
55
10
5
15
7
5
5
5
5
3
10
$125
Percent of
total systems
costs
44
8
4
12
6
4
4
4
4
2
8
100
SOURCE: William R. Tanner and William F. Adolfson, Robotics Use in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacture, Report to the U.S. Department of Transportation, February 1982, p. 42.
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Table 2-9
Tanner and Adolfson: Cost Elements of Typical 
Major Robot System for Body Assembly Welding
Element
Twelve robots
System design
Welding guns, trans 
formers and controls
Conveyors
Locating and positioning
fixturing
Controls and interfacing
Safety devices, guard rails, etc.
Site preparation
System assembly, tryout
and shipping
System installation, robot
programming and debugging
Personnel training
Efficiency and production
losses during start-up
Total
Representative 
cost 
(thousands)
850
250
150
150
250
200
50
150
250
100
25
75
$2,500
Percent of 
total systems 
costs
34
10
6
6
10
8
2
6
10
4
1
3
100
SOURCE: William R. Tanner and William F. Adolfson, Robotics Use in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacture, Report to the U.S. Department of Transportation, February 1982, p. 41.
Upjohn Institute Forecast
The purpose of this section is to present our forecasts of 
the 1990 U.S. robot population and the Michigan robot 
population. That requires selection of a projection date, 
economic scenarios, robot application areas, and user in 
dustries. Second, a logical relationship between the robot 
population in the U.S. and the State of Michigan is 
developed to specifically estimate Michigan's robot popula 
tion.
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Methodology
Unquestionably, the easiest methodological decision was 
the selection of a projection date. Few forecasts of the im 
pacts of robotics have ventured beyond 1990. Post-1990 
technology is problematical, and it is difficult enough just to 
project the impact of an infant industry to that date. In 
short, the terminal projection date of this study of the 
human resource implications of robotics is 1990.
Single point estimates of future unit sales of robots, dollar 
value of sales, and population of robots are inadvisable. Our 
judgment is that such specificity is misleading, however well- 
intentioned the estimates may be. Consider, for instance, the 
impact of a 5 percent variation in Engelberger's expected 35 
percent average annual growth rate in the population of 
robots, 1983-1990, assuming the 1982 year-end stock ap 
proximates 6,800. If the growth rate is 30 percent (a healthy 
growth trend for any industry) the stock of robots at the end 
of 1990 is 55,470. On the other hand, with a growth rate of 
40 percent, the stock of robots at the end of 1990 would be 
100,354. A variation of plus or minus 5 percent around 
Engelberger's expected growth rate of 35 percent causes 
nearly a 100 percent variation in the 1990 stock of robots. Of 
course, such a result reflects the small existing stock of 
robots and the assumption of exponential growth. 
Nonetheless, this example clearly illustrates the difficulty 
with point estimates for the population of robots.
Two scenarios are developed in this study. The low-growth 
scenario for robotics assumes relatively high interest rates 
and slow real GNP growth, approximating the late 1970s an 
nual average of 2.0 percent. The implications for the auto in 
dustry in the low-growth scenario are some recovery of 
domestic auto sales from their current depressed levels, but 
failure to achieve the vigorous rebound that has so often 
characterized auto sales in the past. The high-growth
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scenario for robotics envisions further interest rate declines 
and real GNP growth that approximates the post-World War 
II annual average of 3.5 percent.
Neither scenario includes any specific assumptions of 
breakthroughs in robotics technology, although clearly, as 
will be pointed out later, the growth in importance of 
assembly robots requires some technological improvements. 
There are three reasons why specific technological assump 
tions appear unwise. First, the available economic research 
indicates that there can be a considerable lag between a 
specific technological breakthrough and successful 
marketing of the resultant product, particularly in the case 
of process technology. 4 Second, the same economic research 
indicates there can be considerable delay in application of 
new process technology across industries even after suc 
cessful adoption in one industry. The reason is that the 
technical requirements of each industry tend to be unique, 
and cross-industry adoption frequently requires further 
adaptation of the original process. Third, as stated by the 
Chairman of the Board of Prab Robots, Inc., "the present 
level of robot technology seems to be much more than U.S. 
industry can readily absorb." (Prab Robots, Inc. Annual 
Report, 1981, p. 4)
The implication, strongly confirmed by our interviews, is 
that diffusion of robotics technology will be limited more by 
a lack of human understanding of the existing technology 
than by a lack of new hardware. Perhaps surprisingly, this 
lack of understanding applies even to the major corporate 
user firms of today, including the auto industry. In any 
event, it appears unwise and unnecessary to make any 
specific technological assumptions for the forecast period, 
except as already noted.
4. See the works of Mansfield, Sahal and Gold for an elaboration of these points.
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Several other factors specifically included in our alter 
native growth scenarios must also be mentioned. First, con 
tinued strong foreign competition in autos is expected 
throughout the decade. Second, special investment incen 
tives for robots are unlikely. Third, there is the usual caveat 
about unforeseen economy-wide shocks that may completely 
invalidate the forecast.
In short, our low-growth scenario for robotics presumes a 
continuation of slow GNP growth, lagging auto sales, and 
high interest rates, while the high-growth scenario maintains 
a return to our historical GNP growth trend and decline in 
interest rates to more reasonable levels as well. Obviously, 
the extremes of major economic depression or "booming" 
reindustrialization are avoided.
The selection of specific robot application areas to be 
enumerated in this study is important because the applica 
tion areas must have related occupational content to be 
meaningful. The need for occupational content coincident 
with available data restricts the application areas to five in 
the study: welding, assembly, painting, machine 
loading/unloading, and other. Clearly, more specificity 
would be desirable, but it is necessary to develop the robot 
data in a way that maximizes the comparability with employ 
ment data. Thus it seems preferable to aggregate robot ap 
plication areas somewhat differently from other authors for 
our purposes.
The robot application area of welding includes resistance 
or spot welding and arc welding. Resistance welding applica 
tions dominate in industry today, especially in autos. Utiliza 
tion of arc welding robots will grow in the 1980s now that 
seam-following arc welding robots are available, although 
there is still some disagreement about the likely extent of that 
growth.
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Assembly robots exist in research and development 
laboratories and pilot applications in industry, but most 
assembly operations are incredibly complex for today's 
robots. The future importance of assembly robots depends 
on several intertwined factors: the adequacy of sensory 
perception, adaptability to the workplace environment, and 
the rationalization or orderliness of the workplace environ 
ment. Rudimentary vision systems are available, but adap 
tability remains extremely limited and reliability has yet to be 
conclusively demonstrated in an industrial environment. In 
part, it is simply a problem of consistency the robot or 
robots must assemble a workpiece of perhaps 8 to 16 parts 
(or more) perfectly for 14 hours a day.
In a joint project, Unimation and General Motors have 
developed a robot for small parts assembly called the Pro 
grammable Universal Machine for Assembly (PUMA). In 
itial applications of the PUMA robot are now in progress. 
Engelberger describes these robots as designed to do 
automotive subassemblies; they will work alongside their 
human counterparts doing the simpler assembly tasks. 
(Engelberger, p. 137) He also believes that assembly robots 
are closer to reality than any other new application. 
(Engelberger, pp. 134-135)
The robot application area of painting includes robots that 
are capable of spray painting and application of other 
finishes, coatings, and sealants. It should be noted that the 
workplace environment here is particularly unhealthy for 
human workers. In addition, consistency of the final product 
can be improved with robot application, and significant sav 
ings in materials are also reported. Painting now ranks with 
welding as a proven robot application.
The application area of machine loading/unloading is very 
broad in this study. It encompasses casting, forging, press 
loading, machine tool loading, and heat treatment. Machine
Forecasts of the Robot Population 49
loading robots are currently more important, both absolute 
ly and relatively, outside the auto industry, and that relation 
ship is expected to continue.
The final category of "other" includes robots that are 
used primarily for parts transfer or material handling, in 
spection and other new application areas. The auto industry 
does not foresee a large role for robots in parts transfer in 
their operations, but the possibilities may be significant in 
other manufacturing areas.
The specific application areas of robots are closely related 
to the industries that will most likely use robots. Virtually all 
robots today can be found in the manufacturing sector, and 
that is not expected to change significantly in the forecast 
period. In this study, industrial detail is shown for autos and 
all other manufacturing only. The dichotomy of autos and 
all other manufacturing was chosen for a number of reasons. 
First, considerably more information is available about the 
auto industry. It is not only the largest current user of 
robots, but also the auto firms have publicly announced their 
future plans for utilization of robots. Second, the auto in 
dustry is dominant in the State of Michigan, and it is only in 
the auto industry that robots will have a significant impact in 
the state during the forecast period, as discussed later. Third, 
since the auto industry is beset with such severe problems 
and challenges at the present time, it may well serve as a pro 
totype for the general impact of robotics on manufacturing 
technology in the U.S.
U.S. Robot Population in 1990
Our forecast of the U.S. robot population by application 
and industry is presented in table 2-10. Although we utilized 
all available information in formulating these projections, 
including other forecasts and our interviews with leading ex 
perts in the industry, the forecast represents our own judg-
Table 2-10
Forecast of U.S. Robot Population 
by Application, 1990 •n o
Autos
Application
Welding
Assembly
Painting
Machine loading/unloading
Other
Total
Range
Low
3,200
(21.3%)
4,200
(28.0%)
1,800
(12.0%)
5,000
(33.3%)
800
(5.3%)
15,000
of estimate
High
4,100
(16.4%)
8,800
(35.2%)
2,500
(10.0%)
8,000
(32.0%)
1,600
(6.4%)
25,000
All other
Range
Low
5,500
(15.7%)
5,000
(14.3%)
3,200
(9.1%)
17,500
(50.0%)
3,800
(10.9%)
35,000
manufacturing
of estimate
High
10,000
(13.3%)
15,000
(20.0%)
5,500
(7.3%)
34,000
(46.0%)
10,500
(14.0%)
75,000
Total
Range
Low
8,700
(17.4%)
9,200
(18.4%)
5,000
(10.0%)
22,500
(45.0%)
4,600
(9.2%)
50,000
of estimate
High
14,100
(14.1%)
23,800
(23.8%)
8,000
(8.0%)
42,000
(42.0%)
12,100
(12.1%)
100,000
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ment. In general, we concentrated on forecasting the in 
dividual application areas by industry first, rather than the 
overall totals. For the convenience of the reader, however, 
we begin with a discussion of the overall forecast and then 
proceed to the industries and specific application areas 
within those industries.
We expect strong growth in the utilization of industrial 
robots in the decade of the 1980s. By 1990 the total robot 
population in the U.S. will range from a minimum of 50,000 
to a maximum of 100,000 units. Given our estimate of the 
year-end 1982 population of approximately 6,800-7,000 
units, that implies an average growth rate from 30 percent to 
40 percent for the eight years of the forecast period, or 
roughly a seven- to fourteenfold increase in the total popula 
tion of robots.
It may be worth mentioning that our range for the total 
population of robots in 1990 is not dependent in any way on 
the 1982 year-end stock (or some hypothetical growth rate). 
There is no universal agreement on the U.S. population of 
robots in 1981, although RIA's estimate of 4,700 units is the 
one most frequently accepted, 5 and our estimate of 1982 
sales may be in error. In short, regardless of near term 
market conditions and/or re-evaluations of the existing 
population of robots, we believe our forecast range 
represents an appropriate and reasonable minimum and 
maximum for the U.S. population of robots in 1990.
The overall forecast may appear similar to other available 
forecasts, but it differs from them in at least one major way. 
Other industry forecasts for the 1990 U.S. population of 
robots tend to be near 100,000 units or above. Presumably, 
these are "most likely" or "most probable" forecasts, since
5. There appear to be two problems. RIA's definition of a robot was only officially 
adopted in 1979. It excluded mechanical transfer devices and thus required downward revi 
sions in the stock estimates. Second, the imports of robots are very difficult to estimate.
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they are single point estimates only, whereas our 100,000 
unit forecast is a maximum which we are reasonably confi 
dent will not be exceeded. In other words, we predict strong 
growth for the robotics industry in the 1980s, but that 
growth will likely be slightly less rapid than other forecasts 
would indicate.
There are many factors that support our conclusion of 
strong growth for robotics, but perhaps less spectacular than 
generally anticipated. Some of these factors have been 
discussed previously, but they are mentioned once again to 
highlight the important points. First, and perhaps most im 
portant, American industry lacks trained personnel both to 
implement robotics technology and to maintain and support 
that technology once installed. One corporate user reported 
advertising for a graduate engineer with experience in 
robotics and then receiving only one application showing any 
experience whatsoever (and that experience was minor).
Another complaint mentioned in our interviews was that 
American universities produce engineers who are overly 
specialized, rather than a generalist who understands 
manufacturing technology and how to make it work. There 
were even complaints about the lack of salesmen who truly 
understand the capabilities and possibilities for utilization of 
robotics technology. As stated previously, the lack of skilled 
manpower applies to major current corporate users and to a 
lesser extent to robot manufacturers. Although educational 
programs for skilled robotics technicians (two-year degree) 
are expanding rapidly, the supply of graduate engineers is 
much less elastic. The lack of engineers with meaningful and 
practical robotics work experience will likely continue for 
quite some time. These matters are discussed more fully in 
chapter 4.
A second factor that will limit the growth of industrial 
robots is the financial commitment necessary to implement
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robotics technology. A system of four to six robots can cost 
in excess of $1 million. Even three stand-alone units can cost 
from $300,000 to $400,000. Engelberger reports that utiliza 
tion of less than three robots at a particular location is un 
wise and uneconomical due to maintenance requirements. 
(Engelberger, p. 86) Others might place this figure slightly 
higher, but the important point is that robotics technology 
requires more than a nominal commitment of funds. Fur 
thermore, although advertised robot prices are falling, the 
robot itself usually represents less than 40 percent of the total 
cost of installation, so dramatic price relief is not likely. 
Finally, our interviews with robot users consistently in 
dicated one warning about the cost of robot installations: be 
prepared for a longer than expected start-up time. Given that 
the primary motivation in adopting robots is the labor sav 
ings, start-up delays can erode some of the cost savings 
rather quickly.
The third limit to the growth of industrial robots, closely 
allied with the financial commitment just discussed, is the 
management commitment needed to successfully adopt in 
dustrial robots. Pilot installations of robots almost in 
variably identify some part of the factory that can operate in 
isolation from the rest of the factory to ease the initial in 
troduction of robots (and assure their success), but those 
types of installations are limited. Eventually, user firms must 
rethink and fundamentally restructure the factory to accom 
modate robots. According to Bela Gold, however, the em 
phasis of American industry on short-run payback does not 
facilitate such fundamental rethinking. (Gold, 198la, p. 37)
The UM/SME Delphi survey asked respondents for the 
payback period required by user industries to justify an in 
vestment in a robot. The response was that the required 
payback period today is two to three years. (Smith and 
Wilson, p. A-60) More important, the respondents also said 
that the required payback for a robot investment is expected
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to remain stable or decrease in most industries. (Smith and 
Wilson, p. A-60) In that light, it should come as no surprise 
that the Carnegie-Mellon survey found that the bulk of all 
respondents expected to install robots as retrofits in existing 
plants over the period 1980-1985. (Ayres and Miller, 198la, 
p. 142) The apparent conclusion is that the emphasis of 
American industry on short-run payback to justify expen 
ditures on new plant and equipment applies to robots as well.
The fourth limit to the growth of industrial robots might 
be termed general economic conditions. Very few economists 
expect vigorous GNP growth in the decade of the 1980s, and 
most would probably argue that even average GNP growth 
consistent with the post-World War II annual average of 3.5 
percent is unlikely. Furthermore, the robotics industry will 
not likely be immune from the business cycle, so several 
years of 50 percent growth may be followed by no growth or 
even sales declines. Although we are aware of the reports 
that American industry must reindustrialize rapidly to sur 
vive in world markets and that such capital investment is in 
evitable due to the aging of the existing stock of capital in the 
U.S., we expect economy-wide investment will be more in 
cremental and gradual, consistent with slow GNP growth.
Finally, much more rapid diffusion of robotics technology 
than earlier process technologies appears highly unlikely. 
Not only are there significant time lags between innovation 
and successful marketing but also there can be significant 
lags between successful adoption in one industry and adop 
tion in other industries, as discussed earlier in the study. 
More important, and in sharp contrast to the Carnegie- 
Mellon study, we expect diffusion of robotics technology to 
be limited primarily to large firms, and perhaps even Fortune 
500 firms, for the foreseeable future. Just as small firms 
have not adopted numerically controlled machine tools, 
small firms will not risk their very existence by the adoption 
of robots.
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The foregoing limits notwithstanding, we do expect sus 
tained growth for industrial robots. It is only because of the 
almost euphoric expectations for this industry that we em 
phasize our doubts: the lack of trained personnel, the large 
financial and management commitment required, the unlike 
ly prospect of vigorous GNP growth to support robot in 
vestments, and the difficulties of diffusion of process 
technology in general, including the likely prospect that 
robots will remain large firm "big ticket" items for the 
foreseeable future. In short, the robots are coming, but we 
believe the change will be incremental and evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary.
Turning to the industry forecasts, we project that the 1990 
U.S. population of robots in the auto industry will range 
from 15,000 to 25,000 units. If the auto industry firms were 
to exactly meet their announced plans, there would be nearly 
20,000 robots in the U.S. auto plants by 1990. The range of 
our forecast thus allows for approximately a 25 percent 
variation in those plans. It is roughly comparable to the 
minimum and strong effort forecasts for the auto industry 
by Tanner reported in table 2-7 (less Canada and Mexico).
This small range, much smaller than for the remainder of 
manufacturing, reflects our judgment on a number of mat 
ters about the auto industry. First, the auto industry is the 
recognized pioneer and largest current user of robotics 
technology. Second, the auto industry has undertaken con 
siderable research and development efforts in robotics 
technology. Third, international competitive pressures and 
one of the highest average wage rates in U.S. manufacturing 
lend economic support to the robotization of auto plants. 
Finally, although considerable retooling of auto plants has 
already been accomplished to accommodate the new down 
sized, front-wheel drive, fuel-efficient autos, U.S. auto 
manufacturers plan strong capital expenditures throughout 
the decade of the 1980s to continue product changes and
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meet government-mandated standards. (Arthur Andersen & 
Co., 1979, p. 14) Of course, if there is no recovery from the 
current depressed state of the auto industry, then robot in 
vestment plans and the very survival of the industry will be 
jeopardized. However, we do not think such gloomy 
possibilities are reasonable.
Within the auto industry, the relative magnitudes of the 
estimates were strongly influenced by the public an 
nouncements and plans of the auto firms. Assembly robots 
are the most important application area within the high 
range of the estimate, with 8,800 units or 35.2 percent of the 
total of 25,000 robots in the auto industry, while assembly 
robots are second in importance within the low range of the 
estimate. Machine loading/unloading is the most important 
application in the low-growth case, with 5,000 units or 33.3 
percent of the total of 15,000 robots in the auto industry, 
while machine loading/unloading is second in the high- 
growth case. Thereafter, the relative rankings are the same in 
both the low and high range of the estimate, with welding ap 
plications third, painting applications fourth and other ap 
plications fifth. In the auto industry in the decade of the 
1980s, there is little doubt that the proven applications of 
welding, painting, and to a lesser extent, machine 
loading/unloading will be pursued most aggressively first, 
followed by assembly applications later.
The forecasts of the specific application areas within autos 
and all other manufacturing reflect more technical con 
siderations than anything else. In general, the range of the 
estimates for each of the application areas in autos is nar 
rower than for each of the application areas in all other 
manufacturing due to the greater uncertainties in all other 
manufacturing. The range of the estimates for welding, 
painting, and machine loading/unloading tend to be nar 
rower than the other application areas in both autos and all 
other manufacturing because these three application areas
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are technically feasible today. Likewise, the range of the 
estimates for assembly robots and "other" robots is broader 
because assembly robots are not currently proven applica 
tions and the other category of robots allows for the develop 
ment of new applications as well.
The diffusion of industrial robots in all other manufactur 
ing is more difficult to predict than in autos. While the major 
auto firms have announced their robot investment plans, 
much less information is available about other industries. 
Whereas the auto industry is almost totally dominated by 
large firms likely to adopt robotics technology, other 
manufacturing is less dominated by large firms. The auto in 
dustry is clearly the pioneer in the successful utilization of 
robotics technology, but its technical applicability to other 
industries may require further adaptation, and the cost- 
effectiveness of those applications is not as certain. For these 
reasons and others, we project a rather broad range for the 
population of robots in all other manufacturing of 35,000 to 
75,000 units in 1990.
Within all other manufacturing, machine 
loading/unloading applications are expected to continue 
their dominance in both the high and low range of the 
estimates with nearly 50 percent of the total population of 
robots performing machine loading/unloading tasks. 
Assembly applications are second in the high-growth case, 
while they are third in the low-growth case. The range of the 
estimate for assembly robots is especially broad 5,000 to 
15,000 units reflecting both the technological uncertainties 
and the possible difficulties of adaptation across industries. 
In that regard, it should be mentioned that research and 
development in assembly robots is being conducted by the 
electronics and office computer industries within all other 
manufacturing.
Welding, a proven application, is the second most fre 
quent application in all other manufacturing within the low
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range of the estimate, while it falls to fourth in the high 
range of the estimate as newer applications, especially 
assembly, become relatively more important. Finally, paint 
ing remains in fifth position in both the high and low range 
of the estimates in all other manufacturing, with 3,200 to 
5,500 units expected to be installed by 1990.
As stated earlier, we focused on forecasting the specific 
application areas by industry rather than the overall totals, 
so the overall totals by application areas are simply the sum 
of the individual industry estimates by application areas. 
Overall in our forecast, it turns out that machine 
loading/unloading is first, assembly is second, welding is 
third, and painting and the "other" category exchange the 
fourth and fifth positions depending on the assumed growth 
scenario.
Some final comments about our robot forecast are in 
order. Although autos represent about one-fourth of the cur 
rent robot market, there is no necessary reason for that rela 
tionship to continue. It is reasonable to think that the market 
share of autos as a proportion of total robot sales will de 
pend on economic conditions in the auto industry itself. 
Also, there is little reason to select the mid-point of the range 
of any of our estimates (including the range for each of the 
specific application areas) as the most likely single point 
estimate possible. Uncertainties about the development and 
diffusion of industrial robots are so great that more specifici 
ty than the range itself is impossible at this time.
Michigan Robot Population
The forecast of the U.S. robot population in 1990 is used 
to derive the Michigan robot population in that same year. 
The specific methodology is illustrated in table 2-11. Accord 
ing to the 1977 Census of Manufactures, 35.5 percent of all 
the production workers in the U.S. motor vehicle and equip-
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ment industry (SIC 371) are located in Michigan, while only 
4.1 percent of production workers in the remainder of 
manufacturing are located in the state. These percentages, 
indicating the relative importance of a particular industry in 
Michigan as a proportion of the same industry in the U.S., 
are utilized to assign robots to the state by industry and ap 
plication area.
Table 2-11
Production Worker Employment 
in Michigan and the U.S., 1977
Industry
Motor vehicles 
and equipment
All other 
manufacturing
Total manufacturing
U.S. 
production 
workers 
(thousands)
727.6
12,963.4
13,691.0
Michigan 
production 
workers 
(thousands)
258.4
531.0
789.4
Percent of 
U.S. industry 
in Michigan
35.5
4.1
5.8
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 7977 Census of 
Manufactures: General Summary, Vol. 1, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
DC, 1981, pp. 1-59 and 1-94.
Although the foregoing appears to be the only feasible 
alternative to estimate the number of robots in Michigan in 
1990, there are a number of implications and/or limitations 
that must be explicitly stated. First, this method assumes that 
the relative importance of autos and all other manufacturing 
in the state vis-a-vis the nation will remain the same during 
the forecast period. That is not at all clear. David Verway 
reports that a centralized auto industry utilizing the Japanese 
"kan-ban" system of producing and delivering parts exactly 
when they are needed strongly favors the Midwest, not only
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because the Midwest and Michigan are already the center of 
the auto industry, but also because strong import competi 
tion on the East and West Coasts argues against expansion 
there. (Verway, p. 6)
On the other hand, Verway also argues that the passage of 
domestic content legislation would work against the Midwest 
because the Japanese would probably locate their U.S. 
plants near their major markets, the East and West Coasts. 
(Verway, p. 6) Complicating matters more, GM announced 
recently that discussions were under way with Toyota for 
joint production of a subcompact car, probably utilizing two 
California plants which were only recently shut down. 
Chrysler recently announced similar joint plans with Mit 
subishi for a subcompact automobile utilizing a Missouri 
plant.
All of these potential locational influences and others can 
not be untangled sufficiently to support any other assump 
tion than relative stability in Michigan's proportion of pro 
duction in the U.S. auto industry during the forecast period. 
Michigan's proportion of all other manufacturing may fall 
slightly during the forecast period, but that is of little impor 
tance since the number of robots in all other manufacturing 
in Michigan is expected to be small.
A second implication of the methodology utilized to 
estimate the number of robots in the State of Michigan is 
that it directly assumes that on average the auto firms and 
other firms will install robots in Michigan in the same pro 
portion as the relevant production worker employment in the 
state. The presumption is that production worker employ 
ment represents an adequate measure of the likelihood of 
robotizing Michigan's factories. That appears reasonable 
since robots will replace such workers, but it remains only a 
very rough approximation. In particular, decisions to 
robotize could be expected to reflect wage differentials and
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other determinants of production techniques. In addition, 
the rate of introduction of robots is expected to be more 
rapid where new plants are opened, thus reflecting choices of 
the location of new productive capacity. Influences such as 
these on the probability of robotization of Michigan fac 
tories cannot be accurately predicted at this time.
The derived forecast of the Michigan robot population can 
be found in table 2-12. Since the relative importance of the 
application areas within each industry remains the same as in 
the U.S. forecast, no discussion of those estimates is needed. 
The relative importance of the estimates across industries in 
Michigan, however, differs sharply from the U.S. totals. 
Specifically, three-quarters of the robots in Michigan are ex 
pected to be in the auto industry, while in the U.S. only 
about one-fourth of the robot population will be in autos.
In absolute terms, the number of robots in the auto in 
dustry in Michigan in 1990 is expected to range from a low of 
5,327 units to a high of 8,879 units; the same figures for all 
other manufacturing in Michigan are 1,434 to 3,072 units. 
The combined total 1990 population of robots in Michigan is 
then 6,761 units to 11,951 units. Since about one-third of 
Michigan employment is in the auto industry, but three- 
fourths of Michigan's robots are expected to be applied 
there, it is obvious that the impacts will be much more 
dramatic in the auto industry.
The remainder of the monograph addresses the human 
resource impacts expected to result from this projected 
population of industrial robots in both the U.S. and in 
Michigan. The next chapter specifically addresses the ques 
tion of job displacement, while the following chapter 
discusses those jobs that will likely be created by the spread 
of robotics technology. It will become clear as we proceed 
that the forecast of the robot population is the key link in 
our procedure. The robot forecast establishes the scale to
Table 2-12
Forecast of the Michigan Robot Population 
by Application, 1990
to
Autos
Application
Welding 
Assembly 
Painting 
Machine loading/unloading 
Other
Total
Range
Low
1,136 
1,492 
639
1,776 
284
5,327
of estimate
High
1,456 
3,125 
888 
2,841 
569
8,879
All other
Range
Low
225 
205 
131 
111 
156
1,434
manufacturing
of estimate
High
410 
614 
225 
1,393 
430
3,072
Total
Range
Low
1,361 
1,697 
770 
2,493 
440
6,761
of estimate
High
1,866 
3,739 
1,113 
4,234 
999
11,951
leasts of theRobotP pulation
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which the specific employment impacts are adjusted. In our 
opinion, it is the consistency of these human resource im 
pacts with the robot population forecast that is one of the 
major contributions of the study.

3
Displacement Effects 
of Robots
Before attempting to estimate the displacement effects of 
robots, it is important to insure that the meaning of the term 
"displacement" is clear. We use displacement to refer to the 
elimination of particular jobs, not to the layoff of individual 
workers. Certainly it is possible that the displacement of a 
particular job by a robot might lead to the layoff of the occu 
pant of that job, but it is not necessary. Layoff refers to the 
involuntary separation of the worker from the firm, 
displacement refers to the elimination of the job itself 
without any assumption as to whether the worker in that job 
is separated from the firm, either voluntarily or involuntari 
ly. Later in this chapter, after the discussion of the potential 
displacement effects of industrial robots in Michigan, the 
issue of unemployment resulting from this displacement will 
be discussed.
The basic methodology of this study proceeds from the 
forecast of the robot population presented in the last 
chapter. Once the number of robots by application area and 
industry can be specified (even within a broad range), it is 
only necessary to determine the average job displacement ef 
fect of each robot. Then these estimates of displacement by 
application and industry can be compared to the employ-
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ment totals for the same application and industry to derive 
an estimate of the relative magnitude of job displacement 
associated with the projected robot population.
Average Rate of Job Displacement 
by Robots
Our interviews strongly supported the following conclu 
sion about the average displacement effect of robots: one 
robot replaces one worker per shift. That conclusion should 
not be surprising. Robots are not any faster than human 
workers, and regardless of the protestations of some in the 
industry that robots should not be compared to humans, 
robots do in fact perform functions that were previously 
done by human workers. Engelberger admits that one focus 
of the development effort of the PUMA robot for small 
parts assembly was to make it human size to work alongside 
human workers. (Engelberger, p. 137) In several articles 
discussing cost justification of robots, John A. Behuniak, 
program manager of Automation Manufacturing 
Technology, General Electric Company, stresses that 
managers should guard against overly optimistic estimates of 
labor savings. (Behuniak, 1979 and 1981) He states, 
"Robots, unlike other forms of automation, usually only 
replace humans on a one-for-one basis." (Behuniak, 1979, 
p. 1)
There is a possibility that the average displacement effect 
may increase as technological improvements occur, as robot 
systems become more prevalent, and as the fund of human 
knowledge of robot applications increases. Tanner and 
Adolfson, in their study of the U.S. auto industry, conclude 
that one robot replaces 0.9 workers today in the auto in 
dustry, but that will improve to 1.2 workers by 1990. (Tan 
ner and Adolfson, p. 103) Of course, these data relate to new 
installations only and not to the total stock of robots. So
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even if robot productivity improves, a substitution rate of 
one robot for one worker will not be far off.
It should be reiterated that stand-alone robot installations 
are expected to dominate over the next few years. By 1985 
the UM/SME Delphi forecast anticipates only 20 percent of 
robot sales will be for inclusion in robot systems, and by 
1990 that figure is expected to rise to 40 percent. (Smith and 
Wilson, p. 46) Currently it appears that the displacement ef 
fect of isolated robot systems or cells in production facilities 
is not much different from that of stand-alone robots 
themselves. However, as we slowly move toward the factory 
of the future and these cells are themselves linked together, 
some observers expect the displacement effect to rise 
dramatically.
On the other hand, it may be far too easy to overestimate 
the productivity (displacement) impact of technological 
change in general. Bela Gold, who has studied this question 
in many industries, concludes that even major technological 
changes have ''fallen far short of their expected effects." 
(Gold, 198 Ib, p. 91) The source of the overestimate is the 
tendency to focus only on the change itself and thereby 
neglect the totality of the production process. (Gold, 1981b, 
p. 91) It is somewhat akin to recognizing the important dif 
ference between potential effects and actual effects, as 
discussed in chapter 1, and may in part account for the warn 
ing by Behuniak not to overestimate the labor savings at 
tributable to robots.
There are several factors that will tend to mitigate the job 
displacement impact of industrial robots. First, as robots 
become more common in manufacturing processes, they will 
replace hard automation such as mechanical transfer 
devices, as well as human workers. This kind of substitution 
follows from the fact that industrial robots represent an in 
termediate technology between dedicated or hard automa 
tion and manual or human labor.
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Second, as robots become more numerous, the need arises 
for redundancy in some robot installations. That is already 
occurring today in body assembly welding applications in the 
auto industry, where one or two robots at the end of the line 
are actually spares, available in the event of robot failure. 
Third, there will eventually be a need for replacement 
robots, although it is still too early to establish an average ex 
pected lifespan for a robot. Our interviews revealed 
estimates from 10 to 15 years; one person even maintained 
that with proper maintenance and replacement of parts the 
lifespan of a robot is indefinite, except where the work en 
vironment is unusually harsh, such as painting applications. 
The problem, of course, is that without specific information 
about discards, we may mistakenly count replacement robots 
as new robots and subsequently new displacement when in 
fact no new displacement has actually occurred. In any 
event, dramatic changes in the average displacement ratio 
are highly unlikely during the forecast period, and it is our 
judgment that the one-to-one relationship between robots in 
stalled and workers displaced represents the best approxima 
tion to the actual gross displacement impacts that will occur.
A closely related question is the number of shifts per day. 
This typically varies depending on the industry, stage of the 
business cycle, and sometimes seasonal factors. On the one 
hand, simple formulas suggested to evaluate robot acquisi 
tions imply that single-shift operation of robots is not 
generally cost-effective, although some robots today are be 
ing so used. (Engelberger, pp. 104-106) On the other hand, 
most American manufacturing industry does not currently 
operate three shifts. The UM/SME Delphi forecast foresees 
little impact of robots on the number of daily shifts (Smith 
and Wilson, p. 82) but a careful reading of the rationale pro 
vided by the experts supporting their opinions reflects con 
siderable disagreement on this issue. (Smith and Wilson, p. 
A-88) Some of the experts polled did point out that once
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robots are implemented in significant numbers, time must be 
allowed for robot maintenance. So industry movement to 
three-shift operation may not be likely even with widespread 
robot application.
Given the vagaries of product demand over the business 
cycle and direct maintenance requirements, it appears that 
an average number of shifts in excess of two is highly unlike 
ly. But economic constraints appear to prevent widespread 
robot utilization in single-shift applications. Thus, in this 
study two-shift operations are assumed; so, on the average, 
two workers are displaced for each robot installed. As robot 
utilization becomes more common in production facilities, 
this simple ratio assumption may need to be re-examined, 
but with a 1990 focus two jobs displaced for each robot ap 
pears to be very reasonable.
U.S. Job Displacement
The robot population forecasts presented in the previous 
chapter can be translated directly into the number of jobs 
displaced on the basis of an average of two jobs per robot for 
each functional application. Table 3-1 reports these results 
for the U.S. as a whole. Clearly, the forecast of 50,000 to 
100,000 robots operational in the U.S. by 1990 means that 
100,000 to 200,000 jobs will have been displaced by robots 
during the decade of the 1980s.
Further, we expect job losses of 30,000 to 50,000 in the 
U.S. auto industry as a result of the application of robots, 
and 70,000 to 150,000 jobs lost in other manufacturing in 
dustries. These totals can be broken down to specific func 
tional areas as well. For instance, our robot population 
forecast implies that 6,400 to 8,200 jobs will be eliminated by 
welding robots in the auto industry. Similarly, 11,000 to 
20,000 welding jobs in other manufacturing industries will be 
lost by 1990.
Table 3-1
Estimate of Job Displacement in U.S. 
by Application, 1990
Autos
Application
Welding 
Assembly 
Painting 
Machine loading/unloading 
Other
Total
Range
Low
6,400 
8,400 
3,600 
10,000 
1,600
30,000
of estimate
High
8,200 
17,600 
5,000 
16,000 
3,200
50,000
All other
Range
Low
11,000 
10,000 
6,400 
35,000 
7,600
70,000
manufacturing
of estimate
High
20,000 
30,000 
11,000 
68,000 
21,000
150,000
Total
Range
Low
17,400 
18,400 
10,000 
45,000 
9,200
100,000
of estimate
High
28,200 
47,600 
16,000 
84,000 
24,200
200,000
lacement EffectsofRobo
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A larger number of assembly jobs are expected to be 
eliminated by industrial robots during this decade. Table 3-1 
reports that from 18,400 to 47,600 such jobs are at risk of 
robotization. The range of prediction for assembly displace 
ment is wider than that for welding, owing to the uncertain 
ties of robot assembly capability as discussed in chapter 2. If 
robots enjoy early success at more complicated assembly 
tasks, the job displacement will range to the higher end of 
our estimates. Painting robots will displace fewer jobs than 
either welding or assembly robots as shown in table 3-1. 
However, as we will see later, the relative impact on employ 
ment in this area looks to be very significant.
The greatest number of jobs will be eliminated by pick- 
and-place robots performing machine loading and unloading 
functions. These functions include casting, forging, press 
loading, machine tool loading and other similar operations. 
Table 3-1 suggests that roughly 40 percent of all robot job 
displacement will occur in this area. Machine loading and 
unloading is the best known general use of robots in U.S. in 
dustry today and will continue to be the most prevalent kind 
of industrial robot in the future. It is worthy of note that this 
area is significantly less concentrated in the auto industry 
than those discussed heretofore.
But these numbers have only limited meaning without 
reference to an employment base to put them in relative 
perspective. That is, it is interesting to know that there may 
be 3,200 to 4,100 welding robots in the auto industry by 
1990, and that these robots can be expected to eliminate 
6,400 to 8,200 jobs. But the impact of such a development 
depends to a considerable degree on the relative magnitude 
of this displacement. Does this represent 1 percent or 10 per 
cent or 100 percent of the welding jobs? The answer to such a 
question is required before any conclusions about the 
seriousness of this situation can be reached.
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For instance, if the welding jobs eliminated represent only 
a tiny fraction of welders employed in the auto industry, lit 
tle disruption or distress would be expected. Normal 
employee turnover could be expected to effectuate the reduc 
tion in force required, and displacement of jobs need have 
no implications of layoff or unemployment. On the other 
hand, if a large proportion of jobs is represented, there is 
more cause for concern.
What is needed is an occupational data base organized by 
industry that makes possible the comparison of these poten 
tial job displacement figures with the existing employment 
levels in the same geographical area, function, and industry. 
Fortunately, such a detailed occupational data base does ex 
ist. It is called the Occupational Employment Statistics 
(OES) survey published by the U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The OES survey was developed during the 1970s to fill the 
need for a relatively current, detailed data base for making 
occupational projections. The BLS had used industry- 
occupation matrices based on the 1960 and 1970 Decennial 
Censuses but found that a more frequent survey was desired. 
The 10-year intervals between observations just proved too 
infrequent to serve the purpose of projecting occupational 
needs. (U.S. Department of Labor, 1981b)
The OES survey is conducted jointly by the federal and 
state governments on a 3-year rotating schedule. All 
nonagricultural employers are divided into one of three 
groups according to industry. A sample of establishments 
from one of these groups is surveyed each year. Manufactur 
ing employers were surveyed in 1971, 1974, 1977 and 1980, 
although coverage by state was rather spotty before 1977. 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1980b, p. 91) Detailed occupa 
tional information is collected for a total of 1,678 occupa 
tional titles and 378 industries. The information is gathered
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from each employer using no more than 200 job titles that 
have been previously found appropriate to that industry. 
Employment is reported according to the highest skill level 
performed by an individual employee as of the 12th of April, 
May, or June, depending on which month shows the least 
seasonality in employment in the industry.
From this raw data, the BLS produces national industry- 
occupation matrices. In addition, most states participating in 
the joint effort also produce statewide matrices based on a 
common set of procedures developed by the BLS. To 
evaluate the relative magnitude of job displacement, we can 
compare the gross displacement estimates from table 3-1 to 
employment levels reported in 1980 in the OES survey of 
manufacturing employers.
This procedure should prove sufficient to put the 
magnitude of projected job displacement in perspective, but 
there are problems with misinterpreting the precision of such 
estimates. We discuss four of these problems. First, the 
utilization of employment data from any given year implies 
the assumption of constant output. Thus, using a 1980 
employment data base to assess the significance of job 
displacement carries the assumption that output and employ 
ment in 1990 would be comparable to 1980 levels, except for 
the influence of robots. Of course, this is highly unrealistic; 
there are a multitude of forces that will cause output and 
employment levels in 1990 to differ from those in 1980.
The only alternative to this unrealistic fixed output 
assumption is to forecast the influence of all these other fac 
tors and then use the projected output and employment 
levels as a base for determining the relative impact of robots. 
Results of this type will be presented later in the chapter. 
Suffice it to say that there is some merit in using known facts 
as a basis to assess the significance of a change rather than a 
projection of unknown accuracy.
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Second, in addition to the implicit assumption of fixed 
output, choice of a particular base year also carries with it 
the peculiar circumstances of that year. This can best be il 
lustrated by recent employment trends in the auto industry. 
Auto sales and auto industry employment peaked in 1978. 
For the U.S. as a whole, employment in the auto industry 
declined precipitously from 1979 to 1980 and has shown no 
improvement since. In fact, 1982 employment levels reflect a 
further decline over the depressed 1980 and 1981 totals. 
Table 3-2 reports these totals with an index number showing 
the employment level relative to the 1978 peak for all 
employees and for production workers. It is clear from the 
table that employment in the auto industry has declined by 
roughly 30 percent from 1978 through May of 1982. Between 
1979 and 1980 alone, the average total employment in the 
auto industry declined by over 20 percent, due to the impact 
of the recession and foreign imports.
Table 3-2
Employment in U.S. Motor Vehicle and Equipment
Industry (SIC 371)
1978 to 1982
Year
1978
1979
1980
1981
May 1982
Total
employment
(thousands)
1,004.9
990.4
788.8
783.9
717.0
Index
(1978 = 1.00)
1.000
.986
.785
.780
.714
Production
workers
(thousands)
781.7
764.4
575.4
582.8
533.2
Index
(1978 = 1.00)
1.000
.978
.736
.746
.682
SOURCES: Data for 1978 through 1981 from Supplement to Employment and Earnings: 
Revised Establishment Data, Bureau of Labor Statistics, June 1982, p. 88. The 1982 data 
are from Employment and Earnings, Bureau of Labor Statistics, August 1982, Table B-2, 
p. 40.
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But if one is trying to assess the relative displacement ef 
fect of robots, which employment level is appropriate? If the 
reduction in employment in 1980 is regarded as a permanent 
change, clearly 1980 is an adequate base year. If, however, 
the reduction is seen as a short term phenomenon, using 1980 
employment numbers will significantly distort the results. 
Clearly, the reduction of 20 percent in auto employment in 
1980 would cause an increase of 20 percent in the calculated 
displacement rate with the methods used here.
Actually, we would not regard either the peak 1978 
employment levels or the depressed 1982 employment levels 
as a fair baseline. It is probably not reasonable to predict a 
return to 1978 employment totals in the auto industry, even 
if sales do recover to the 13 million level. The U.S. auto in 
dustry must raise the productivity of its labor force (or 
reduce the levels of compensation) if it is to meet the foreign 
competition. Thus it is appropriate to anticipate a declining 
labor input requirement for a given level of sales. The ap 
plication of industrial robots is obviously one of the ways the 
industry is attempting to meet the challenge.
On the other hand, if profitability cannot be restored to 
the industry through significant sales gains in the short term, 
the capacity to finance the capital improvements (including 
robots) needed to meet the long term competitive goals will 
be seriously impaired. From the perspective of anticipated 
employment levels in the industry, these considerations lead 
us to believe that an employment base somewhere between 
the 1978 level and the 1982 level is most reasonable. The 1980 
employment base utilized here thus appears overly 
pessimistic, but it represents the most recently available data 
from the OES base. Utilizing an employment base that 
underestimates the true level will serve to bias the job 
displacement rates upward. This issue will be discussed brief 
ly again when the Michigan displacement figures are 
presented later in the chapter.
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The third reason to be cautious about the precision of our 
estimates involves the definition of the auto industry itself. 
Up to now it has not been necessary to specify precisely what 
is meant by the term auto industry. Implicitly we have used 
the term to refer to the major auto producers, General 
Motors, Ford, Chrysler and American Motors. This is 
primarily a matter of convenience, but also reflects the judg 
ment that robots will continue to be large firm technology 
through at least 1990. At the other definitional extreme 
would be what the Michigan Employment Security Commis 
sion has called "Motor-Vehicle-Related" employment. 
(Michigan Employment Security Commission, 1981b, p. 2) 
This includes not only the assembly of motor vehicles, but 
component parts suppliers, raw material providers, and tool 
and die shops as well.
Unfortunately, neither of these options are workable when 
matching up against an occupational data base. The OES 
uses three-digit SIC codes as the minimum level of aggrega 
tion available to the public. This poses a potential problem 
of comparability with the robot forecasts presented earlier. 
The only workable definition of the auto industry at the 
three-digit SIC level is SIC 371, Motor Vehicles and Equip 
ment. This will include auto parts and accessory manufac 
turers, but excludes stamping plants, engine plants, and 
other major component manufacturing from the industry- 
occupation data base. The result is that there can be a 
discrepancy between the areas of application of the robots 
and the occupational employment figures against which the 
displacement should be measured. Given the lack of more 
specific information, these inaccuracies must be tolerated.
The final reason to question the precision of our estimates 
is the problem of determining what, if any, displacement im 
pacts have already been registered in the U.S. economy. 
Ideally, an employment observation dating before any 
substantial robot deployment would eliminate the possible
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question of intermediate impacts. That is, if the employment 
profile available predates the application of robots, there is 
no necessity to try to determine what effects have occurred to 
date and are therefore already imbedded in the measured 
employment base. Unfortunately, there is insufficient infor 
mation to determine the industry of use or application areas 
for the less than 2,000 robots installed in the U.S. by the time 
of the survey. Thus, we must disregard these intermediate 
impacts, which are quite small in any event, when using a 
1980 employment base.
In summary, there are many reasons to be wary of the 
precision of our displacement rates. There are serious ques 
tions about the assumption of constant output, the ap 
propriateness of the base year, the definition of the auto in 
dustry, and the neglect of intermediate impacts. Thus the 
estimates of the relative magnitude of job displacement must 
be regarded as representing a general range rather than a 
precise point. We do believe, however, that we can identify 
the general order of magnitude of robot impacts, even if 
specific estimates are inaccurate. Further, we submit that it is 
the order of magnitude that should shape any policy 
response to the challenge of robotics at this early date.
Table 3-3 presents the estimated displacement impact of 
industrial robots in the U.S. Since employment levels are 
from 1980 and the robot population forecast is for 1990, the 
job displacement is a cumulative total over the 1980 to 1990 
period. For each of the application areas listed, a specific oc 
cupational correlate was selected from those available in the 
OES. For the welding robot application area, the occupa 
tional title "welders and flamecutters" was selected as 
representing the job content against which the projected 
number of welding robots would be applied. For assembly 
robots, the "assembler" titles were judged to be the employ 
ment base. For painting robots, the "production painter" 
occupation in the OES was chosen. For the machine loading
Table 3-3
Displacement Impact of Robots in the United States 
by Application, Cumulative 1980 to 1990
Autos
Application
Welding 
Assembly 
Painting
Machine loading/ 
unloading
All operatives 
and laborers
All employment
1980 
employment 
level
41,159 
175,922 
13,556
80,725
467,846
773,797
Displacement 
range 
(percent)
15-20 
5 - 10
27 -37
12-20
6- 11
4- 6
All other manufacturing
1980 
employment 
level
359,470 
1,485,228 
92,622
988,815
9,954,048
19,587,771
Displacement 
range 
(percent)
3 - 6 
1 - 2 
7 - 12
3 - 7
1 - 2
0- 1
Total
1980 
employment 
level
400,629 
1,661,150 
106,178
1,069,540
10,421,894
20,361,568
Displacement 
range 
(percent)
4- 7 
1 - 3 
9- 15
4- 8
1 - 2
0- 1
acement Effec s ofRobo
SOURCE: Employment data based upon unpublished OES data provided by Office of Economic Growth and Employment Projections, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC.
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and unloading applications, the semi-skilled metalworking 
operative group (with the exclusion of welders and flamecut- 
ters) was selected. This includes drill press operatives, grind 
ing and abrading machine operatives, lathe and milling 
machine operatives, punch and stamping press operatives, 
and other precision machine operatives.
Clearly, the choice of the specific occupational content 
against which to apply the robot displacement figures is 
somewhat arbitrary. For instance, we chose to apply the 
painting robots against employment in the production 
painter occupational category. But it is quite likely that some 
of the jobs actually displaced will come from other occupa 
tions, say, materials handlers or general laborers. This is par 
ticularly likely if a robot system is installed rather than just a 
stand-alone retrofit robot. Again, the conclusion is that 
these numbers should be taken as indicative of the general 
range of impact on occupational employment.
Table 3-3 indicates that the robot population forecasts 
presented in chapter 2 will have widely varying impacts on 
different occupations. The most dramatic displacement rate 
is for production painters in the auto industry. Our results 
show that from 27 to 37 percent of these jobs may be 
eliminated by 1990. In addition, table 3-3 shows that 7 to 12 
percent of production painter jobs in other manufacturing 
industries may be displaced. Overall, 9 to 15 percent of these 
jobs are threatened by robots in this decade. These results 
should not be surprising. Painting is a prime robot applica 
tion, in that it is based on existing technology, and painting 
itself is a particularly dirty and potentially hazardous job.
Significant job displacement is also anticipated for 
welding occupations, another prime robot application. Table 
3-3 indicates that 15 to 20 percent of welder jobs in the auto 
industry will be displaced by welding robots. A lesser impact 
on other manufacturing welding jobs is also shown, with 3 to
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6 percent displacement forecast. For all manufacturing, 4 to
7 percent of welder jobs are expected to be eliminated by 
1990.
Very similar results apply to the machine loading and 
unloading robot application area. Overall, 4 to 8 percent of 
this large employment group can expect to be displaced by 
1990, with autos showing three to four times the impact of 
other manufacturing. Since this job content is already 
automated to some degree, robot application here calls for 
integrating the robots into the existing production facilities. 
This is notoriously difficult to accomplish smoothly.
This is even more true for the assembly robots, the task 
which shows the least impact in table 3-3. While 5 to 10 per 
cent of auto assembly jobs are expected to be robotized, only 
1 to 2 percent of such jobs in other manufacturing are at 
risk. The aggregate manufacturing displacement rate for 
assembly will only be 1 to 3 percent. As mentioned earlier, 
this impact depends on continued refinements in robot 
capability, adaptability, and reliability. The projections here 
are clearly more speculative than those for welding or paint 
ing.
Some may question why some of the specific occupational 
displacement rates are not higher, particularly in the auto in 
dustry. For example, in chapter 2 it was pointed out that the 
installation of welding robots in the auto industry will slow 
down after 1988. Presumably that represents maximum ap 
plication of robotics technology to welding functions. Why, 
then, isn't the displacement of welders approaching 100 per 
cent?
There are a number of reasons for this apparent discrepan 
cy. First, it is clear that the OES occupation of welders and 
flamecutters in the auto industry includes people doing work 
other than welding auto bodies together on the assembly 
line, the primary robot application. Second, the auto in-
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dustry as defined in the OES data base includes many small 
firms producing auto parts and accessories. As discussed 
earlier, we do not expect small firms to adopt robotics 
technology in substantial numbers before 1990. So there is a 
considerable population of welders in smaller firms who may 
not even see a welding robot by 1990.
Third, even though we have tried to be as careful as we can 
in formulating our estimates and applying them to the 
available occupational data base, there are bound to be 
many inaccuracies associated with such a procedure. For in 
stance, actual job classification schemes utilized in most 
large firms tend to be much more detailed than the occupa 
tional data available in the OES data base. Thus when we 
think of occupational displacement, we may be utilizing a 
broader definition of an occupation than some other 
observers.
In general, without a detailed case study at the plant level 
of labor input vectors before and after a specific 
technological change, it is difficult to say how much our 
simplifying assumptions may have influenced particular oc 
cupational displacement rates. This is yet another reason to 
regard our relative displacement rates as estimates of the 
general order of magnitude of job elimination rather than 
precise point estimates. It is also one of the reasons that we 
will next assess the impacts of robots against more general 
measures of employment, where occupational classification 
is not a factor.
The two bottom rows of table 3-3 express the relative 
displacement impact in this more aggregated manner. The 
job displacement expected is calculated as a proportion of all 
employment and of all operatives and laborers, in other 
words, the semi-skilled and unskilled manufacturing labor 
force. As shown in the table, aggregate job displacement of 4 
to 6 percent in the auto industry is anticipated. However, this
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represents 6 to 11 percent of operatives and laborers, the 
"blue collar"workforce. Thus, during the decade of the '80s 
production worker employment in the auto industry is pro 
jected to be up to 11 percent lower than it otherwise would be 
due to the introduction of robots.
Table 3-3 also reveals that anticipated impacts are much 
lower in other manufacturing industries. From 1 percent to 2 
percent of all semi-skilled jobs will be eliminated by 1990 in 
these areas. Of course, individual industry impacts would 
tend to be higher than the average in those industries where 
robots are well suited to production techniques. On the other 
hand, we are not aware of any other industry that will show a 
gross impact equal to the auto industry. Thus it is not 
unreasonable to suppose that our displacement figures for 
the auto industry represent an upper bound for other 
manufacturing industries during the forecast period.
In summary, table 3-3 indicates that robots will not have a 
significant direct impact on overall employment levels in the 
U.S. between now and 1990. Robots in total will eliminate 
less than 1 percent of all jobs in this period. In the auto in 
dustry, however, overall displacement impact does appear 
significant. In particular applications like welding and paint 
ing, the job displacement impact is quite dramatic. The im 
portance of these job displacement results is that they in 
dicate a wide range in the impact of robotics. While there is 
no cause for concern in an aggregate sense, there will be 
pockets of significant job displacement. Later in the chapter 
we will attempt to describe the possible unemployment im 
pact of this job displacement.
Before going on to discuss the potential displacement in 
duced by robots in Michigan, it may be useful to compare 
our U.S. results with others, especially the Carnegie-Mellon 
study and the UM/SME Delphi forecast. Table 3-4 presents 
these comparative results organized according to the applica-
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tion areas used for this study. Maximum comparability was 
sought here, but comparisons across studies must always be 
interpreted cautiously because of differing scope, puposes, 
methods, definitions, time periods, etc. Even the occupa 
tions themselves are not identical across the studies, 
although they are similar. In general, our estimates of 
displacement are the lowest ones shown. This is especially 
marked when comparing our total displacement rates with 
those from the Carnegie-Mellon study. But the results from 
the UM/SME Delphi forecast may help make it clear why 
this is so.
Recall from chapter 1 that the Carnegie-Mellon study ask 
ed what proportion of the work done by given occupations 
could be performed by Level 1 or Level 2 robots. Thus the 
question corresponds most closely with the potential 
displacement figure from the UM/SME Delphi survey. In 
fact, the Carnegie-Mellon displacement rates are even 
higher, though the rates shown are the average response for 
Level 1 robots only. It is also interesting to note that the 
Carnegie-Mellon displacement rates are rather close to the 
top end of our range for the automobile industry.
This result may be due in part to the Carnegie-Mellon 
weighting procedure which gives greater importance to large 
employers. The large firms in their survey are more likely to 
be auto or auto related firms, since there is a dispropor 
tionate concentration of both robot users and large 
establishments within the auto industry. (Ayres and Miller, 
198la, p. 100) This raises the possibility that the Carnegie- 
Mellon displacement estimates could be more descriptive of 
the auto industry than an all-industry average, at least 
through 1990. Our total manufacturing gross displacement 
rates agree more closely with the UM/SME Delphi survey ac 
tual expected displacement rates than with the UM/SME 
Delphi potential rates. This is to be expected since our pro 
jections are also targeted on the actual rather than
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theoretical or potential impacts. In fact, our estimates tend 
to be slightly lower than the UM/SME Delphi estimates of 
actual expected displacement.
In summary, the Carnegie-Mellon displacement results are 
quite similar to our projections for the auto industry. Given 
that the auto industry is the leader in the application of 
robots, this may corroborate their theoretically possible 
levels of displacement for Level 1 robots. We do not feel, 
however, that their displacement results can be generalized 
across all manufacturing industries. Our gross displacement 
rate estimates coincide much more closely with the results of 
the UM/SME Delphi forecast. We are not dismayed by the 
fact that our estimates tend to be somewhat more conser 
vative than even the UM/SME Delphi actual projections. 
We discussed the reasons for our reservations extensively in 
chapter 2. We repeat our belief that most of the observers of 
robotics are erring on the side of technical progress without 
full consideration of the human, organizational, and finan 
cial limits to changes in process technology.
Michigan Job Displacement
For the State of Michigan, OES surveys of manufacturing 
employers were conducted in 1977 and 1980. However, the 
1980 survey data are not yet available for public release, so 
the 1977 survey is actually the only such detailed data base 
currently available for the State of Michigan. (Michigan 
Employment Security Commission, 198la) Actually, we will 
be using a BLS standardized 1978 update of these raw 1977 
Michigan numbers to maximize consistency of the informa 
tion. These unpublished data were provided by the MESC at 
the three-digit SIC level, in contrast to the published 1977 
data which are at two-digit industry level only.
Table 3-5 shows the estimates of job displacement 
resulting from the application of robots in the State of
Table 3-5
Estimate of Job Displacement in MicMgan 
by Application, 1990
oo ON
O co*
T3
Autos
Range of estimate
Application
Welding
Assembly
Painting
Machine loading/unloading
Other
Total
Low
2,272
2,984
1,278
3,552
568
10,654
High
2,912
6,250
1,776
5,682
1,138
17,758
All other manufacturing
Range of estimate
Low High
450 820
410 1,228
262 450
1,434 2,786
312 860
2,868 6,144
Range
Low
2,722
3,394
1,540
4,986
880
13,522
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of estimate
High
3,732
7,478
2,226
8,468
1,998
23,902
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Michigan. It is based on the Michigan robot forecast 
presented in chapter 2 and the assumption of two jobs 
displaced per robot applied. Overall, we project that between 
13,522 and 23,902 jobs will be displaced in Michigan by 
1990. Because of the structure of employment by industry in 
the State of Michigan, the impact of robots in the auto in 
dustry looms much larger than for the U.S. as a whole.
Table 3-5 shows that 75 percent of the job loss in Michigan 
is expected to be in the auto industry (SIC 371) with gross 
displacement of 10,654 to 17,758 auto jobs. Nearly 2,000 
painting jobs, 3,000 welding jobs, 6,000 machine tending 
jobs, and over 6,000 assembly jobs in the auto industry could 
be lost to robotization by the end of the decade in Michigan. 
The results in the table also show that gross job displacement 
in Michigan will be very minor outside the auto industry.
Table 3-6 presents these same job displacement results ex 
pressed in relative terms. Each gross job displacement 
figure in table 3-5 is divided by the corresponding occupa 
tional employment from the OES for Michigan in 1978. 
Thus the displacement rates presented in table 3-6 represent 
the cumulative total gross displacement proportion for that 
occupational group over the period from 1978 to 1990.
In addition to these specific occupational rates, the bot 
tom lines of the table show the overall displacement rates 
calculated against all employment and against employment 
in the operative and laborer sectors, generally encompassing 
the semi-skilled and unskilled workers. From the table it is 
apparent that the projected Michigan robot population in 
1990 will displace somewhere between 1 and 2 percent of all 
1978 manufacturing jobs in the state. When assessed against 
only the semi-skilled and unskilled employment base, the 
proportion of job displacement exactly doubles to between 2 
and 4 percent. In both instances, the Michigan displacement 
impact is roughly twice that of the U.S.
Table 3-6
Displacement Impact of Robots in Michigan 
by Application, Cumulative 1978 to 1990
00
00
Autos
Application
Welding 
Assembly 
Painting
Machine loading/ 
unloading
All operatives 
and laborers
All employment
1978 
employment 
level
14,910 
65,764 
4,378
42,149
206,927
409,506
Displacement 
range 
(percent)
15 -20 
5- 10 
29-40
8- 14
5 - 9
3 - 4
All other manufacturing
1978 
employment 
level
22,694 
50,678 
4,387
86,906
397,598
769,841
Displacement 
range 
(percent)
2- 4 
1 - 2 
6- 10
2- 3
1 - 2
0- 1
Total
1978 
employment 
level
37,604 
116,442
8,765
129,055
604,525
1,179,347
Displacement 
range 
(percent)
7- 10 
3- 6
17-25
4- 7
2- 4
1 - 2
>lacement EffectsofRobots
SOURCE: Employment data based upon unpublished OES data provided by Office of Economic Growth and Employment Projections, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC.
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Outside the auto industry, robot job displacement in 
Michigan during the decade of the '80s will be minimal, with 
one exception. It appears likely that production painters in 
all other manufacturing will experience significant displace 
ment. Table 3-6 indicates that the application of painting 
robots can be expected to eliminate 6 to 10 percent of these 
production painter jobs by 1990.
The significant job displacement in Michigan will be con 
centrated in the auto industry. This results from Michigan's 
dependence on the auto industry and the circumstance that 
the auto industry will continue to lead other industries in 
robotization. According to table 3-6, from 3 to 4 percent of 
Michigan 1978 auto industry employment can be expected to 
be eliminated by industrial robots by 1990. When the 
displacement is expressed as a percentage of only the semi 
skilled and unskilled labor component, the rate rises to 5 to 9 
percent.
When attention is confined to the prime robot applica 
tions, once again it is seen that 15 to 20 percent of the 
welding jobs in the Michigan auto industry are expected to 
disappear by 1990. For production painters the proportion is 
even higher, from 29 to 40 percent eliminated. These must be 
deemed significant job displacement rates by anyone's stan 
dards. They will in all probability create some labor market 
dislocation in Michigan in the absence of some intervention, 
either private or public. Furthermore, these impacts can be 
predicted with lower ranges of uncertainty because the 
technology is already known. In these applications it is 
primarily a question of the rate of diffusion of currently ex 
isting techniques.
In summary, the Michigan displacement estimates are 
similar to those of the U.S. Robots will not have an enor 
mous impact on overall employment levels in the State of 
Michigan between now and 1990. Robots are projected to
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have no significant negative impact in nonauto manufactur 
ing with the possible exception of production painters. In the 
auto industry, however, overall displacement does appear 
significant; it is quite dramatic in particular applications like 
welding and painting.
Before moving on to the question of possible labor market 
implications, there are two other issues which must be dealt 
with. The first is the question of the effect of the 1978 
employment base on the displacement figures reported in 
table 3-6. Outside the auto industry, there appears to be no 
problem because of the relative stability of manufacturing 
employment. But, as mentioned earlier, 1978 represented a 
cyclical peak for the auto industry. Indeed, if one compares 
table 3-3, the U.S. estimates of displacement, with table 3-6, 
the Michigan estimates of displacement, these points are il 
lustrated quite well. The displacement rates are generally 
similar for all other manufacturing in both cases. The ag 
gregated displacement rate in the auto industry for all 
operatives and laborers, however, is 20 to 25 percent less in 
Michigan than the U.S., reflecting the effect of the 1978 
cyclical employment peak. The all employment figures for 
the auto industry cannot be compared because of the relative 
concentration of automotive adminstrative headquarters and 
research facilities in Michigan. Likewise, the total estimates 
cannot be compared because of the rather significant dif 
ference in industrial structure between Michigan and the na 
tion as a whole. In short, at the aggregate level the utilization 
of the 1978 employment base for the Michigan auto industry 
estimates appears to confirm our expectations of the effect 
of using a different employment base.
However, it is puzzling that the specific occupational 
displacement rates in the auto industry in Michigan are not 
generally lower than the corresponding U.S. estimates. This 
puzzle may be explained by recalling the method used to 
derive the Michigan robot population. Production worker 
employment in the auto industry in Michigan relative to the
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nation as a whole was assumed to adequately reflect 
robotization potential. Thus, a gross production employ 
ment figure was used to assign robots to the State of 
Michigan. Presumably the unique structure of auto employ 
ment in Michigan was not captured by this procedure.
For these reasons we think the 1980 estimated displace 
ment rates for the U.S. auto industry may be more mean 
ingful even for Michigan, although it bears repeating that the 
aggregate employment levels in the auto industry in 1980 ap 
pear overly pessimistic. Thus the U.S. job displacement 
results may provide an upper bound for our estimates.
The other major question is the location of the jobs dis 
placed within the State of Michigan. While there are no data 
available that would make is possible to accurately represent 
the occupational profile of sub-state regions, it is reasonable 
to assume that the job displacement will occur throughout 
the industry. The best assumption, absent a major effort to 
delineate exactly what job content is present in each auto- 
related establishment in Michigan, is simply to assume that 
the job displacement will occur where the current production 
worker jobs are located.
Table 3-7 is adapted from MESC data collected for a study 
of Michigan's auto dependency. It shows that, in March of 
1979, 60 percent of the "motor-vehicle-related" employment 
in the state was located in the Detroit SMSA. An additional 
17.6 percent was located in the outlying Flint and Ann 
Arbor-Ypsilanti SMSAs. If the 9.4 percent accounted for by 
Saginaw and Lansing-East Lansing is added to these 
numbers, 87.0 percent of the auto employment is in the 
southeast Michigan quadrant. Accordingly, we would 
assume that 87 percent of the job displacement resulting 
from the application of robots will occur in Southeast 
Michigan as well. 1
1. This situation has not changed since 1979. In 1981, 88.1 percent of employment in SIC 
code 37, transportation equipment, was in Southeast Michigan.
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Table 3-7
Motor-Vehicle-Related Employment 
in Michigan SMSAs, March 1979
Motor-vehicle-related employment
SMSAs
Detroit SMSA
Ann Arbor- Ypsilanti SMSA
Flint SMSA
Lansing-East Lansing SMSA
Saginaw SMSA
All other areas
Michigan total
Number
393,100
36,300
79,100
32,300
29,200
85,200
655,200
Percent
60.0
5.5
12.1
4.9
4.5
13.0
100.0
SOURCE: Adapted from Motor Vehicle and Related Industries in Michigan, Michigan 
Employment Security Commission, Bureau of Research and Statistics, Summer 1981, 
Table VI, p. 14.
Anticipated Impact of Job Displacement
Having completed the discussion of which jobs are likely 
to be displaced by robots by 1990, it is time to turn to the 
more critical issue of the possible unemployment impact of 
the elimination of up to 200,000 U.S. jobs in this decade. 
That is, how much labor market distress is likely to result 
from the job elimination which has been described here?
The first point that should be made is that we do not 
believe that the impact of robotics can truly be separated 
from other forces influencing employment levels between the 
present and 1990. However, for the purpose of assessing the 
possible unemployment impacts of robotics, we will examine 
this one development in isolation, as if it were the only 
change. Once again our purpose is to affix the order of 
magnitude of job elimination due to robotics relative to
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other (more ordinary) labor market developments, not to 
reach precise estimates of the impact of robotics on the 
unemployment rate. 2
While the gross displacement results presented thus far ap 
pear to give relatively little cause for concern except in the 
auto industry, a fuller appreciation of the level of projected 
job displacement can be obtained from table 3-8. This table 
compares the simple average annual job displacement rate 
over the 1980 to 1990 period from our projections with 
average annual replacement needs and total openings as 
estimated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Office of 
Economic Growth and Employment Projections.
The BLS projects employment levels and demand for 
labor as a part of their labor market information system to 
assist program planners and individual decisionmakers in 
career choices. As reported in table 3-8, they also derive 
estimates of average annual replacement needs and total 
average annual openings. Average annual replacement needs 
are those job openings due to deaths, disabilities, and 
retirements only, while total average annual openings also 
include the BLS projected change in demand for that oc 
cupation. Neither data series, however, includes occupa 
tional transfers, i.e., the extent to which people voluntarily 
change occupations; so the relative rates in the table 
understate true annual labor market needs or vacancies.
The last column in table 3-8 shows that for welders, the 
BLS projects that job openings will average 5.1 percent an 
nually over the period 1978 to 1990. Further, replacement 
needs alone, without any expansion in welding employment, 
would require filling 2.3 percent of all welder jobs every 
year. As the first three columns show, this is far above the
2. For an interesting account of a much more elaborate input-output version of this type of 
exercise in assessing the impact of technological change on the Austrian economy, see the 
article by Leontief listed in the bibliography.
Table 3-8
Displacement Impacts of Robots 
Compared to BLS Estimates of Job Openings
Simple average annual
displacement impact of robots
Application
Welding
Assembly
Painting
Maching loading/
unloading
All operatives
and laborers
All employment
1980 - 1990*
All other
Autos manufacturing
2.0
1.0
3.7
2.0
1.1
.7
.6
.2
1.2
.7
.2
.1
Total
.7
.3
1.5
.8
.2
.1
BLS average annual
replacement needs
1978 - 1990
All industries
2.3
3.0
2.4
2.5
2.9
3.8
BLS total average
annual openings
1978 - 1990
All industries
5.1
6.5
3.9
3.0
4.0
5.5
8
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SOURCE: Replacement needs and total average annual openings from The National Industry-Occupation Employment Matrix, 1970-1978, and 
Projected 1990, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 2086, Vol. 2, April 1981, pp. 495-502. 
*Assuming maximum growth in robot population.
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annual displacement rate for all manufacturing industries 
estimated earlier. It is even slightly above the annual job 
displacement rate projected in this study for welders in the 
auto industry.
These BLS projections were made prior to any significant 
sales of robots, so it is unlikely that the BLS made any 
specific allowance for robots in their occupational forecasts. 
It is also important to note that the actual job content of 
each occupational category in table 3-8 is not identical to 
those used in this study. The BLS 1978-1990 forecast used 
the 1970 Census of Population as a base; hence it employed 
the Census Bureau occupational classification structure. 
This scheme is considerably less detailed than the OES base 
underlying our displacement projections. 3 But with the 
caveat that it is the most comparable data we can get, 
analysis of job openings and job displacement can be very il 
luminating. Any distortions should be small in most cases 
because we are looking at relative rates rather than absolute 
levels.
In no case do our job displacement rates exceed the BLS 
average annual openings figure. In fact, our manufacturing 
displacement numbers do not even come close to the replace 
ment needs for all industries except in the case of painters. 
Whereas the BLS forecasts total job openings of 3.9 percent 
per year and replacement needs of 2.4 percent per year, our 
displacement rate ranges as high as 1.5 percent annually for 
painters in all manufacturing. If both forecasts were ac 
curate, the introduction of industrial robots could be ex 
pected to eliminate roughly 62 percent of the painter jobs 
that would be opened through death, disability, or retire 
ment. The point is, there still would be job openings for 
painters available each year, as well as additional vacancies 
due to occupational transfers.
3. For a comparison of the two occupational classification schemes, see U.S. Department 
of Labor, 1981b.
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Using the same reasoning, our estimated robot job 
displacement impacts will eliminate about one-third of the 
welding and machine loading and unloading job openings 
due to replacement needs. Only about one-tenth of replace 
ment assembly jobs would be eliminated. Even less than one 
in ten replacement positions for all operatives and laborers 
will be affected. Thus, if our most optimistic robot forecast 
proves accurate, the net result is that about 5 percent of pro 
jected annual job openings for operatives and laborers 
through 1990 will not materialize. About 7 percent of labor 
replacement needs for this group will be nullified. This is not 
a trivial result, but it is also not the end of the world for the 
blue collar worker.
There is another way to use the BLS occupational 
forecasts to illuminate the magnitude of job displacement by 
robots. One can compare the BLS projected employment 
growth by occupation to 1990 with the gross displacement 
projections by occupation reported earlier in this chapter. In 
this case, the occupational classifications are identical since 
the BLS results are also built upon the OES data base. This 
approach has the further significant advantage of 
eliminating the unrealistic assumption of constant output 
which was implicit in our displacement rates calculated on 
today's known employment base.
In accord with the economic assumptions behind the low- 
growth and high-growth variants of the BLS occupational 
employment projections, 4 we have deducted our gross job 
displacement figures from the corresponding employment 
projection. Thus we subtracted our low robot growth 
displacement figures from BLS low employment growth pro 
jections and similarly our high-growth forecast displacement 
from their high-growth projections. This approach is
4. For more information about the BLS 1990 projections, the interested reader should con 
sult Monthly Labor Review, October 1981 (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics).
Table 3-9
Projected U.S. Employment Changes 1980-1990 Utilizing Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Estimates Adjusted for Displacement Caused by Robots
Autos All other manufacturing
Percent 
change
Application
Welding
Assembly 
Painting 
Machine
loading/ 
unloading
AH operatives
and laborers
All employment
1980
employment
level
41,159
175,922 
13,556
80,725
467,846
773,797
1980-1990
Low
growth
3
14 
-8
6
12
15
High
growth
15
25 
-2
15
24
29
1980
employment
level
359,470
1,485,228 
92,622
988,815
9,954,048
19,587,771
Total
Percent 
change
1980-1990
Low
growth
17
18 
15
14
11
14
High
growth
29
28 
22
25
19
23
1980
employment
level
400,629
1,661,150 
106,178
1,069,540
10,421,894
20,361,568
Percent 
change
1980-1990
Low
growth
15
18 
12
14
11
14
High
growth
28
28 
19
24
20
23
SOURCE: Employment data based on unpublished OES information provided by Office of Economic Growth and Employment Projections, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC.
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reasonable because the economic assumptions of the BLS 
correspond closely with our economic assumptions stated in 
chapter 2. Table 3-9 reports the result.
In each case, the 1980 employment in the occupational 
group is reported, together with the net employment change 
from 1980 to 1990 under both the low-growth and high- 
growth variants. Last, the percentage change in employment 
from 1980 to 1990 is reported. Frankly, this procedure at 
tributes too much accuracy to both forecasts, but it is an in 
teresting exercise that helps to put the job displacement ef 
fects of robots in perspective.
What table 3-9 tells us is that our job displacement totals 
are not sufficient to offset BLS predicted expansion of 
employment for any impacted occupation, except in the case 
of production painters in the auto industry. This is the only 
declining employment cell in the table. Even welders in the 
auto industry are forecast to expand in numbers during the 
1980 to 1990 decade. In fairness to the BLS, it should be 
made clear that these forecasts were completed before the 
depth and breadth of the current auto slump were apparent. 
We would not regard the results of this exercise as serious 
forecasts of 1980 to 1990 employment change in light of 
more recent developments. But table 3-9 does put the job 
loss projected to result from the application of industrial 
robots in perspective. It will have little influence on employ 
ment trends to 1990 except in highly specialized situations.
Another analysis of the labor redundancy issue has been 
done in an unpublished General Motors Institute thesis by 
Jeffrey Krause. Using the announced General Motors target 
of 14,000 robots installed by 1990 and a displacement of two 
jobs per robot, Krause finds 28,000 GM workers potentially 
displaced by 1990. On the other hand, he cites a projected 
natural attrition rate for GM hourly employees through 1990 
of 4.1 percent annually. (Krause, p. 104) Applying the stated
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attrition rate to the 1981 hourly labor force, Krause finds 
that a predicted turnover of 97,000 GM employees by 1990 is 
implied. His conclusions were: "First, by itself, robotics will 
contribute a relatively small amount to the overall reduction 
in the workforce; second, the rate of employee displacement 
due to new robotic applications will be gradual, relative to 
the rate of natural attrition." (Krause, p. 104)
Krause goes on to discuss other possible influences on the 
employment levels at General Motors, concluding with the 
following statement: "The displacement of 28,000 workers 
in General Motors should be compared to the approximately 
140,000 workers presently laid off, due to lagging sales, poor 
economy, and intense foreign competition." (Krause, p. 
105)
It would seem that even for the auto industry, the overall 
displacement induced by robot applications by 1990 will not 
be a major problem. Only for specific occupations within the 
auto industry, those particularly amenable to robotization 
with current technology, will job displacement be likely to 
cause significant labor market dislocations.
This result is also reflected in the UM/SME Delphi survey. 
When the Delphi survey sample was asked about the ex 
pected disposition of the workers displaced by robots during 
the 1980s, they responded with the following results. (Smith 
and Wilson, p. 75) Twenty-five percent of the workers were 
expected to be transferred to other jobs without additional 
training. Fifty percent were expected to be retrained for new 
positions in the same plant. Thirteen percent were expected 
to be retrained for new positions at another plant of the same 
employer. A total of 6 percent of displaced workers were ex 
pected to be terminated. An additional 6 percent were ex 
pected to be retired early. Thus, a maximum of 12 percent of 
all displaced workers were expected to be separated from 
their current employers.
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The comparisons so far presented have been made on the 
basis of simple annual averages and decade long impacts. 
One might plausibly argue that this approach overstates the 
displacement impact of robots early in the decade but 
understates it later in the decade when sales of robots 
become much more significant. That is true in the aggregate, 
but not necessarily for individual occupations. The reason is 
that some robot applications, such as welding and painting, 
are expected to be much more important early in the decade. 
Others, such as assembly, are expected to rise in importance 
later in the decade. Furthermore, the timing of robot pur 
chases on an annual basis by application area is even more 
uncertain than the total cumulative plans themselves, and 
there is no such data base available in any event. For these 
reasons we conclude that the simple annual averages by oc 
cupation such as those in table 3-8 are the most meaningful 
available.
However, we can determine the aggregate displacement 
impact of robots in 1990 alone. We estimated maximum 
sales of robots of 28,350 units in that year. The aggregate 
displacement effect of this maximum level of sales in 1990 is 
.3 percent of all 1980 manufacturing employment or .5 per 
cent of all 1980 operatives and laborers. These single-year 
gross displacement impacts are also much less than replace 
ment needs. If the BLS replacement numbers reported in 
table 3-8 are accurate, the 1990 single-year job displacement 
effect would eliminate roughly one blue collar job opening 
out of eight; one out of six for replacement openings. While 
this single-year impact appears more significant, it is still not 
cataclysmic by any means.
From at least four different perspectives then, the 
magnitude of worker displacement appears even less signifi 
cant than the magnitude of job displacement presented 
earlier in the chapter. Even in the areas of most dramatic im 
pact, the best evidence is that robots alone will not generally
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be enough to offset projected growth in employment. Job 
displacement levels to be produced by robots in this decade 
are small even when compared to replacement requirements 
of the labor force. Thus, on the basis of the evidence 
presented here, it appears that we will continue to need 
welders, machine operators, and assembly workers for the 
immediate future, even in the auto industry.
From the broad perspective, it is apparent that the rapid 
spread of robotics technology through American industry 
will not throw any significant number of American workers 
out of their jobs in this decade. It may still be true in 1990, as 
is claimed by industry sources today, that "no worker in 
American has lost his or her job because of a robot." The 
conclusion of this examination of job displacement by 
robots and the possible unemployment implications is that 
robots will have very little influence on aggregate levels of 
employment and unemployment in the decade of the 1980s. 
However, this conclusion must be tempered somewhat by a 
number of observations.
First, it is important to point out that robots could still 
add to the unemployment problem, even if no one actually 
loses their job due to a robot. If jobs that would have been 
created in the absence of robots are not created, there is a 
loss in the demand for labor, a loss in the total number of 
jobs. In these circumstances, it seems likely that the burden 
of unemployment generated by robots, if any, will fall on 
labor market entrants. Those who have not secured an entry 
to the factory before the robots arrive may be excluded. 
Thus robotics will play a role in the continuing loss of job 
opportunities for the relatively unskilled worker. This is part 
of a process of substitution of machines for humans in pro 
duction that began over 200 years ago. The application of 
robots is yet another step in this evolutionary process.
It should also be noted that job elimination can have 
positive implications too. Robotics technology is generally
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being applied first to dirty, dangerous work situations. One 
of the guidelines for robot installations is, "look for the con 
centration of workers' compensation claims arising for 
prime robot applications." So there can be gains in social 
welfare associated with replacing humans in hazardous oc 
cupations with machines. This may even be true of the ma 
jority of robot installations in the U.S. to date. However, as 
robotics technology diffuses more widely, such as to 
assembly applications, the elimination of dirty and 
dangerous tasks will probably become a less important 
criteria for specific applications.
Last, it is clear from the evidence presented here that the 
job elimination impacts of robots will not be evenly spread 
occupationally, industrially, or geographically. We have 
shown that production painters will be most heavily im 
pacted in the next few years. We have demonstrated that the 
auto industry will experience much more job elimination 
than the average manufacturing industry. We have also ex 
amined the potential impact on a single state and found that 
the job displacement impact of robotics will be concentrated 
in the southeast quadrant of Michigan. There will be other 
such pockets of localized impact where current employment 
is concentrated in manufacturing areas particularly suscepti 
ble to robots technology. So even if the overall unemploy 
ment implications of robotics are negligible, there will still be 
specific sites or specific occupations where the impact may 
be significant in this decade. Thus, there could be a displaced 
worker problem in such areas even if there is no general 
problem.
We will return to these displacement issues again in the 
conclusions chapter when policy implications of the study 
are discussed. Let us turn now to the other side of robotics 
technology: the jobs that will be created as robots spread 
through American industry, and the requirements for 
worker training or retraining that those jobs will impose.
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Only after this side of the picture is fully discussed will the 
final conclusions about job displacement and potential 
unemployment emerge.

4 
Job Creation
Introduction
Currently there are only scattered general statements 
about the job creation potential of robotics. A study by the 
Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress concluded 
that "even if the most optimistic forecasts of sales growth 
materialize, total employment in robotic manufacture would 
not exceed 50,000 at any time in the next decade." (Vedder, 
p. 24) The UM/SME Delphi forecast estimated that 70,000 
to 100,000 robotics-related jobs would be created by 1990. 
(Smith and Wilson, p. 67) The Carnegie-Mellon study in 
dicated that the job creation potential of robotics was quite 
small and concentrated on the displacement question entire 
ly. (Ayres and Miller, 1981a, pp. 134-135)
No primary data base exists from which to estimate the 
number of jobs that will be created by the robotics industry 
in the U.S. or Michigan. Normal U.S. government statistical 
sources are no help whatsoever since robotics is not a 
separately identified industry. According to the Michigan 
Employment Security Commission (MESC), the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) instructions are to place firms that 
produce lifting and handling robots in SIC code 3537 (In 
dustrial Trucks and Tractors), and firms that produce all 
other types of robots in SIC code 3569 (General Industrial 
Machinery, Not Elsewhere Classified). Given the small size 
of robot manufacturing today, such a classification scheme
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insures that no meaningful information about robot 
manufacturing will be available from government sources 
for some years.
Yet, there remains a significant need for such data, par 
ticularly occupational data. Interest in community college 
curricula for robotics technicians appears high nationwide, 
and formal course offerings are proliferating. True, there 
may be a shortage of trained technicians today (not to men 
tion engineers with robot applications experience); but 
robotics is a "glamour" field, so there is also the possibility 
of turning a shortage of technicians into a glut in the near 
future. In any case, meaningful projections of employment 
by occupation in robotics are needed to guide potential new 
entrants to the labor force as well as those who may be seek 
ing retraining.
Given the paucity of data, and other factors that will 
become apparent shortly, this chapter is necessarily more 
speculative than previous chapters. It is an initial effort to 
estimate the potential for job creation due to robotics in the 
U.S. and Michigan by industry and occupation. We will ex 
plain our forecast and assumptions sufficiently to enable (or 
encourage) those who follow to improve on our efforts.
Our estimates were developed from interviews, secondary 
sources, and where necessary, our own judgment. The data 
for the robot manufacturing occupational profile were pro 
vided under conditions of strict anonymity and with the 
understanding that only broad aggregates would be publish 
ed. Although the occupational profile is only an informal 
representation of the robotics industry, it does represent the 
bulk of the output of that industry. Complete data for the 
occupational profile were obtained from firms representing 
well over 50 percent of the output of the industry.
The chapter is organized as follows. A brief description of 
the robot industry today is provided first. Then, the general
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methodology to estimate the employment impacts in 1990 is 
presented, including the limitations of that methodology. 
Third, the total 1990 employment impacts and the specific 
occupational impacts are discussed, for the U.S. and then 
for Michigan. The chapter concludes with an examination of 
the training implications of robotics.
Robot Manufacturing Employment
The U.S. robot manufacturing industry today is still em 
bryonic, accounting for approximately $150 million of sales 
in 1981. Conigliaro's estimates of sales by firm for 1981 are 
provided in table 4-1. The firms with Michigan production 
facilities Prab Robots, Inc., Copperweld Robotics, and 
DeVilbiss accounted for 19 percent of the estimated sales. 
Clearly, however, the industry is dominated currently by 
Unimation in Danbury, Connecticut and Cincinnati 
Milacron, whose headquarters and research facilities are 
located in Ohio and whose production facilities are located 
in South Carolina. Conigliaro says that roughly 20 percent 
of U.S. production is exported (Conigliaro, June 19, 1981, 
p. 2) while the UM/SME Delphi forecast estimates that im 
ports today are 20 percent of sales. Given the European and 
Japanese expertise in robotics technology, it is somewhat 
surprising that the UM/SME Delphi forecast expects the lat 
ter percentage to remain constant through 1990. (Smith and 
Wilson, p. 45)
Our interviews revealed considerable disappointment in 
1982 sales, but that must be weighed against the optimistic 
(perhaps overly optimistic) sales expectations that prevailed 
earlier in the year, as discussed in chapter 2. Of course, there 
also has been some entry of new firms, so smaller-than- 
expected sales may in part reflect smaller market shares. 
There are reports, however, that the new entrants are not do 
ing well in terms of orders. ("A Robotics Mecca in 
Michigan? Car Sales Must Rebound First")
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Table 4-1
Estimated Sales of U.S. Robot 
Manufacturers, 1980-1981*
Sales
1980 1981 
Robot manufacturers (in millions)
Unimation
Cincinnati Milacron
Prab Robots, Inc.
ASEA
Copperweld Robotics
Advanced Robotics Corp.
Automatix
Cybotech
Nordson Corp.
DeVilbiss
Mobot Corp.
U.S. Robot
Other
Total
$ 42
30
6
7.5
4.5
-
0.4
-
1
8
0.7
-
1
$100**
$ 55
40
10
12
6
5
3
3
3
12
1
0.8
2
$150**
SOURCE: Laura Conigliaro, Robotics Newsletter, No. 3 (New York, NY: Prudential- 
Bache Securities, Inc., March 25, 1981), p. 2.
*Conigliaro actually provides a range for sales. We show only the lower end estimates 
because actual total sales in both years were near the lower end of her range according to 
most sources.
**Total sales is itself an estimate, so the individual estimates of firm sales do not sum to the 
total sales estimates.
As stated in chapter 2, we expect sales revenues were flat in 
1982 or perhaps showed a small increase. In any event, sales 
growth in 1982 was much less than that required to support 
some of the higher growth projections. Although prospects 
for 1983 are difficult to assess at this time, there appears no 
basis to expect near term improvement unless a vigorous 
economic recovery begins soon.
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The consensus of economic forecasters is that general 
economic growth in 1983 will be modest at best. The U.S. 
auto companies, after experiencing the worst year since 1961 
in the 1982 model year, remain cautious about production 
plans for 1983 models even though there was some sales im 
provement in late 1982. ("Motor Vehicles, Model Year 
1982," p. 23) Economy-wide reports of 1983 capital spend 
ing plans, including machine tool orders, are especially slug 
gish. ("Business Outlays to Rise Modestly in '83 First Half"; 
"Little Corporate Zest for Leading a Recovery," p. 14; 
"Capital Spending's Sickening Fall," p. 36) In short, strong 
recovery in robot sales, at least in the first half of 1983, ap 
pears unlikely.
We estimate employment in U.S. robot manufacturing 
currently to be approximately 2,000 workers nationwide. 
Consistent with normal BLS practices, this estimate includes 
foreign firms with U.S. production facilities such as the 
Swedish firm, ASEA, but it excludes the sales and service of 
fices of robot importers, even those with U.S. affiliates who 
serve as distributors. The BLS intent is simply to limit the 
definition of a particular manufacturing industry to actual 
domestic producers without regard to ownership. Given the 
rather rapid entry of new firms in this industry, our estimate 
of 2,000 workers is only a rough approximation of 1982 
employment levels.
Our estimate of the current occupational profile of U.S. 
robot manufacturers is presented in table 4-2. For com 
parative purposes, the occupational structure of the motor 
vehicle and equipment industry, all manufacturing, and all 
industries are also presented. The employment profiles have 
been aggregated in the listed occupational groupings 
primarily to facilitate comparison and to highlight the 
technical labor input component. Unquestionably, the most 
surprising finding is that slightly over two-thirds of the 
workers in robot manufacturing are in the traditional white
Table 4-2 g
Current U.S. Occupational Profiles: 
 
Robot Manufacturing, Motor Vehicles and Equipment, ^
All Manufacturing, and All Industries g!
n
Employment distribution (percent)
Robot 
Occupation manufacturing
Engineers 
Engineering technicians 
All other professional and technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Sales workers
Clerical workers
Skilled craft and related workers
Semi-skilled metalworking operatives 
Assemblers and all other operatives
Service workers
Laborers
Farmers and farm workers
Total
23.7 
15.7 
4.2
6.8
3.4
13.9
8.4
4.2 
19.0
-
0.7
-
100.0
Motor vehicles 
& equipment
2.3 
1.2 
2.4
3.3
0.5
6.2
20.8
15.8 
38.6
2.8
6.1
-
100.0
All 
manufacturing
2.8 
2.2 
4.0
5.9
2.2
11.3
18.5
7.2 
36.2
2.0
7.7
-
100.0
All 
industries
1.2 
1.4 
13.5
8.1
6.3
19.9
11.8
1.7 
13.1
15.8
6.0
1.0
100.0
Columns may not add to total due to Founding.
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collar areas of the professions, technicians, administrators, 
sales and clerical workers, while only one-third are in the 
traditional blue collar areas of the crafts, production 
operatives, and laborers. To some extent that is simply a 
reflection of a young, high technology industry with low 
sales, where the firms tend to be assemblers with little 
fabrication of parts. However, it is also indicative of a pro 
duct that cannot be produced and sold like a loaf of bread; 
there are significant requirements for engineering design, 
programming and installation for each specific application.
Engineers are the dominant occupation in robot manufac 
turing (and a large number of the managers, officials and 
proprietors are trained engineers also). We estimate that 23.7 
percent of the robot manufacturing employees currently are 
engineers. The bulk of these jobs are held by mechanical and 
electrical engineers, although there are a large number of 
electronic/computer specialists as well. There are also "pro 
posal sales engineers" who prepare detailed plans and cost 
estimates based upon information from sales represen 
tatives. One manufacturer described "proposal sales 
engineers" as the heart of the business and claimed that only 
the best engineers are assigned the task. We did not classify 
these people as sales workers because it would not be in 
dicative of the training required for the job. We estimate that 
no more than one-fourth of the engineers are working in 
research and development efforts at present.
The second most prevalent occupation, engineering 
technicians, represents 15.7 percent of the workforce. The 
bulk of these jobs could be called "robotics technicians," 
although there are also drafters, mechanical engineering 
technicians, and electrical and electronic technicians. The 
term robotics technician is more generic today than descrip 
tive of a specific occupation with clearly defined training re 
quirements. One manufacturer was not even aware of com 
munity college graduates in this field. It is likely that as two-
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year graduates become readily available, manufacturers will 
mold the job to the tasks for which the technician is best 
trained or for which an aptitude exists. Currently, the most 
prevalent tasks for robotics technicians in robot manufactur 
ing are testing, programming, installing and 
troubleshooting, both in the manufacturer's plant and on- 
site with purchaser of the robot. Some robotics technicians 
also function as trainers and manual writers. One manufac 
turer speculated that perhaps some might become sales 
representatives. To some extent, robotics technicians are the 
key to ameliorating any possible shortage of trained robotics 
personnel in the short run. Robotics technicians are also 
needed for maintenance tasks by corporate users of robots, a 
topic which is discussed later.
Together, engineers and technicians constitute nearly 40 
percent of all employment in robot manufacturing. That 
must be tempered with the knowledge that the industry is 
very small absolutely, so 40 percent of robot industry 
employment probably represents less than 1000 jobs nation 
wide. The future prospects for engineers and technicians in 
robot manufacturing are discussed later.
The concentration in the technical areas is offset by a 
relative lack of jobs in the production worker occupations 
typical of more conventional manufacturing industries. 
Table 4-2 shows a marked lack of craft workers, semi-skilled 
metalworking operatives, assemblers, and laborers when 
compared to other manufacturing. Clearly, this reflects the 
low level of robot production, but it also reveals the high 
technology component of robotics.
In general, robot manufacturing can be contrasted with 
other manufacturing by the rather obvious "skill-twist" of 
the occupations. Over two-thirds of the jobs are white collar 
versus much less than one-third in all manufacturing. Well 
over 50 percent of the jobs in robot manufacturing require
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two years or more of college training versus less than 20 per 
cent in all manufacturing. Even assemblers in robot 
manufacturing generally perform higher-order assembly 
tasks than most assemblers in other manufacturing in 
dustries.
Robot-Related Employment
Besides employment in robot manufacturing itself, there 
are also numerous jobs created directly in other industries as 
a result of the spread of robotics technology. Robot-related 
employment exists today in firms that are direct suppliers to 
robot manufacturers and in firms that use robots. Some 
employment is also beginning to emerge in what we designate 
as robot systems engineering primarily the installations or 
applications engineering required for robot systems. This 
area may or may not actually develop into an identifiable 
sector but it will likely create additional employment oppor 
tunities nonetheless.
Direct Suppliers to Manufacturers
Robot manufacturing directly creates jobs in firms that 
supply the parts and components (material inputs) to make a 
robot. Table 4-3 details the major components of a com 
posite robot, the industry of origin by SIC code (3-digit level 
of aggregation), and the value of the material inputs supplied 
by each industry as a percent of the total value of material in 
puts. The information in the table was provided by William 
R. Tanner, a robotics expert and engineering consultant. The 
total value of material inputs makes no allowance for shop 
labor to assemble a robot, applications engineering, or any 
overhead costs. Naturally, these parts and components ac 
tually vary somewhat depending on the in-house capabilities 
of the robot manufacturer and the type of robot being pro 
duced.
Table 4-3 
Major Component Parts of Robot by Industry of Origin
SIC
code Industry Major parts of robot
Percent of
total value of
material inputs3
o 
cr
O
304 Rubber and plastics hose and belting
306 Fabricated rubber products, not 
elsewhere classified
307 Miscellaneous plastics products
329 Abrasive, asbestos, and miscellaneous 
nonmetallic mineral products
331 Blast furnaces, steel works, and 
rolling and finishing mills
332 Iron and steel foundries
335 Rolling, drawing, and extruding 
of nonferrous metals
336 Nonferrous foundries (castings)
339 Miscellaneous primary metal products
343 Heating equipment, except electric and 
warm air, and plumbing fixtures
344 Fabricated structural metal products
Pneumatic hose, rubber belting, V-belts 
Rubberized fabrics, grommets, tubing
Vulcanized fiber, foams, molded plastic 
parts, custom compounds of resins 
Gaskets, grease seals, oil seals
Steel pipes and tubes
Malleable iron castings 
Copper wiring and tubing
Aluminum castings 
Heat treated metal parts 
Heat exchangers, radiators
Manufactured sheet metal forms 
and machine guards
1
1
1
1
<3
345 Screw machine products, and bolts, 
nuts, screws, rivets, and washers
346 Steel forgings and stampings
349 Miscellaneous fabricated metal
products 
356 General industrial machinery and
equipment
357 Office, computing, and accounting
machines 
359 Miscellaneous machinery, except
electrical 
362 Electrical industrial apparatus
364 Electric lighting and wiring equipment
Bolts, nuts, screws, rivets, washers
Electronic enclosures, perforated
stamped metal
Valves and pipe fittings, wire springs, 
fabricated pipe and pipe fittings 
Pumps, ball and roller bearings, 
blowers for exhaust fans, air filters, 
speed changers, gears, ball joints, 
clutches, couplings, drive chains, 
sprockets, pulleys, fluid power 
motors, fluid filter elements 
Electronic computing equipment
Cylinders, machined parts on job basis
Electric motors, synchros, electro 
magnetic brakes and clutches, 
electric motor controls and starters, 
positioning controls, solenoid 
switches, controls and control 
accessories
Current-carrying wiring devices, non- 
current-carrying wiring devices
<3
1
17
14
30
18
o o*
O
Table 4-3 (continued) 
Major Component Parts of Robot by Industry of Origin
SIC
code Industry Major parts of robot
Percent of
total value of
material inputs3
o
cr
Q 
n
367 Electronic components and 
accessories
382 Measuring and controlling 
instruments
Semiconductors and related devices, 
electronic capacitors, resistors, 
electronic coils, transformers, 
inductors, electronic connectors, 
printed circuits, switches 
Industrial instruments for measurement, 
display and control of process 
variables, totalizing fluid meters 
and counting devices, instruments 
for measuring and testing of 
electricity, other measuring and 
control devices
<2
SOURCE: William R. Tanner, Productivity Systems, Inc., Farmington, Michigan.
a. Total value of material inputs does not allow for shop labor to assemble robot, applications engineering, or any other overhead costs.
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Table 4-3 is important because it indicates the direct sup 
plier industries that will experience the greatest employment 
impacts due to the growth of robot manufacturing itself. Ac 
cording to these results, five industries account for the bulk 
(83 percent) of the value of all material inputs. The computer 
or microprocessor and other associated electronic hardware 
are provided primarily by the SIC code 357 (Office, Com 
puting, and Accounting Machines) and SIC code 367 (Elec 
tronic Components and Accessories) sectors respectively. 
Together, these two industries account for approximately 18 
percent of the value of material inputs. That percentage may 
appear low to those unfamiliar with robotics technology but 
today's robot does not require a complicated general pur 
pose computer. SIC code 356 (General Industrial Machinery 
and Equipment) provides various pumps, motors, gears, 
speed changers, etc., and accounts for 17 percent of the 
value of material inputs. Electric motors and controls and 
other electrical apparatus is provided by SIC code 362 (Elec 
trical Industrial Apparatus). These items account for ap 
proximately 18 percent of the value of material inputs. Final 
ly, machine shops that provide precision-cut steel or steel 
alloy parts constitute the largest single proportion of the 
value of material inputs, approximately 30 percent. These 
machine shops are classified in SIC code 359 (Miscellaneous 
Machinery, Except Electrical).
As shown in table 4-3 there are numerous other industries 
involved in supplying component parts to robot manufac 
turers, but each of them is relatively minor. In total, these 
other industries provide about 17 percent of the material in 
puts for a typical robot. The listing of the major parts of a 
robot is long but the components themselves do not stretch 
the bounds of existing technology or the manufacturing 
capabilities of supplier firms. To some extent it is true that 
the robot itself represents old technology. The challenge is to 
extend robot capability and reliability while successfully in 
tegrating them into specific production processes.
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Robot Systems Engineering
The process of integrating robots with other plant equip 
ment is usually called installations or applications engineer 
ing. The bulk of the installations engineering today is being 
performed by robot manufacturers or by the purchasers 
themselves. There is no evidence yet, however, that in-house 
plant engineering staffs of user firms are being expanded to 
accommodate the introduction of robots, although some 
think that must (or should) be done. Robots today simply are 
an added responsibility for plant engineering staffs of user 
firms. Thus, the current situation raises few interesting 
robot-related employment questions. As robot systems 
become more numerous, however, there may be significant 
changes in applications engineering responsibilities.
According to the UM/SME Delphi forecast, 20 percent of 
industrial robots will be purchased as part of robot systems 
(versus individual stand-alone units) by 1985. That figure is 
expected to climb to 40 percent of all sales by 1990. (Smith 
and Wilson, p. 46) Even small robot installations of one or 
two units can be complicated, but larger installations of 
robot systems present many more predesign and technical in 
tegration problems. The robots must be interfaced not only 
with other plant equipment but also with each other; the 
details of planning and design expand geometrically. Addi 
tional applications engineering capability will be mandatory 
with such complex systems. The question is who will provide 
these applications engineering services.
In our interviews, considerable interest on the part of users 
was expressed in outside engineering assistance for robot in 
stallations. Some even indicated a desire for so-called "turn 
key" robot systems. The term "turn-key" is applied (as in 
computer systems applications) to systems providers who are 
able to completely install one or more robots and all 
associated peripheral equipment, including any special pur-
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pose or hard automation. The "turn-key" provider 
guarantees operation of the system and turns it over to the 
purchaser only after successful operation, hence the name 
"turn-key." Some robot manufacturers, independent robot 
systems consultants (who are not robot manufacturers), and 
traditional machine tool or dedicated automation providers, 
have all indicated interest in the market for "turn-key" 
systems. A partial list of the firms who have either an 
nounced entry or who are expected to enter this market in 
clude: Unimation, Cincinnati Milacron, Bendix, Cross and 
Trecker, F. Joseph Lamb, General Electric, IBM and Texas 
Instruments. This market is attracting so much attention 
because the systems provider acts as a general contractor and 
therefore may come to be influential in total factory automa 
tion purchase decisions.
It is not necessary in this study to determine either who 
will provide robot systems or whether significant markets 
will emerge for "turn-key" robot systems. However, it is im 
portant to note that robot systems will require significant ap 
plications engineering capabilities that will likely add to 
robot-related employment. In part, the strong desire of users 
of robots for outside assistance in performing robot applica 
tions engineering is just another reflection of the lack of ade 
quately trained personnel who truly understand the 
capabilities and limitations of robotics technology.
Besides applications engineering, installation of robot 
systems also requires considerable peripheral equipment and 
special purpose or dedicated machinery, usually denoted as 
the hard automation in the system. In general, such equip 
ment has been provided by the traditional machine tool or 
capital goods sector. Thus one might plausibly argue that the 
hard automation in robot systems may create net new 
employment in the traditional machine tool sector; but that 
scenario appears to be of dubious validity, at least judging 
by the experience in the auto industry.
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The bulk of all robot investments in the auto industry are 
being made during normal retooling or major overhauls of 
plant and equipment to produce new models. It does not ap 
pear logical to expect robot systems to create additional 
demands for the special purpose (and custom designed) 
machinery for the fabrication of auto parts. The composi 
tion of some of the support equipment like conveyors will 
certainly change but not necessarily substantially increase. In 
brief, the bulk of the hard automation in robot systems may 
be the identical machinery or slightly different machinery 
from what would have been used in the absence of robots. 
Economists call this capital for capital substitution. The true 
extent of the substitution is uncertain and beyond the scope 
of this study to determine empirically. However, it will likely 
be greatest in industries that are using significant amounts of 
automated equipment already, the same mass production in 
dustries most likely to adopt robots in the first place. Thus it 
appears doubtful that the installation of robot systems will 
be a significant plus for the traditional machine tool sector in 
terms of net new employment.
It should also be emphasized explicitly that the traditional 
machine tool firms may increasingly experience serious com 
petition from the new providers of robot systems. The poten 
tial loss to the old-line firms includes not only the general 
contracting and design but also the possibility that at least 
some of the hard automation will not be sub-contracted to 
these firms either. In short, the introduction of robot 
systems may significantly alter long-standing relationships 
between firms and their traditional machine tool providers. 
No doubt, that is the very reason that some of the larger 
machine tool providers to the auto industry have themselves 
announced entry in the new market for robot systems.
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Robot User Firms
The final area in which a significant number of jobs will be 
available is robot maintenance at corporate user locations. 
Typically, production up-time requirements are so high that 
maintenance must be available immediately in the case of 
robot failure. There are even stories of robots literally cut 
from the line and replaced with human workers to maintain 
production schedules. However, experienced personnel 
trained in complex machinery repair are not intimidated by 
robots and in fact are performing robot maintenance today 
with three months or less of training. We define these 
maintenance personnel as robotics technicians, but in firms 
with small numbers of robots such technicians will be re 
quired to maintain a variety of automated equipment. Even 
in larger firms, flexibility may be required of such techni 
cians.
In the auto industry currently, robot maintenance techni 
cians are primarily skilled electricians who have received 
specialized training in robot maintenance. Since robots are 
production equipment and all production equipment is 
maintained by members of the skilled trades bargaining unit 
of the UAW, these jobs will remain within the UAW in 
autos. As developed later in the chapter, it is doubtful that 
any of these jobs will be available to new graduates of two- 
year robotics technician programs in the near term.
At least two other job specialties are sometimes mentioned 
as potentially significant new robotics-related employment 
opportunities at corporate user firms: robot operators and 
robot programmers. We believe there is little potential for 
either. Presumably, robot operators would have minimal 
robotics training and oversee the operation of one or more 
robots. Such a function however, appears contradictory and 
self-defeating if the robot or robots were purchased to 
replace human workers (save labor costs). Provided suffi-
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cient electrical and/or mechanical limit or stop-switches were 
installed originally to properly interface the robot with other 
plant equipment, an operator should not be required in nor 
mal circumstances. In short, the term robot operator appears 
to be a misnomer, logically inconsistent and unlikely to 
emerge as a separate new occupation or employment oppor 
tunity.
The employment possibilities for robot programmers at 
corporate user locations are slightly more difficult to deal 
with. In nontechnical terms, today's robots are preprogram 
med with a general software package that will enable the 
robot to accept (and remember) a specific routine. The 
specific routine itself is usually programmed and fully tested 
by the manufacturer on behalf of the purchaser of the robot. 
Once installed at the purchaser's location, today's industrial 
robots are usually not reprogrammed. However, to the ex 
tent that reprogramming is necessary for some specific ap 
plications, robot software packages, like other computer 
software packages, are made to be "user friendly." In our 
interviews, one robot manufacturer claimed that robot pro 
gramming can be learned in two hours or less. That may be 
optimistic but certainly robotics technicians or others with 
similar skills can quickly learn to program robots with 
specific routines and in fact are doing so today as part of 
their regular duties.
Highly skilled computer specialists are required to develop 
the general software packages for robots, and more 
sophisticated robots and robot systems will increase the com 
plexity of that software, particularly the requirements for in 
terfacing the robots with plant equipment. However, as long 
as reprogramming tends to be infrequent or does not require 
changes in the general software, these positions will remain 
small in number and likely will continue to be found at robot 
manufacturers, specialty suppliers to robot manufacturers,
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or possibly with robot systems providers, rather than at user 
sites.
The purpose of the discussion of robot-related employ 
ment was to lay the necessary groundwork for our projec 
tions of job creation associated with the spread of robots in 
the U.S. and Michigan. Robotics-related jobs exist today in 
direct suppliers to robot manufacturers and in robotics 
maintenance at corporate user sites. As of now, the robotics 
applications engineering is being done largely by robot 
manufacturers and/or by the purchasers. However, the 
growth of robot systems will likely create new employment 
opportunities in this area. With these general categories of 
employment established, we are prepared to present our 
forecast of specific job creation accompanying the spread of 
robotics technology.
Forecast of Job Creation 
Due to Robotics
One of our goals in this study was to develop a consistent 
economic framework within which to estimate the impact of 
industrial robots in the U.S. and Michigan. To some extent, 
the specific methodology to forecast job creation is predeter 
mined or conditioned by other parts of the study, although 
there are some unique issues in job creation. General 
methodological issues are discussed first; this includes the 
range of the estimates, the specific industries and/or areas in 
which jobs will be created, and the limitations of our ap 
proach. Then the individual industry forecasts are presented 
with an explicit discussion of any unique assumptions that 
apply to each. Finally, a summary occupational structure of 
the jobs created is presented.
As stated earlier, some of the methodological issues in job 
creation are predetermined or conditioned by other parts of 
the study. The projection date remains 1990. The range in
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the expected U.S. population of robots from 50,000 to 
100,000 implies an annual robot sales level in 1990 of 14,175 
to 28,350 robots, assuming a constant rate of growth 
throughout the forecast period. The exponential growth 
assumption is artificial, but no one can predict the peaks and 
valleys of the business cycle; so there really is no viable alter 
native to assuming a 1990 sales level which is consistent with 
the average growth needed to achieve the projected 1990 
population of robots.
As mentioned earlier, Conigliaro estimates robot exports 
as 20 percent of production today, and the UM/SME Delphi 
study estimates imports at a constant 20 percent of sales 
through 1990. In the absence of any better information, we 
have assumed imports and exports will roughly offset each 
other. Consequently, a 50,000 to 100,000 range in the U.S. 
population of robots in 1990 is still consistent with U.S. pro 
duction of 14,175 to 28,350 robots in 1990.
However, there is no guarantee that American producers 
will hold their share of the worldwide robot market. If ex 
ports were to fall or imports were to rise significantly, the 
employment effects would be correspondingly reduced in the 
manufacture of robots and in robot manufacturing sup 
pliers. This threat is especially menacing because of Japanese 
and European expertise in robotics technology. It is impor 
tant not to delude ourselves; just because the U.S. may be a 
large market for robots, there is no guarantee that those 
robots will be manufactured here.
There is also the question of robot replacement demand in 
1990, although this is less difficult to deal with than the ex 
port/import market. Because the population of robots is so 
small today and because the lifespan of robots is expected to 
be a decade or more, there will be very little replacement de 
mand until well into the 1990s. Even if there are significant 
breakthroughs in robotics technology in the near future, we
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do not expect obsolescence to become a factor in the demand 
for robots, since they are capital goods and can be expected 
to generate productive services for many years.
The industries and/or areas within which jobs will be 
created directly by industrial robots were introduced in our 
earlier discussion of the robotics industry today; namely, 
robot manufacturing, direct suppliers to robot manufac 
turers, robot systems engineering, and corporate users of 
robotics technology. Corporate robot users are again 
separated into autos and nonautos to maintain comparabili 
ty with the job displacement figures in the previous chapter.
We will estimate the likely applications engineering re 
quirement for robot systems without specifying the industry 
within which that employment will occur. It might be argued 
that corporate users will increase their engineering staffs to 
support the development of robot systems; but there is little 
evidence of that so far. It is possible that the robot manufac 
turers will best understand robot systems and therefore will 
sell their products inclusive of applications engineering ser 
vices. It may be that machine tool builders who already act 
as general contractors for automated systems are best suited 
to provide the new robot systems. Finally, one could argue 
that independent robotics specialists (consultants) will evolve 
to supply robot systems. Our interviews supported all of 
these viewpoints and more. However, the truth is that no one 
knows the likely market outcome, so we attempt to estimate 
the applications engineering requirement without regard to 
industry of employment.
In summary, we estimate total employment in the U.S. in 
1990 directly due to robotics in four broad areas: robot 
manufacturing, direct suppliers to robot manufacturers, 
robot systems engineering, and corporate robot users, the 
latter to identify maintenance requirements for robots. The 
projected employment impacts are based upon estimates of
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annual sales in 1990 that are consistent with the total popula 
tion of robots forecast in chapter 2.
Although we believe that the above is the best possible 
procedure to estimate job creation given the constraints of 
this study, there are limitations and caveats which must be 
stated. First, we have not estimated the induced income ef 
fects that lead to further job creation. Clearly, the new 
employees in robotics spend their income which creates fur 
ther jobs in wholesale and retail trade, services, etc. 
However, we have not estimated the negative induced in 
come effect of jobs displaced either. Suffice it to say that the 
induced income effects, both positive and negative, raise 
complex issues that are beyond the scope of this study and 
neither is investigated here. Our method does include the 
total impact of purchases of material inputs by robot 
manufacturers, however.
A closely related limitation is that we do not consider price 
or competitive effects. As stated earlier, robots are intro 
duced to lower costs and improve the quality of the product. 
If price reductions result, this will add to demand. Thus the 
productivity gains are passed along to the consumers of the 
product, and the increasing level of sales induces some 
"second-order" job creation. The other side of this argu 
ment is that without robots there would be additional job 
losses in those industries falling prey to foreign competition, 
so displacement questions can be ignored. The respon- 
siveness of demand to price (called elasticity of demand by 
economists) and competitive effects are legitimate issues. We 
are not able to make specific forecasts of their magnitude, 
however, so these issues are not directly addressed here.
A final limitation is that we estimate total direct job crea 
tion rather than the increase in jobs from now to 1990. In 
other words, some jobs already exist today in robotics in the 
U.S., and those impacts have already been registered in the
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national economy. In chapter 3 we disregarded any in 
termediate displacement effects that had already occurred, 
so we do likewise in this chapter on job creation. In any 
event, the precision of our estimates is not sufficient that 
2,000 employees make a significant difference. Again, we are 
trying to establish the general order of magnitude of job 
creation in robotics by 1990; that is all that is possible at this 
early date.
The potential cumulative direct job creation in the U.S. by 
1990 due to robotics is presented in table 4-4. We estimate 
that the total number of jobs created will range from a low 
of about 32,000 to a high of about 64,000. The low range of 
the estimate assumes a 1990 impact which is consistent with a 
U.S. population of robots of 50,000, and production of 
14,175 robots in 1990. The high range of the estimate 
assumes an impact consistent with a population of 100,000 
robots in 1990 and production of 28,350 robots in 1990. 
Both the low and high estimates assume no change in the 
relative importance of the U.S. import or export market for 
robots.
Table 4-4
Direct Job Creation in U.S. 
Due to Robotics, 1990
Employment
Range of estimate 
Area or industry Low High
Robot manufacturing
Direct suppliers to robot manufacturers
Robot systems engineering
User firms - auto
User firms - other
Total
8,700
8,091
5,297
3,000
7,000
32,088
17,400
16,182
10,594
5,000
15,000
64,176
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Robot Manufacturing
We estimate employment in robot manufacturing in the 
U.S. to range from a low of 8,700 to a high of 17,400 in 
1990. This was estimated in the following way. Gross sales 
volume per employee by robot manufacturers exceeded 
$90,000 according to our interviews, while Conigliaro's 
estimated average price in 1981 slightly exceeded $70,000. 
(Conigliaro, June 19, 1981, p. 9) That implies an average 
output per employee of just under 1.3 robots. 1 Productivity 
was assumed to improve by a conservative 3.4 percent per 
year, the forecasted rate for all manufacturing contained in 
the National Planning Association's projections of the U.S. 
economy. (Terleckji and Holdrich, p. 4) So average output 
per worker in robot manufacturing would be slightly over 
1.6 robots by 1990. Total U.S. employment in robot 
manufacturing in 1990 was then determined by dividing the 
potential market of 14,175 units to 28,350 units by average 
output per employee.
We believe that 1990 employment in robot manufacturing 
is likely overestimated using our procedure. First, 1982 has 
not been a good year for robot manufacturers, so sales per 
employee may not reflect average conditions in the industry. 
Also, there may have been overstaffing due to expected 
strong growth that did not materialize. Both these facts lead 
us to think that sales per employee, the numerator in 
estimated robot output per employee, is probably 
underestimated. Second, Conigliaro's average price (the 
denominator in estimating average robot output per 
employee) was a 1981 price, while prices are know to be fall 
ing in 1982. So the denominator is probably overestimated. 
In addition, the productivity improvement factor of 3.4 per-
1. Our rough estimate of employment in robot manufacturing of 2,000 included an 
estimate of employment in some firms with little or no robot sales in 1982. For obvious 
reasons, such firms were excluded from the calculations for average robot sales per 
employee and therefore average robot output per employee.
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cent annually appears extremely modest for such a young in 
dustry. These industries are the very ones that sometimes ex 
hibit spectacular productivity gains. All of these factors lead 
us to think that average robot output per worker is 
underestimated in our calculations. This has the effect of 
overestimating the employment in robot manufacturing con 
sistent with a given level of sales. This approach was used 
nonetheless because of our decision to use known facts and 
conservative assumptions throughout the study.
Direct Suppliers to Manufacturers
We estimate employment in firms that are direct suppliers 
to robot manufacturers in the U.S. to be from about 8,000 to 
16,000. We followed the approach of Burford and Katz 
where the direct supplier jobs or interindustry effects can be 
found as a multiple of the jobs in the primary industry, 
robotics in our case. (Burford and Katz, p. 152) The 
Burford-Katz technique can be applied in a nation or region 
(the latter will be helpful later in developing estimates for the 
State of Michigan) to estimate the direct supplier jobs where 
an input-output table which details the interindustry rela 
tionships is not available for the industry in question, or the 
industry itself is new so the interindustry relationships are 
unknown. Specifically,
Wj
M; = 
J l - w
where
Mj = relative effect of industry j on supplier industries in the
region.
wj = expenditures within the region of the jth industry as a 
proportion of total shipments.
w = average expenditures of all industries in the region as a 
proportion of total shipments.
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Descriptively, the Burford-Katz technique is simply saying 
that the direct supplier effect in a nation or region is depen 
dent on the uniqueness of the industry in question, which is 
measured by the purchases the industry makes from other in 
dustries as a proportion of its total shipments (wj) and on the 
average interrelations among all industries that exist within 
the nation or region (w). Burford and Katz tested their ap 
proach against several regions where input/output tables 
were available and found their short-cut method to be very 
precise. Of course, that kind of precision will not be achieved 
here, but it is possible to obtain a reasonable estimate of the 
direct supplier effect of robot manufacturing in the U.S.
Estimation of the direct supplier effect using the Burford- 
Katz approach is relatively straightforward. Step one was to 
estimate w, essentially the material purchases of all firms in 
the nation as a proportion of total shipments. The total 
materials purchased by all U.S. manufacturing industries as 
a proportion of sales was 57 percent in 1977 according to the 
1977 Census of Manufactures. (U.S. Department of Com 
merce, 198la, pp. 30-31) So a reasonable estimate of w is 
.57.
The second step was to estimate wj, the average material 
purchases of robot manufacturers in the U.S. Our interviews 
revealed a remarkable consistency in estimates of material 
purchases as a percent of sales in robot manufacturing 40 
percent. So, if 40 percent of total sales of robot manufac 
turers are material purchases, and 57 percent of total sales of 
all manufacturing firms in the nation are material purchases, 
that leads to a direct supplier effect of .93. This implies that 
for every job created in robot manufacturing in the U.S., 
another .93 jobs are created in direct supplier industries. 
Thus, 8,700 to 17,400 jobs in robot manufacturing lead to 
8,091 to 16,182 jobs in other manufacturing industries in the 
U.S.
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In assessing the estimates of the direct supplier effect of 
robot manufacturing utilizing the Burford-Katz technique, 
several cautions and comments are worth mentioning. First, 
we do not account for import purchases of robot manufac 
turers or for all industries, the net effect of which may either 
lower or raise the direct supplier effect. If import purchases 
of materials are relatively more important for robot 
manufacturers than for all industries, then the direct supplier 
effect will be lower. Second, we do not allow for industry 
growth that sometimes increases interindustry dependence 
and the associated multiplier effect, especially for new in 
dustries like robot manufacturing. In both of these cases 
there is no empirical basis to determine the likelihood or 
magnitude of the possible change.
The third caution is that we utilize output relationships 
estimated with the Burford-Katz technique to determine 
employment impacts in the direct supplier industries. The 
resultant estimates will be true if and only if the supplier in 
dustries hire at the same rate as robot manufacturing. In this 
case that is probably acceptable since sales per employee in 
robot manufacturing is near the U.S. average for all 
manufacturing and the supplier effect itself is approximated 
by the U.S. average; but it remains a rough approximation 
only.
Given these cautions, we sought some confirmation of our 
estimate that (on average) for every job created in robot 
manufacturing .93 jobs are created in direct supplier in 
dustries. 2 That was done by examining related industries in 
the national input/output table for the U.S. where complete
2. Wassily Leontief, Institute for Economic Analysis, New York University, has under 
taken a large project with support from the National Science Foundation to determine the 
impact of technological change on employment to the year 2000. The effort by Leontief 
holds the prospect of yielding more definitive information about the direct supplier effect 
of robot manufacturing and other emerging high technology industries.
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interindustry relations are available, imports are accounted 
for, and employment to output relations are known directly. 
Unpublished data from the 151 sector national input/output 
table were provided by the Office of Economic Growth and 
Employment, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Specifically the 
1981 total employment requirements table was utilized. This 
table shows total employment impacts per one million 
dollars of sales of the product of each industry to final users, 
based upon the interindustry relationships in the 1977 in 
put/output table (the most recently available) and 1981 
employment to output relationships.
As discussed earlier in the study, the most closely related 
industry to robot manufacturing is generally acknowledged 
to be numerically controlled machine tools; a more distant 
second might be computers. In the national input/output 
table, numerically controlled machine tools are a part of 
metalworking machinery. For that sector (SIC code 354) the 
1981 employment requirements table indicates that on 
average, for every job created in metalworking machinery 
.73 jobs are created in supplier industries. 3 Similarly, for 
every job created in computers and peripheral equipment 
(SIC codes 3573-3574), 1.53 jobs are created in supplier in 
dustries.
When compared to our estimate of the direct supplier ef 
fect of .93 for robot manufacturing, the national input/out 
put table indicates that the direct supplier effect of 
metalworking machinery is less than that for robot manufac 
turing, but the effect of computers and peripheral equipment 
is significantly greater. Of course, such comparisons are 
never clear-cut (metalworking machinery encompasses much 
more than numerically controlled machine tools) and do not 
constitute empirical proof in any event. Nonetheless, it is in-
3. The direct supplier effect was approximated as the total employment impact of the in 
dustry per million dollars of sales minus the impact in the primary industry itself with the 
result divided by the employment impact in the primary industry.
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teresting that the national estimates of related industries do 
not contradict our estimates of the direct supplier effect for 
robot manufacturing; they even support the notion that 
robot manufacturing is more closely aligned with 
metalworking machinery, its most closely related industry in 
the national input/output table, than with computers.
Besides computers, we also calculated the direct supplier 
effect for the four other major parts and components sup 
pliers for robots. The results are .71 for SIC code 359 
(Miscellaneous Machinery, Except Electrical), 1.05 for SIC 
code 362 (Electrical Industrial Apparatus), .90 for SIC code 
367 (Electronic Components and Accessories), and 1.19 for 
SIC code 356 (General Industrial Machinery and 
Equipment). If the direct employment impact of robot 
manufacturing is assumed to be the weighted average of 
these five industries which supply 83 percent of the value of 
material inputs to robot manufacturers, where the weights 
are the relative percentages from table 4-3, the direct supplier 
effect is 1.03, once again close to the impact estimated with 
the Burford-Katz technique.
In short, we conclude that the order of magnitude of our 
estimate of the direct supplier effect of robot manufacturing 
is very reasonable. The direct supplier effects of robot 
manufacturing may appear modest to some observers, but 
any industry where material purchases are only 40 percent of 
sales will likely have a small relative effect on other in 
dustries.
Robot Systems Engineering
Total employment in robot systems engineering in the 
U.S. was estimated as 5,300 to 10,600 in 1990. This is a net 
figure that represents the likely applications engineering 
employment, without specifying the actual industry of 
employment. As discussed earlier, that means these jobs may
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be with corporate users, robot manufacturers, machine 
toolmakers, or independent robot systems consultants. Since 
robot systems are not a separate market at this point, both 
total employment and the occupational profile are based on 
very sketchy information. First, total system sales in 1990 are 
estimated. According to the UM/SME Delphi study, the 
total robot market in 1990, including total system sales and 
individual unit sales of robots, will be nearly $2 billion in 
terms of 1980 dollars. (Smith and Wilson, p. 50) The 
UM/SME Delphi forecast also estimates that the 1990 
average price for a robot will be $30,000 in terms of 1980 
dollars. In addition, 40 percent of all robot sales will be 
system sales, and 30 percent of the cost of a system is the 
robots themselves. (Smith and Wilson, pp. 37, 46 and 47) 
That implies that the nearly $2 billion robot market in 1990 
consists of $.6 billion in individual units, $.4 billion pack 
aged for systems, and $.93 billion in other systems hardware. 
So total system sales in 1990 in terms of 1980 dollars would 
be $1.33 billion.
The UM/SME Delphi estimate of the total systems market 
in 1990 must be adjusted downward to reflect our smaller 
forecast of unit sales of robots in 1990. We estimate 1990 
robot sales at 28,350 (maximum) while the UM/SME Delphi 
forecast implies unit sales of 33,333 ($1 billion divided by the 
average price of $30,000). Using the ratio of our estimate of 
unit sales to the UM/SME Delphi estimate of unit sales, our 
derived estimate of total systems sales of $1.13 billion in 
1990 emerges.
The second step is to estimate the applications engineering 
required for system sales of $1.13 billion. According to our 
interviews, applications engineering constitutes about 30 per 
cent of the cost of a robot system, so the applications 
engineering required for $1.13 billion total system sales 
would be approximately $340 million. We then assumed that 
approximately 80 percent of the applications engineering re-
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quirement is personnel costs, which results in $272 million 
wage income for applications engineering in robot systems. 
The third step is to estimate employment, given that the ap 
plications engineering represents approximately $272 million 
(1980 dollars) of wage income in 1990. That requires estima 
tion of the occupational content of the jobs as well as 
average pay for those jobs. Those estimates are presented in 
table 4-5.
The occupational distribution for the applications 
engineering of robot systems is unknown today, so a 
hypothetical distribution was constructed based upon the oc 
cupational profile of robot manufacturers. The relative im 
portance of (1) all other professional and technical workers, 
(2) managers, officials, and proprietors, (3) sales workers, 
and (4) clerical workers is the same as that for robot 
manufacturers. The remainder of the occupational profile, 
engineers and robotics technicians, assumes a two-to-one 
ratio between these occupations. That is based on the oc 
cupational profile of robot manufacturers who limit robotics 
technicians to testing, programming, troubleshooting, and 
installation of robots. Given that our estimates of the dollar 
value of the applications engineering of robot systems is 
stated in terms of 1980 dollars, the relative distribution of 
occupations can be used in conjunction with estimates of 
average earnings for these occupations in 1980 to arrive at 
total employment for robot systems engineering of 10,594 as 
illustrated in table 4-5. The identical procedure was followed 
for the low growth scenario which assumes a smaller market 
for robots in 1990. Although the details of those calculations 
are not discussed here, the net result is a minimum estimate 
of employment in robot systems engineering of 5,297.
Of course the separate estimation of approximately 5,300 
to 10,600 jobs in robot systems engineering in 1990 and the 
occupational content of those jobs is highly speculative. This 
market barely exists today, and the future structure of the
Table 4-5 
Robot Systems Engineering Employment in 1990
Occupation
Engineers
Robotics technicians
All other professional and
technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Sales workers
Clerical workers
Total
Employment
distribution
(percent)
47.8
23.9
4.2
6.8
3.4
13.9
100.0
Total
employment
5,064
2,532
445
720
360
1,473
10,594
Annual average
pay in 1980
(dollars)3
29,806
19,896
24,984
32,461
27,253
17,993
 
Total pay
(millions)
150.9
50.4
11.1
23.4
9.8
26.5
272.1
ON
O
cr
n
a. Source of average annual pay data is U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Money Income of Households, Families, and 
Persons in the United States: 1980, Series P-60, No. 132, p. 195.
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market is unknown. At one extreme one might argue that we 
are guilty of double-counting, in that employment in robot 
manufacturing of 8,700 to 17,400 sufficiently accounts for 
the applications engineering requirement of robot systems. 
However, we think that future development of robot systems 
will cause a significant increase in the need for applications 
engineering to successfully install those systems, even though 
we cannot at this time identify the specific industry within 
which that employment will occur. At the other extreme one 
might argue that we are guilty of under-counting the jobs 
that will be created to provide the hard automation in robot 
systems. However, as discussed earlier, we think much of the 
hard automation in robot systems will be capital for capital 
substitution. Therefore the traditional machine tool sector 
will not experience significant net expansion due to the in 
troduction of robot systems, although there certainly may be 
changes in the composition of the hard automation required 
and in the specific firms which provide it.
Robot User Firms
The estimates of the jobs created in the corporate user in 
dustries in the U.S. are 3,000 to 5,000 in autos and 7,000 to 
15,000 in all other manufacturing. All of these jobs are 
assigned to robot maintenance, loosely called robotics 
technicians in this study, although such technicians may be 
required to maintain other automated equipment as well. In 
troduction of robot systems may require additional engineer 
ing support at corporate user firms as well, but those jobs 
have already been accounted for in our estimates of robot 
systems engineering employment.
The specific requirements for robotics technicians at cor 
porate user firms were derived from Tanner and Adolfson's 
estimate that the maintenance standard is one person to ten 
robots per shift. (Tanner and Adolf son, p. 107) In some 
cases it is a low estimate, especially where total robot usage is
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low, but it is likely more accurate for more substantial in 
stallations and those installations should predominate by 
1990. By that year, robot dependability should have improv 
ed significantly, but prudence dictates a conservative 
estimate. Using our assumption of an average of two shifts, 
two maintenance workers are needed per ten robots and the 
estimate of robotics technicians for maintenance of robots at 
corporate user industries follows directly.
Occupational Distribution of New Jobs
The occupational distribution of the jobs created by 
robotics in the U.S. is presented in table 4-6. The current 
robot manufacturing occupational profile was used in 
developing the 1990 profile, except that engineers were 
reduced to 20 percent of the total and assemblers were in 
creased to 23.7 percent of the total. That corresponds to our 
expectation that engineers, especially in research and 
development, will not expand as rapidly as output, but 
assemblers will become relatively more important as output 
increases. The occupational profile for the direct suppliers to 
robot manufacturers was constructed as the weighted 
average of the individual occupational profiles for the five 
industries which account for 83 percent of the value of 
material inputs to a robot. The weights were determined bas 
ed on the percentages in table 4-3. The individual occupa 
tional profiles (SIC codes 356, 357, 359, 362 and 367) 
themselves, are from the OES data base for 1980 and were 
provided by the Office of Economic Growth and Employ 
ment, Bureau of Labor Statistics. The robot systems engi 
neering estimates utilized the occupational profile discussed 
earlier in this chapter. Finally, corporate user positions were 
all assigned to robotics technicians.
We estimate 4,600 to 9,300 engineering jobs will be created 
in the U.S. due to robotics and 13,000 to 26,000 engineering 
technicians will be required. The bulk of these technicians
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will be robotics technicians, but if one assumes that none of 
the jobs in autos will be available to two-year graduates of 
robotics technician curricula, then that figure should be 
reduced to 10,000 to 21,000, a rather significant difference. 
The training/retraining implications of these estimates are 
discussed later in this chapter.
Table 4-6
Direct Job Creation in U.S. 
Due to Robotics, by Occupation, 1990
Employment
Range of estimate 
Occupation Low High
Engineers
Robotics technicians
Other engineering technicians
All other professional and
technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Sales workers
Clerical workers
Skilled craft and related workers
Semi-skilled metalworking operatives
Assemblers and all other operatives
Service workers
Laborers
Total
4,636
12,284
664
936
1,583
581
2,908
2,163
2,153
3,763
138
279
32,088
9,272
24,568
1,328
1,871
3,166
1,162
5,817
4,326
4,306
7,526
276
558
64,176
The other potential job creation in table 4-6 directly due to 
robotics does not appear to raise particularly significant 
training issues. The numbers are rather small and well within 
current supply capacity. It is important to note, however, 
that there is an extremely poor job match between the jobs 
that robots will likely displace and similar jobs that will be 
created through the introduction of robots. Specifically, in
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chapter 3 we estimated total job displacement of 100,000 to 
200,000, with all of these tasks in the traditional blue collar 
areas, while from table 4-6 only 8,500 to 17,000 similar blue 
collar jobs will be created. Thus very few workers can expect 
to transfer to the new robotics sector but continue to per 
form essentially their old job tasks.
The shocking feature of table 4-6, the occupational profile 
of those jobs created, is that well over half of all of these 
jobs require two or more years of college training. That is 
consistent with the occupational profile of the robot 
manufacturing industry, but it is still a startling revelation 
and attests to the high technology nature of robotics.
Forecast of Job Creation in Michigan 
Due to Robotics
The job creation potential of robotics in the State of 
Michigan follows logically from the U.S. estimates. For that 
reason the organization of this section parallels that of the 
previous one. Additional assumptions and methodology are 
discussed as needed.
The level of the U.S. production of robots in 1990 alone is 
not sufficient to estimate the number of jobs created in 
Michigan, for we must also determine Michigan's market 
share of this production. Just as a single point estimate of 
the population of robots in 1990 was deemed unwise, it is 
also unwise to consider a single point estimate for 
Michigan's market share of that production. Since it is 
beyond the scope of this study to do a thorough locational 
analysis of the robotics industry, it is assumed that 
Michigan's share of the U.S. market in 1990 will range from 
a low of 20 percent to a high of 40 percent.
Both figures are speculative, but the low end of the 
estimate is conditioned by Michigan's current market share 
of the production of robots, approximately 19 percent in
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1981. At first glance the high end of the estimate may appear 
overly optimistic, but it is not necessarily so. First, robotics 
is the number one (immediate) ''target industry" in Gover 
nor Milliken's plan to attract high technology industry to the 
State of Michigan. (Milliken, 1981b, p. 13) Second, the pro 
posed program of the nonprofit Industrial Technology In 
stitute should help to attract robot manufacturers as well as 
other manufacturing process suppliers. Third, there is no 
doubt that the auto industry centered in Michigan is the 
single largest market for robots today. Fourth, some market 
entrants who have announced plans to produce robots or are 
producing robots already have a Michigan base. These in 
clude Bendix, General Motors, United Technologies, and a 
number of other small firms in the state.
There are no guarantees that these factors will increase 
Michigan's market share in the future. There are also no 
guarantees that imports or other factors will not reduce 
Michigan robot production below the low end estimate. 
While a market share of 20 to 40 percent for Michigan is op 
timistic, it is not unreasonable.
The potential cumulative direct job creation in Michigan 
by 1990 due to robotics is presented in table 4-7. We estimate 
that the total number of jobs created will range from a low 
of about 5,000 to a high of about 18,000. The low range of 
the estimate assumes a 1990 impact which is consistent with a 
U.S. population of robots of 50,000, production of 14,175 
robots in 1990, and a 20 percent share of the market for 
Michigan. The high range of the estimate assumes an impact 
consistent with a population of 100,000 robots in 1990, pro 
duction of 28,350 robots in 1990, and a 40 percent share of 
that production for Michigan. The range of the estimate for 
job creation is large because of the dual uncertainties of 
growth in the U.S. production of robots and the relative 
share of that production accounted for by Michigan.
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Table 4-7
Direct Job Creation in Michigan 
Due to Robotics, 1990
Employment
Range of estimate 
Area or industry Low High
Robot manufacturing
Direct suppliers to robot manufacturers
Robot systems engineering
User firms - auto
User firms - other
Total
1,740
974
1,059
1,065
287
5,125
6,960
3,898
4,238
1,776
865
17,737
We estimate employment in robot manufacturing in 
Michigan to range from about 1,700 to 7,000 in 1990. That 
was estimated in the following way. Michigan's share of 
robot manufacturing employment was found by multiplying 
the low estimate of 8,700 employees nationwide by the low 
estimate of Michigan's share of the production for that 
market (20 percent). The same was done for the high produc 
tion estimate and the high estimate of Michigan's share of 
that production. That leads directly to the final result.
We project employment in firms that are direct suppliers 
of robot manufacturers in Michigan to be about 1,000 to 
4,000. Once again, we followed the approach of Burford and 
Katz to determine the direct supplier effect. The estimates 
are more difficult and tentative here because utilization of 
the Burford-Katz technique requires knowledge of material 
purchases of all industries and robot manufacturing within 
the state. That information is not available, but it is possible 
to obtain an upper bound for the direct supplier effect of 
robots in the State of Michigan.
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Step one was to estimate w for Michigan, essentially the 
material purchases of firms within the state as a proportion 
of total shipments. The total materials purchased by all 
Michigan industries as a proportion of sales was 61 percent 
in 1977 according to the 1977 Census of Manufactures (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1981a, p. 101), so an upper limit 
of w is .61. Burford and Katz, however, suggest that seldom 
do the material purchases within a region exceed .40 as a pro 
portion of total shipments. (Burford and Katz, p. 158) We 
assumed w equals .50 in Michigan, which, if true, means that 
over 80 percent of material purchases of Michigan manufac 
turing firms are made from other manufacturing firms in the 
state.
The second step was to estimate wj for Michigan, the 
average material purchases of robot manufacturers in the 
state from other industries in the state. Specifically, the 
estimation of wj for a region depends not on the total 
material purchases of all firms in the industry but on the 
regional proportion of material purchases of such firms in 
the region. We assumed that total materials purchased by 
robot manufacturers in Michigan as a proportion of total 
shipments approximated the national average of 40 percent 
and that by 1990 a maximum of 75 percent of the material 
purchases of robot manufacturers in Michigan would be 
spent with the state. So, if 40 percent of total sales of robot 
manufacturers are material purchases, and for those 
manufacturers in the State of Michigan 75 percent of that 
figure is spent within the state, then w; equals .28, or 28 per 
cent.
Given our estimates of w and wj for Michigan, we can use 
the Burford and Katz formula from the previous section. 
That leads to a supplier effect of .56 which implies that for 
every job created in robot manufacturing in Michigan 
another .56 jobs are created in direct supplier industries.
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Thus, the approximately 1,700 to 7,000 jobs in robot 
manufacturing lead to about 1,000 to 4,000 jobs in other 
manufacturing industries in Michigan.
Although the estimates of the direct supplier jobs in 
Michigan may appear small, we believe these estimates are 
reasonable or perhaps overestimated. First, the average 
material purchases of all Michigan firms within the region is 
almost certainly less than the 50 percent used in our calcula 
tions, which would lower the direct supplier effect. Second, 
the average material purchases for robot manufacturing 
firms in Michigan from other firms in the state is much less 
than 28 percent of total shipments today (75 percent of total 
material purchases) and likely in 1990 as well. The State of 
Michigan is not a significant producer of microprocessors 
and the other electronic/computer-related components of a 
robot. Furthermore, very few industries in any region pur 
chase as much as 75 percent of their material inputs locally 
from firms that are actually local producers (not 
wholesalers). In general, the direct supplier effect of an in 
dustry in an open region tends to be less than the direct sup 
plier effect for that same industry in the nation.
Total employment in robot systems engineering in 
Michigan was estimated as approximately 1,000 to 4,200 in 
1990. Once again, this is a net figure that represents the ap 
plications engineering employment likely in Michigan 
without specifying the actual industry of employment. It was 
found in exactly the same way as robot manufacturing 
employment in Michigan. Specifically, Michigan's share of 
robot systems engineering employment is the national 
employment in robot systems engineering (5,297 to 10,594), 
multiplied by the associated share of robot production in the 
state (20 to 40 percent). The implied assumption is that the 
hypothesized share of robot production in the state is also 
applicable for robot systems engineering. That may or may
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not be true, but there appears to be no better alternative at 
this time.
The stakes are not small in robot systems for Michigan's 
auto-dominated economy where employment in the Detroit- 
based machine tool sector accounted for over 50,000 jobs in 
1977. (Institute of Science and Technology, p. 67) That sec 
tor, of course, has primarily supported the auto industry. 
Thus, Michigan's traditional machine tool providers and 
other general contractors in the state may experience serious 
competition from firms outside the state to provide robot 
systems to the auto industry. The potential loss includes not 
only the general contracting and design, which is con 
siderable in a robot system, but also the possibility that at 
least some of the hard automation will not be provided by 
Detroit-based capital goods firms either.
Of course, this pessimistic scenario is only one possibility, 
and Michigan's success in developing the expertise for robot 
systems engineering may also serve to retain jobs in the tradi 
tional machine tool sector in the state. Robot systems 
engineering is an important area where the Industrial 
Technology Institute may come to play a role. The program 
of the Institute is to include an Applications Consultant Pro 
gram which will aid with specific automation application 
problems. The Institute also plans to initiate a continuing 
program of research on the integration of manufacturing 
automation which will be essential to full implementation of 
the flexible automated manufacturing concept. It is entirely 
possible that Michigan could develop a manufacturing 
systems design capability that would lead to significant ex 
port of both goods and services to other states.
The estimates of the jobs created in the corporate user in 
dustries in Michigan are about 1,100 to 1,800 in autos and 
300 to 900 in all other manufacturing. These numbers follow 
directly from the projection of the robot population in
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Michigan and the assumption that one robotics technician is 
needed per ten robots per shift for maintenance work. In 
sharp contrast to the national estimates, almost 75 percent of 
the robotics technicians in corporate user industries in 
Michigan will likely be in the auto industry. This occurs 
because the auto industry will likely continue to be the 
largest single user of robots and because of the relative con 
centration of the auto industry in the State of Michigan.
The total occupational impact of the jobs created in 
Michigan is presented in table 4-8. This table was con 
structed in exactly the same way as the national estimates. 
We estimate about 900 to 3,600 engineering jobs will be 
created in Michigan due to robotics and 1,900 to 4,900 
engineering technicians will be required. The bulk of these 
technicians will be robotics technicians, but if one assumes 
that none of the jobs in autos will be available to two-year 
graduates of robotics technician curricula, then that figure 
should be reduced to 750 to 2,700, a rather significant dif 
ference for the state. The training/retraining implications of 
these estimates are discussed in the next section.
Training Implications
On the whole, these job creation numbers are rather 
modest. It might even be assumed that there are no serious 
training questions arising from the creation of less than 
65,000 jobs over an 8-year period; however, there are a few 
areas that should be mentioned as possible problems. The 
first is engineers; electrical and mechanical engineers will be 
required in significant numbers if the industrial robot 
population is to grow as we project. There will also be needs 
for industrial engineers and computer specialists as well.
Engineers. As described repeatedly throughout the study, 
industrial robots do not just come "off-the-shelf" and onto 
the factory floor fully functional from the time they are
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Table 4-8
Direct Job Creation in Michigan 
Due to Robotics, by Occupation, 1990
Employment
Range of estimate 
Occupation Low High
Engineers
Robotics technicians
Other engineering technicians
All other professional and
technical workers
Managers, officials, proprietors
Sales workers
Clerical workers
Skilled craft and related workers
Semi-skilled metalworking operatives
Assemblers and all other operatives
Service workers
Laborers
Total
898
1,810
108
159
266
108
505
318
288
610
17
38
5,125
3,593
4,469
430
638
1,065
432
2,020
1,275
1,154
2,441
66
154
17,737
plugged in. A significant number of graduate engineers will 
be required to help robots find their place in U.S. factories. 
Specifically, we forecast a need for 4,600 to 9,300 engineers, 
primarily for robot system design and implementation as 
well as for design work with robot manufacturers.
What are the prospects of obtaining the required engineer 
ing talent to support the development of robotics? Clearly, 
the answer to this question can only be obtained by looking 
at the total market for engineers rather than focusing on 
specific industries within that market. First, we will examine 
the likelihood of a sufficient supply of engineers. Then we 
assess the prospects for the overall demand for engineers. In 
general, this supply-demand approach leads us to think that
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there is no reason to be optimistic that sufficient engineers 
will be available in the decade of the 1980s to support all of 
the requirements for engineers.
Table 4-9 shows the experience with the supply of 
engineers at the bachelor's, master's, and doctorate levels 
for the period 1960 to 1980. The absolute numbers of both 
bachelor's and master's degrees in engineering have increas 
ed, although the proportion of all U.S. bachelor's and 
master's degrees that are awarded in engineering declined 
from nearly 10 percent in 1960 to 6 percent in 1980. From 
1970 to 1980 alone there has been an absolute decline in the 
number of doctorates awarded in engineering while the 
number of master's degrees awarded has increased only 
slightly.
Labor market analysts are well aware of the volatility in 
engineering enrollments. Post-World War II production of 
engineers has had at least three distinct cycles. First, 
enrollments increased explosively 1946-50 as veterans return 
ed in large numbers to the campuses with the educational aid 
available under the GI bill. That was followed by a 
precipitous decline in enrollments of over 50 percent by 1955 
as these same benefits were terminated. The second cycle 
began in the late 1950s due to the Soviet launching of "Sput 
nik" and the subsequent American response which included 
various kinds of student aid and research support in the 
sciences and engineering. The student aid was authorized as 
part of the National Defense Education Act of 1958. 
Thereafter there was a long sustained rise in engineering 
enrollments which peaked 15 years later in 1973, although in 
absolute terms enrollments never exceeded the level of the 
early 1950s. Finally, after a decline in enrollments through 
1976, the third and current cycle began when engineering 
enrollments began to rise once again.
Table 4-9 
Engineering Degrees Conferred in U.S.
B.S.
Year
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
Engineering 
degrees
59,240
53,720
47,411
41,581
39,114
40,065
43,530
46,989
46,003
45,387
44,772
41,553
37,614
36,188
35,815
36,795
35,226
33,458
34,735
35,866
37,808
Percent of 
all degrees
5.9
5.4
4.8
4.2
3.9
4.1
4.3
4.8
4.9
5.1
5.4
5.4
5.6
6.1
6.4
6.8
7.0
7.4
8.3
8.9
9.6
M.S.
Engineering 
degrees
16,846
16,193
17,015
16,889
16,170
15,434
15,393
16,758
16,802
16,347
15,597
15,243
15,188
13,885
13,678
12,056
10,827
9,635
8,909
8,178
7,159
Percent of 
all degrees
5.6
5.4
5.4
5.3
5.2
5.3
5.5
6.3
6.6
7.1
7.4
7.8
8.6
8.8
9.7
10.7
10.7
10.5
10.5
10.4
9.6
Ph.D.
Engineering 
degrees
2,519
2,517
2,442
2,599
2,835
3,151
3,336
3,560
3,704
3,654
3,681
3,377
2,932
2,614
2,304
2,124
1,693
1,378
1,207
943
786
Percent of 
all degrees
7.7
7.7
7.6
7.8
8.3
9.2
9.9
10.2
11.1
11.4
12.3
12.9
12.7
12.7
12.6
12.9
11.7
10.7
10.4
8.9
8.0
o 
cr
O
VO
SOURCE: National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Degrees: 1950-80, NSF 82-307, Washington, DC, 1982, pp. 21-32.
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Because of this record there is very little reason to be con 
fident that recent increases in engineering enrollments will be 
maintained in the decade of the 1980s. (Freeman, pp. 
111-117) In addition, the total number of science and 
engineering degrees awarded has been falling since the mid- 
seventies, so recent gains in engineering degrees appear to 
have come at the expense of other scientific fields. There is 
also no evidence that the proportion of people in the labor 
force with engineering degrees is increasing. (National 
Science Foundation, 1982a, pp. 60-62) Finally, the 
unemployment rate for engineers is extremely low, 1.5 per 
cent in 1980, and the National Science Foundation reports 
that few engineers are working outside their professional 
specialties involuntarily. (National Science Foundation, 
1981c, pp. 15-16) So we cannot expect the supply of 
engineers to expand much in the decade of the 1980s through 
reabsorption of unemployed engineers or the reentry of 
engineers who are currently working in nonengineering jobs.
A closely related question about the supply of engineers is 
the adequacy of the training received. Specifically, are 
engineers prepared in such a way as to facilitate the introduc 
tion of new technologies such as robotics? An adequate 
answer to this question is far beyond the scope of this study, 
but some comments are offered briefly. First, as mentioned 
in chapter 2, our interviews did reveal some criticisms of to 
day's engineers particularly that they are over specialized. 
That sentiment is echoed in an article by Gail Martin which 
discusses manufacturing engineering as a much needed 
multidisciplinary engineering specialty. (Martin, 1982b, pp. 
22-26) Second, the National Science Foundation reports that 
10 percent of faculty positions in engineering programs were 
vacant in the Fall of 1980. (National Science Foundation, 
198la, p. 1) Moreover, approximately 90 percent of all 
engineering colleges reported that in the last five years, staff 
ing had become more difficult because of their increasing in-
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ability to match private industry salaries. The schools 
responded to this shortfall of faculty by both cancelling 
classes and increasing teaching loads.
Finally, the National Science Foundation also reports that 
the proportion of science and engineering faculty with recent 
doctorates (within the last seven years) has fallen to approx 
imately 20 percent in 1980 from almost 40 percent in 1968. 
(National Science Foundation, 1981b, p. 1) That decline is 
typical of all the engineering fields. It indicates that our 
academic teaching and research staffs in engineering schools 
are not receiving the infusions of young talent generally 
believed necessary to remain vigorous. From table 4-9 it is 
clear that we are training fewer Ph.D.'s in engineering than 
even five years ago at the very same time that engineering 
enrollments are increasing and the proportion of engineering 
faculty with recent doctorates is reaching new lows. These 
divergent trends are largely explained by the strong market 
demand for engineers, but they are very disturbing 
nonetheless. We cannot continue to borrow from the future 
human resource pool indefinitely for the sake of immediate 
needs. We fear that the supply of engineering graduates may 
prove to be a limiting factor in the spread of robotics 
technology in the U.S.
Turning our attention to the demand for engineers, it is 
clear first of all that there is no current surplus of engineers. 
Unlike the market for most other college graduates, the 
market for engineering graduates remains tight. That is at 
tested to by the low unemployment rate for engineers, but 
there are even better indicators of the short-run labor market 
tightness for engineers. According to a National Science 
Foundation survey of the recruiting experience of private in 
dustries, there is a definite shortage of electrical engineers. 
Employers were only able to achieve 41 percent of their hir 
ing goals for electrical engineers in 1981. (National Science
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Foundation, 1982b, p. 4) Only computer engineering person 
nel were in a tighter supply situation. The same publication 
reports that the supply of industrial engineers and 
mechanical engineers were roughly in balance with demand. 
The signals were somewhat confusing for industrial 
engineers, however; they could be in current shortage also. 
Employers who reported shortages of engineers attributed 
the problem to the growth of needs in their industry.
The longer run prospects for engineers can be assessed by 
examining the occupational projections of the BLS, using 
the OES survey data base. The BLS projected change to 1990 
in employment for engineering personnel as a percent of the 
1980 employment base is shown in table 4-10. Once again, a 
range is provided reflecting the low- and high-growth 
scenarios for the national economy. It may be helpful to 
keep in mind that the total labor force is expected to grow in 
the decade of the 1980s, so it may be more meaningful to 
discuss the growth of engineers relative to all occupations.
Table 4-10
Projected Change in Employment
for Engineering Personnel
1980-1990
Percent change 1980 -1990
Total manufacturing Total employment 
Occupation Low High Low High
Electrical engineers
Industrial engineers
Mechanical engineers
Computer specialists
All engineers
All occupations
35
29
34
48
30
15
47
42
49
62
42
24
35
26
29
58
28
17
47
37
41
70
38
25
SOURCE: Based on data from OES survey provided by the Office of Economic Growth 
and Employment Projections, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, 
Washington, DC.
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The relative increase projected for all engineers ranges 
from 50 to 100 percent greater than that for all occupations 
depending on the specific forecast. In relative terms, the 
greatest projected increase is for electrical engineers and 
computer specialists, although the needs for industrial and 
mechanical engineers are well above average as well. The 
specialties projected to have the greatest relative increase are 
also the largest specialties today in absolute terms. So the 
order of magnitude in relative terms is identical to the order 
of magnitude in absolute terms for these four fields com 
puter specialists, electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, 
and industrial engineers. In general, in the longer run, the 
need for engineers is projected to grow at a much faster rate 
than that for all occupations.
There is also anecdotal evidence which seems to support 
an increased need for engineers. More engineers will be re 
quired for the coming defense buildup that may not be 
reflected in the data today. Moreover, recent federal budget 
trends suggest a shift in demand away from teachers and 
social workers and toward engineers and scientists. It can 
also be anticipated that any acceleration in the rate of capital 
investment or plant modernization in U.S. industry will lead 
to additional requirements for engineers. If America is going 
to be reindustrialized, we will require the assistance of a 
great many engineers. So there may be a significant increase 
in the demand for engineers in the U.S. in the decade of the 
1980s, perhaps even more than currently anticipated.
Viewed in isolation, the need for 4,600 to 9,300 engineers 
to support the growth of robotics technology appears in 
consequential. The high range of the estimate for total 
engineers required for all robotics applications by 1990 
represents less than one-fifth of one full year's graduates 
utilizing the 1980 data as shown in table 4-9. This hardly ap 
pears to be an insurmountable goal, but some concerns arise 
when we look at the broader supply-demand conditions for
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engineers within which robotics must compete for personnel. 
On the supply side, engineering degrees conferred have been 
increasing recently, but the historical precedent of extreme 
volatility in engineering enrollment leaves doubt that the re 
cent increases will be maintained throughout the decade of 
the 1980s. There have also been no increases in degrees con 
ferred at the master's and doctorate levels, and colleges 
report that they are finding it more difficult to retain 
qualified faculty, particularly younger faculty. So, among 
the many other supply issues, there are serious questions 
about the ability of our colleges to continue to increase 
engineering enrollments without possibly compromising the 
quality of engineering education.
On the demand side we begin the decade of the '80s with a 
short-run deficit of engineers, and longer run projections an 
ticipate an increasing demand for engineers relative to all oc 
cupations. Thus, any decline in enrollments or further in 
creases in demand (which appear likely) would have the 
potential of creating a severe shortage of engineers in the 
decade of the 1980s. Even if robotics employers attract more 
than their fair share of engineering talent, a tight engineering 
labor market may impede the growth of robotics technology 
in this decade.
Robotics Technicians. The largest major occupational de 
mand category identified in table 4-6 is that of robotics 
technicians. We expect from 12,300 to 24,600 such jobs will 
be created in the U.S. by 1990. As explained earlier, we are 
using robotics technician as a generic term to refer to the in 
dividuals who have sufficient familiarity with robotics 
technology to be capable of testing, programming, install 
ing, troubleshooting and maintaining industrial robots. In 
addition, we have included robot maintenance and repair in 
user industries, although this is somewhat arguable based on 
the auto experience discussed below. In a supply sense, we
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expect this emerging occupation will be dominated by 
graduates of 2-year community college programs. Again, 
this may be less true of the maintenance and repair function 
in user industries, especially in the auto industry.
The auto industry's demands for personnel to maintain 
and repair their robots must be treated separately, because it 
appears that this demand will not be expressed in the external 
labor market. Judging by the plans at General Motors, these 
positions will be staffed by existing employees. To begin 
with, the labor agreement between the UAW and General 
Motors assigns responsibility for maintaining production 
equipment to the Skilled Trades Council. With the introduc 
tion of welding robots at GM, a memorandum of agreement 
was signed on March 15, 1972 outlining the specific work 
assignments relating to the " Welding Equipment 
Maintenance and Repair'' classification. This document also 
sets out the training requirements for an apprentice program 
for welding equipment maintenance and repair. (Agreement 
Between General Motors Corporation and the UAW, pp. 
176-185) In brief, the rules have already been negotiated, and 
the UAW Skilled Trades Council has jurisdiction over the 
jobs.
Secondly, the newly endorsed "Statement on 
Technological Progress" contains very specific language ad 
dressing the questions of new technology, the bargaining 
unit, and retraining policies:
It is recognized that advances in technology may 
alter, modify or otherwise change the job respon 
sibilities of represented employes at plant locations 
and that a change in the means, method or process 
of performing a work function including the in 
troduction of computers or other new or advanced 
technology will not serve to shift the work function 
from represented to non-represented employes.
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In view of the Corporation's interest in affording 
maximum opportunity for employes (sic) to pro 
gress with advancing technology, the Corporation 
shall make available short-range, specialized train 
ing programs for those employes who have the 
qualifications to perform the new or changed work, 
where such programs are reasonable and prac 
ticable. Therefore, in the event the work performed 
by employes covered by the National Agreement is 
altered as the result of technological changes so 
that additional short-range training may be re 
quired, the Corporation is willing to train such 
employes where practicable to enable them to per 
form such work. (Agreement Between General 
Motors Corporation and the UAW, pp. 431-432)
This statement makes it rather clear that employees will be 
considered when technical change impacts unfavorably on 
their job security.
Thirdly, the new agreement also established a Joint Skill 
Development and Training Committee whose responsibilities 
(among others) include: (1) seeking ways of arranging for 
training, retraining and development assistance for 
employees displaced by new technologies, new productive 
techniques and shifts in customer product preference; and 
(2) developing and providing training to enhance skills for 
present and anticipated job responsibilities and to meet new 
technology. (Agreement Between General Motors Corpora 
tion and the UAW, pp. 277-288)
Furthermore, the charge to this committee is to be backed 
up by a dual funding commitment by General Motors. There 
is to be 5 cents contributed for every hour worked to the Ex 
ecutive Board-Joint Activities. This amount will be used to 
fund all joint efforts, including the Joint Skill Development 
and Training Committee, the Joint Council for Enhancing
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Job Security and the Competitive Edge, and the National 
Committee to Improve the Quality of Worklife. In addition 
to these funds, GM has agreed to provide $80 million per 
year "for current and expanded training for bargaining unit 
employees." (Agreement Between General Motors Corpora 
tion and the UAW, p. 425)
Taking all these elements together, it is reasonable to 
believe that General Motors will be able to develop the skills 
it needs for the future primarily from current bargaining unit 
employees. Assuming that other auto manufacturers follow 
this lead, it seems sensible to assume that the 3,000 to 5,000 
robotics technicians projected for the auto industry in 1990 
will represent retrained current employees rather than new 
hires. The very extensive existing skilled trades apprentice 
programs in the auto industry also add credibility to this 
scenario. The General Motors-UAW program appears to 
serve both the private and public interests in technological 
change in the auto industry. Technical change and job 
displacement will be accommodated without compromising 
the job security of employees unduly.
It remains an open question whether the pattern being 
established in the auto industry to accommodate the in 
troduction of new technologies such as robotics will be 
followed in other industries. However, this possibility can 
not be dismissed out of hand. Several major unions have 
recently announced either their intent to bargain over 
retraining and job security issues or have already signed con 
tracts where these issues played a role. (Ruben, 1982a, pp. 
44-45; Ruben, 1982b, p. 44; "A Year of Settling for Less - 
and Breaking Old Molds," pp. 72-74) To be sure, no 
agreements to date approach the scope or magnitude of the 
retraining commitment contained in the auto industry 
agreements, but these issues are becoming more important to 
workers.
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We also note that it may be a good human resource 
management to upgrade workers wherever possible as 
robotics technicians. There is the rather obvious need for a 
cohesive and cooperative workforce as new technology is in 
troduced. Moreover, as discussed earlier, there will likely be 
experienced personnel already in the factory who are trained 
in complex machinery repair and who will not be intimidated 
by robots. So these experienced workers may be ideal can 
didates for retraining to accommodate the introduction of 
robots.
It may be helpful to briefly recap our remarks about the 
demand for robotics technicians, especially for those readers 
unfamiliar with the jargon of labor market analysis. We pro 
ject a cumulative total requirement for 12,300 to 24,600 
robotics technicians by 1990, but the auto industry will likely 
meet its need through what economists generally call the in 
ternal labor market, i.e., by retraining current workers to 
staff the robot maintenance function. From the perspective 
of the young person seeking training in robotics from a 
2-year community college without a prior commitment from 
an employer (the external labor market), our projections 
should thus be reduced at least by the anticipated needs of 
the auto industry. That results in a projection for the exter 
nal labor market of 9,300 to 19,600 robotics technician jobs. 
Even these estimates are a maximum, since other industries 
besides autos will also likely employ a retraining strategy to 
some extent.
The same interpretation of our projections applies to com 
munity colleges offering robotics technician training, except 
that some community colleges will probably contract with 
specific employers to provide retraining for their current 
employees as well as the training they traditionally provide 
for the external labor market. It is very early in the game to 
make any judgments about supply adequacy for robotics 
technicians; the occupation barely exists today. Yet, interest
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appears extremely high among student populations, and 
robotics technician curricula are expanding rapidly.
Macomb County Community College in Warren, 
Michigan is generally acknowledged as the originator of the 
robotics technician curriculum in the United States. 
(Schreiber, pp. 78-79) Ms. Schreiber dates the beginnings of 
Macomb's program to 1978 when they added a specialty in 
robotics to their fluid power technology associate degree 
program. Because of all the media emphasis in the last 12 
months, Macomb has had to turn away hundreds and hun 
dreds of students who wanted to enroll in robotics courses in 
the Fall of 1982.
In addition to Macomb, robotics technician curricula are 
now offered at three other Michigan community colleges 
(Henry Ford, Oakland, and Washtenaw) and there are plan 
ning efforts under way in at least eight more (Grand Rapids, 
Highland Park, Kellogg, Lansing, Mott, Schoolcraft, St. 
Clair, and Wayne). Interest is running so high in robotics 
that when Oakland Community College in Michigan opened 
a brand new program in the fall of the 1982-83 school year, 
they immediately enrolled over 600 students in the introduc 
tory course. The next semester another 900 were enrolled. 
Washtenaw Community College, like Macomb, also turned 
away hundreds of students this year, and interest in 
Schoolcraft College's planned technician program appears 
high as well.
Michigan does seem to be the clear leader in the area of 
robotics technician education presently. Robotics Interna 
tional of the Society of Manufacturing Engineers is currently 
conducting a nationwide survey of colleges, universities, and 
corporations involved in education and training for people 
working with industrial robots. Results of the survey will be 
published in an education and training directory later this 
year. Preliminary reports indicate that there is intense in-
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terest in robotics technician programs in Tennessee and 
Texas. There appear to be at least 7 colleges outside the State 
of Michigan now offering robotics technician curricula. 
Clearly, the Robotics International survey which will be up 
dated on a yearly basis will offer much needed information 
to students and educators alike.
There are other robotics technician programs besides those 
in the community college system. At least two (and probably 
more) private-for-profit schools are operating now, and we 
have received inquiries from several others that are consider 
ing such a program. These schools appeal especially to the 
unemployed worker who has some technical background and 
wishes to become a robotics technician in a short period of 
time, generally one year or slightly less. In fact, these schools 
may be appealing to any student where (for whatever the 
reason) time compression of the training is a key considera 
tion.
There have also been at least two federally assisted 
robotics technician training programs aimed at the displaced 
worker. The City of Warren, Michigan sponsored a 40-week 
program under the Comprehensive Employment and Train 
ing Act (CETA) in 1982. Approximately 20 students were 
enrolled at a cost of 12,000 per student. ("Robotics Class 
Looks Ahead") The other program was conducted by the 
Downriver Community Conference, Wyandotte, Michigan, 
a federal demonstration project dealing with displaced 
workers. The training was done at Macomb Community 
College. According to a recent letter announcing the "First 
Annual Job Fair" for the Downriver graduates, 24 people 
were enrolled in the program with from 5 to 20 years of prior 
work experience. The placement results of these pilot pro 
grams have been disappointing, but that should not be inter 
preted as a sign of failure. The graduates appear to be receiv 
ing numerous interviews. We are confident that these
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retrained workers will be hired as soon as the current reces 
sion subsides and robot sales resume their healthy growth.
We estimate that two to three hundred students will com 
plete robotics technician curricula in 1983. In the current 
school year we estimate that there are 2,500 to 3,000 students 
enrolled in the introductory robotics course at schools that 
offer a 2-year robotics technician degree. Given the com 
bination of high student interest in robotics and the apparent 
responsiveness (perhaps overresponsiveness) of the educa 
tional system to that interest, enrollment may climb 
significantly in the next school year, 1983-84. In short, there 
appears to be no need to worry about a lack of supply of 
robotics technicians.
Some attention should be given, however, to ensure the 
quality of supply. A Robotics Clearinghouse project is being 
sponsored by the Michigan Department of Education to 
assist in the development of curricula in the automated 
manufacturing systems/robotics technology area. A consor 
tium of Washtenaw Community College, Henry Ford Com 
munity College and Macomb Community College are par 
ticipating in this effort. They have developed plans for a 
survey of robot users to help in determining what the needs 
of potential employers might be. This effort offers the 
potential to see that the educational product is the right one.
One of the dangers is that students and educators might 
overconcentrate on robots. This conclusion may seem sur 
prising, but there are several reasons for it. First, robots are 
only one type of automated equipment, and it is important 
that these technicians be flexible enough to work on other 
automated equipment as well. Our interviews revealed rather 
strong support for broad-based training in the fundamentals 
of electronics, hydraulics, etc., rather than overspecializa- 
tion in robots. Second, the demand for robotics technicians 
will likely be small until the latter 1980s while supply appears
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to be expanding rapidly now, so some technicians may not 
find immediate employment in robotics-related fields.
Unfortunately we are not able to adequately assess the 
prospects of employing robotics technicians in other closely 
related fields. Clearly, that depends on the type and ade 
quacy of the specific curricula completed. The BLS occupa 
tional projections foresee an above average increase in the 
need for engineering and science technicians in the decade of 
the 1980s of 24.5 percent to 34.1 percent, and this occupa 
tional category is large with over a million members in 1980. 
But we simply do not know how many of these jobs someone 
trained as a robotics technician might be qualified to do. For 
these reasons our advice to students is to avoid overcommit 
ment to a narrowly defined robotics technician curriculum. 
Likewise, schools should avoid overzealous promises of 
employment directly in robotics, at least until the market for 
this emerging occupation becomes more clearly delineated.
Overall supply-demand conditions for robotics technicians 
are extremely difficult to evaluate now. Robotics itself is just 
an infant industry, it is unknown how many of today's 
enrollees will actually complete the curricula, and it is 
unknown how rapidly additional schools will begin to offer 
such programs. With those caveats in mind, we attempt to 
draw some conclusions based on the scattered information 
available.
In the near term there may be a shortage of technicians. If 
a vigorous recovery from the recession ensues, demand could 
pick up overnight. Obviously, supply does not respond as 
swiftly because of the time required for training. But we 
must note that there is at least one student enrolled in the in 
troductory robots course in the 1982-83 school year for every 
robot that will likely be sold in the U.S. during 1983. 
Moreover, given the high interest in robotics training among 
student populations and the fact that robotics technician cur-
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ricula are just beginning to proliferate nationwide, the 
greatest likelihood in the 1983-84 school year is for new 
enrollments to grow more rapidly than robot sales. If these 
trends continue very long, we think most observers would 
agree that there will likely be a surplus of robotics techni 
cians.
For these reasons we strongly urge providers of education 
to concentrate on quality rather than quantity. They must 
ensure that their product is what employers need. The 
breadth of training is also a very important consideration 
because of the uncertainties in demand for robotics techni 
cians. We generally prefer the educational approach that 
adds robotics courses to an electronics technician or other 
similar training program rather than a more specialized 
robotics technician program. Students, on the other hand, 
must understand that the creation of 25,000 robotics techni 
cian jobs by 1990 does not mean all of these positions will be 
available to new labor market entrants. We do not expect to 
see hiring from outside to staff the robot maintenance func 
tion in the auto industry, and it is possible that this will be 
true for other industries as well.
In the final chapter, the job displacement and job creation 
projections will be drawn together to describe the very 
significant skill-twist that appears to be associated with the 
introduction of robots. Let it suffice at this point to show 
that most of the jobs created will require a high quality 
technical education. On the other hand, most of the jobs to 
be displaced require little formal education. This poor match 
appears to be a major labor market implication of robots.

5 
Summary and Conclusions
Introduction
The robots are coming; not as rapidly as anticipated by 
some nor with the devastating impact predicted by others, 
but they are coming. Furthermore, we all have a stake in the 
impending change, at least to the extent that robots will be 
part of a movement to raise the productivity of American 
factories and retain the competitiveness of American goods 
in national and international markets. We have argued 
throughout this monograph that robots should be regarded 
simply as another labor-saving technology, one more step in 
a process that has been going on for some 200 years.
This study has focused on the human resource implica 
tions of the introduction of industrial robots, but to begin it 
was necessary to put the so-called "robotics revolution" into 
some perspective. Hard data about industrial robots are 
scarce today. Most of the public awareness of robots has 
been shaped by the hyperbole in the popular press. Futurists 
and others compete for media attention with wild projec 
tions of the impacts of robotics 800,000 people making 
robots, 1.5 million technicians maintaining robots, and 
millions of workers displaced with little or no considera 
tion of the practical issues involved. We believe the intense 
media attention on robotics in the past year or so may have 
seriously confused the issues.
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First, we submit that the very use of the word 
"revolution" is inappropriate when dealing with any 
manufacturing process technology. Capital goods for pro 
duction have long lives and are not scrapped immediately 
when something better comes along. Numerically controlled 
machine tools, usually regarded as the capital equipment 
most closely related to robots, expanded at a growth rate of 
only 12 percent for the most recent 10-year period. After 25 
years, only 3 to 4 percent of all metalcutting machine tools 
are numerically controlled. Even digital computers, widely 
heralded as the most significant technological innovation of 
the 1960s and 1970s, expanded at a growth rate of only 25 
percent. Yet many are implicitly assuming much higher 
growth rates for industrial robots. In terms of actual applica 
tion, all process technology changes are evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary because of the physical, financial and 
human constraints on the rate of change of process 
technology.
Second, the fear of massive unemployment caused by the 
introduction of industrial machinery appears to be unfound 
ed. Such fears began with the dawn of the industrial era in 
the 1700s. They are particularly acute during major reces 
sions. For example, the "automation" problem was of 
urgent national concern in the early 1960s after a halting 
recovery from the sharp recession of 1958-59. There were 
grim predictions that automation was causing permanent 
unemployment in the auto industry and other industries. A 
national commission was appointed to study the problem 
and in 1966, with the economy near full employment, the 
commission rendered its final report. To no one's surprise, 
they concluded that a sluggish economy was the major cause 
of unemployment rather than automation.
Third, there appears to be a fundamental lack of under 
standing that the association of technological change,
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economic growth, and job displacement is not just a coin 
cidence; they are intertwined and inseparable. That is not to 
imply that adoption of new technologies necessarily insures 
economic growth, or that displaced workers will always find 
new jobs. However, it does mean that we all have a vital 
stake in productivity gains (i.e., in displacing jobs) because 
that is what allows the possibility of economic growth. The 
price of a growing, dynamic economy that makes more 
goods and services available to all of us is job displacement, 
or the elimination of jobs through technological change.
The intent of this study has been to provide an informed, 
balanced review of the direct impact of robots on the 
employment picture in the U.S. and Michigan between now 
and 1990. Given the lack of universally accepted data about 
robots, and a robot industry that is still in the formative 
stage, it was necessary to resort to considerable projection 
and estimation. This creates the opportunity to be ex 
travagant; we have tried to avoid this. We have selected the 
conservative, but realistic alternative wherever there was a 
choice. By laying all assumptions before the reader, we hope 
to make that point clear.
This method also has the advantage of focusing disagree 
ment on the particular assumptions used in the study, thus 
providing the opportunity for refinements or improvements. 
Our hope is that this study will help restore reason and 
balance to the discussion of these issues.
Findings
The projections of occupational impact in this study are 
the result of first forecasting the U.S. robot population by 
industry and application areas. This approach constrains the 
employment impacts to reflect the actual expected sales of 
robots. In this way a consistent economic framework is 
established within which it is possible to estimate not only
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the population of robots and job displacement but also the 
job creation resulting therefrom. This consistency is also 
very helpful in avoiding unrealistic or exaggerated conclu 
sions.
We expect strong growth in the utilization of industrial 
robots in the decade of the 1980s. In chapter 2 we forecast 
that the total robot population in the U.S. by 1990 will range 
from a minimum of 50,000 to a maximum of 100,000 units. 
Given our estimate of the year-end 1982 population of ap 
proximately 6,800 to 7,000 units, that implies an average an 
nual growth rate of between 30 and 40 percent for the eight 
years of the forecast period, or roughly a seven to fourteen- 
fold increase in the total population of robots.
This range is intended to contain the actual robot popula 
tion with a high probability level, and allows for variation in 
interest rates, capital investment climate, auto industry 
recovery, and rate of economic growth. We are confident 
this range will contain the 1990 robot population. That 
means we do not expect developments such as the total col 
lapse of the automobile industry, a major renaissance in the 
U.S. capital investment, the early development of a signifi 
cant number of nonmanufacturing robot applications, or the 
widespread adoption of robotics technology by small firms.
The U.S. population of robots is developed separately for 
the auto industry and all other manufacturing. This is partly 
to take advantage of the fact that the auto producers have 
announced goals for robot installations which could be fac 
tored into our robot population forecast. It also reflects the 
fact that the major impact of robots in the State of Michigan 
will be in the auto industry. Our forecast sees 15,000 to 
25,000 robots employed in the U.S. auto industry by 1990.
Utilizing the robot forecast by industry, and the assump 
tion of a gross displacement rate of two jobs per robot which
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was strongly supported in our interviews, estimates of gross 
job displacement can be derived. We estimate that robots in 
the U.S. will eliminate between 100,000 and 200,000 jobs by 
1990. From 30,000 to 50,000 of these will be in the auto in 
dustry, while 70,000 to 150,000 jobs in other manufacturing 
industries will also be eliminated.
In addition to the assignment of robots by industry, it was 
necessary to forecast the applications for which they will be 
used. This is required if the robot population forecast is to be 
useful in predicting occupational displacement. Otherwise 
there is no way to connect the robots with the work content 
of specific jobs. The application areas used in this study are 
welding, assembly, painting, machine loading and 
unloading, and other.
When the robot forecast by application area and industry 
is matched against an occupational data base similarly 
organized, specific occupational displacement rates can be 
estimated. In chapter 3 it was shown that while the maximum 
overall job displacement rate in manufacturing of 1 percent 
through 1990 is not particularly problematical, specific in 
dustry and occupation displacement rates are very signifi 
cant, even dramatic.
To begin with, the displacement rate derived for the auto 
industry ranged from 4 to 6 percent of all employment. But 
when displacement was calculated only against the produc 
tion workers in the auto industry, the magnitude of displace 
ment was from 6 to 11 percent. Even when considered to be 
over a period of a decade, these rates of job displacement are 
significant.
When specific occupational displacement rates are 
calculated, even more striking results emerge. Our results 
suggest that between 15 and 20 percent of the welders in the 
auto industry will be displaced by robots by 1990. Even more
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dramatically, between 27 and 37 percent of the production 
painter jobs in the auto industry will be eliminated by 1990. 
While displacement results are generally less significant for 
specific occupations in all other manufacturing, it is pro 
jected that 7 to 12 percent of the production painter jobs 
there will be lost in the same time frame.
The conclusion of the job displacement estimates is that 
while job displacement due to robots will not be a general 
problem before 1990, there will clearly be particular areas 
that will be significantly affected. Chief among these will be 
the painting and welding jobs for which today's robots are so 
well adapted. Lesser impacts will be apparent on metalwork- 
ing machine operatives and assemblers. Geographically, 
states such as Michigan, especially the southeastern quadrant 
with its heavy dependence on autos, will suffer greater 
displacement than other states or regions.
We do not believe that this job displacement will lead to 
widespread job loss among the currently employed, 
however. Even in the auto industry, voluntary turnover rates 
historically have been sufficient to handle the reduction in 
force that might be required. In addition, the new General 
Motors-United Auto Workers contract seems to provide ade 
quate job security assurances, and the retraining commit 
ment necessary to back them up. Thus we do not expect any 
substantial number of auto workers to be thrown out of 
work due to the application of robots. Any unemployment 
impact is likely to be felt by the unskilled labor market en 
trants who will find more and more factory gates closed to 
the new employee. Therefore, if there is an increase in 
unemployment as a result of the spread of robotics 
technology, we fear the burden will fall on the less experi 
enced, less well educated part of our labor force.
Turning our attention to the job creation issue, in chapter 
4 we forecast the direct creation of about 32,000 to 64,000
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jobs in the U.S. by 1990 in four broad areas: robot manufac 
turing, direct suppliers to robot manufacturers, robot 
systems engineering, and corporate robot users. The jobs in 
corporate robot users identify maintenance requirements for 
robots, while the jobs in robot systems engineering identify 
the applications engineering requirements for robot systems, 
without regard to industry of employment.
In these projections we assumed that the status quo would 
be maintained in both the import and export markets for 
robots, primarily because of a lack of any better informa 
tion. But there is certainly no guarantee that U.S. producers 
will maintain their share of the national or worldwide 
market. This threat is especially menacing because of 
Japanese and European expertise in robotics technology.
The projections of robot-related job creation by occupa 
tion are very speculative because of the limited experience to 
date with robots and the uncertainties involved in predicting 
the future occupational profiles of firms that do not yet ex 
ist. However, the high technical component of labor demand 
is quite startling. Well over half of the jobs created will re 
quire two or more years of college training.
The largest single occupational group of jobs created by 
robotics will be robotics technicians. This is a term which is 
just coming into general usage; it refers to an individual with 
the training or experience to test, program, install, 
troubleshoot, or maintain industrial robots. We anticipate 
that most of these individuals will be trained in community 
college programs of two years duration. We project that jobs 
for about 12,000 to 25,000 robotics technicians will be 
created in the U.S. by 1990. We do not anticipate a supply 
problem for robotics technicians, as the community college 
system gives every indication that they will be ready and will 
ing to train whatever numbers are needed. In fact, our cur-
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rent concern is that they may, in some instances, be increas 
ing the supply too rapidly.
In the auto industry, we expect the robot maintenance re 
quirement will continue to be met by the members of the 
UAW Skilled Trades Council. General Motors already has 
agreed to a retraining effort approximating $120 million an 
nually. We believe the strong implication of the contractual 
arrangements is that auto industry employers will not be re 
quired to hire from the outside to meet their robotics techni 
cian needs. Other major robot users may follow the lead of 
the auto industry, but it is impossible to predict that with 
assurance at this early date.
There also will be a relatively large number of graduate 
engineers needed to implement the expansion of robotics 
technology in U.S. industry. We estimated the requirement 
from about 4,600 to 9,300 new engineers. While these 
numbers are comparatively small, only one-fifth of one 
year's production of engineers at the baccalaureate level, 
there is already a clear shortage of engineers, so we start 
from a deficit position. In addition, we face the challenge of 
other likely engineering demand increases as well as the 
historical instability of engineering enrollments. Thus it is 
quite likely that a shortage of engineers could compromise 
the expansion of robotics technology.
The most remarkable thing about the job displacement 
and job creation impacts of industrial robots is not the fact 
that more jobs are eliminated than created; this follows from 
the fact that robots are labor-saving technology designed to 
raise productivity and lower costs of production. Rather, it is 
the skill-twist that emerges so clearly when the jobs 
eliminated are compared to the jobs created. The jobs 
eliminated are semi-skilled or unskilled, while the jobs 
created require significant technical background. We submit 
that this is the true meaning of the so-called robotics revolu 
tion.
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Implications
This study has focused on the employment and training 
implications of the spread of robotics technology by the year 
1990. It is probably fair to say that the major determinant of 
the overall impact of robotics in the '80s is the fact that 
robotics is an infant industry today. There is no way that the 
robotics industry can grow to be a giant in less than a decade 
(the futurists notwithstanding). It has repeatedly been 
demonstrated in this study that even with an extremely rapid 
growth rate of 30 to 40 percent annually in the population of 
robots in American industry, the robotics industry will still 
be small in 1990. The consensus prediction of the size of the 
industry in 1990 is $2 billion of sales annually. But General 
Motors Corporation alone had sales of nearly $50 billion in 
the U.S. in 1981. Chrysler had net sales of nearly $11 billion 
in a depressed economy. So an industry with $2 billion sales 
will still be very small in 1990.
The growth of the industrial robot population will not be 
restricted because of the inability of manufacturers to pro 
duce robots fast enough; there is plenty of capacity today 
and we are confident it can be expanded rapidly. The limits 
on the use of industrial robots will derive from the human, 
financial, and physical constraints that retard changes in 
manufacturing process technology. We have argued that 
process technology is significantly different from product 
technology. Robots cannot spread through America's fac 
tories the way Rubik's cube spread through America's 
homes. We have demonstrated by analogy with other process 
technology innovations that such change is evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary. To repeat a phrase used earlier, 
we believe the very use of the word "revolution" is inap 
propriate when dealing with any manufacturing process 
technology. Nevertheless, this examination of the human 
resource implications of the rapid growth in the robot
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population up to 1990 has revealed some potentially signifi 
cant problems.
First, while we are convinced that there will be no general 
worker displacement problem, there clearly will be particular 
pockets of displacement that may cause labor market 
distress. Particular occupations, industries, and locations 
will suffer the brunt of the job displacement impact. Ex 
amples include industrial welders and production painters, 
the auto industry, and Southeast Michigan. In each of these 
cases, substantial job displacement will occur in the decade 
of the '80s because of the application of robots. While a 
review of labor force attrition rates suggests that there will be 
very few workers actually thrown out of work even in these 
highly impacted areas, there is still some potential for 
displaced workers in these situations. We do not pretend our 
results are precise enough to make such calls with unfailing 
accuracy.
Robotics is obviously not the only change that will be 
forthcoming in the rest of the decade. There will be many in 
fluences on the levels of employment by occupation and in 
dustry. We have only examined the impact of robots, ignor 
ing any other effects. This includes possible expansion in 
volume of production due to price reductions or quality im 
provements. We also ignored potential international trade 
implications of robotics technology. In essence we have im 
posed our assumptions about the robot population and job 
displacement on an existing economic structure, without 
allowing for the natural adaptation and feedback effects that 
will likely occur.
In addition, we are very sensitive to the fact that we do not 
begin from a satisfactory employment situation. We still 
languish in the trough of a severe recession; aggregate 
unemployment rates are setting post-Depression records. 
Discussion of even minimal job elimination in the next few
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years as a result of the application of industrial robots seems 
particularly grim in times like these. We need more job crea 
tion, not job elimination. Even though it is ludicrous to 
believe that the seven thousand robots now operating in 
American factories have played a significant causative role in 
the unemployment of 11 million Americans, job loss hysteria 
has reached a point where there is a need to find scapegoats 
for our desperate situation.
Auto workers particularly are caught in a difficult trap. If 
it is true that the greater incidence of robots (and the 
manufacturing quality they help provide) plays a role in the 
success of Japanese automobiles in the American market, 
the challenge of robotics must be met. But the introduction 
of robots will clearly cause the direct displacement of some 
auto worker jobs. It is impossible to guarantee that robots 
will help regain some of the market share lost to the Japanese 
and therefore result in the restoration of jobs previously 
eliminated through competitive pressure. We do not know 
whether the Japanese challenge will be met successfully. Nor 
do we know how important robots may be in meeting this 
challenge. We do believe that the robots are coming to the 
auto industry anyway and must be accommodated. Those 
opposing technological progress rarely change the course of 
history for long.
Nevertheless, we believe it is clear that the rapid spread of 
robotics technology through American industry in this 
decade will not throw any significant number of American 
workers out of their jobs. Therefore we do not feel compell 
ed to call for a major policy response to a problem that does 
not exist. Robots may add somewhat to our existing displac 
ed worker problems during the 1980s, but they will not be a 
major contributor. Whatever policy initiatives are designed 
for the general displaced worker problem should adequately 
address those displaced by robots as well. We do believe that 
targeting such efforts occupationally, industrially, and
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geographically should be an important consideration in the 
design of any program to address the displaced worker 
problem.
The second major conclusion of the study is the skill-twist 
that characterizes the jobs displaced and the jobs created by 
robotics. Even though it is difficult to predict the exact oc 
cupational structure of an infant industry, we think it is clear 
that robotics will employ workers who are significantly more 
skilled on the average than more traditional industries. As 
shown earlier, over half of all the jobs created by robotics 
will require a 2-year degree or more. The new jobs will re 
quire much more technical background than manufacturing 
jobs in the past. The major implication of this observation is 
that retraining the workers displaced by robots for the new 
jobs created may not be realistic. On the other hand, our 
results suggest that the pace of displacement will be suffi 
ciently gradual that human resource planning can obviate the 
problems.
To use the auto industry as an example again, it would be 
difficult to retrain a welder from the line to repair and main 
tain the welding robot that will be doing his job in the future. 
However, it is not particularly difficult to train skilled plant 
maintenance workers to also maintain industrial robots. 
Thus the most efficient human resource management 
strategy may involve retraining the former welder to operate 
a machine which will not be robotized, while the robotics 
training is concentrated on those workers who are skilled 
already, it is not likely that the very same person replaced by 
the robot will be doing the new job or jobs created by the 
robots. Of course, the net result of such retraining and 
upgrading will be a markedly different skill mix; in other 
words, the skill-twist.
We have also expressed our concern about the job outlook 
for unskilled youth in the future. We believe it is likely that
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employment in manufacturing will continue to expand much 
more slowly than the labor force as a whole. To the extent 
that we already have a serious job deficit for unskilled youth, 
the growth of robotics will tend to exacerbate the problem. 
As displaced unskilled and semi-skilled workers are retrained 
and transferred to the remaining blue collar jobs in the fac 
tories, the outlook for hiring new unskilled workers declines 
correspondingly. Thus, we fear that any unemployment 
burden caused by robotics will ultimately fall on the younger 
generation.
It may be a fortuitous coincidence of the baby "bust" that 
the number of youth entering the labor market will be declin 
ing substantially at approximately the same time as the job 
displacing impacts of robotics become significant. Never 
theless, we urge young people to get a solid science and 
mathematics background if they want to be employable in 
the manufacturing sector.
The third major thrust of the study is the question of sup 
ply of the technical skills required by robotics technology. 
We have identified two very different problems, a potential 
oversupply of robotics technicians and a probable shortage 
of engineers. The rapid spread of robotics technology will 
enhance the demand for engineering talent, adding to an ex 
isting shortage situation. While robotics alone will not im 
pact significantly on the demand for engineers, we believe 
there are other reasons for expecting the shortage to grow 
more serious during the rest of the decade. Thus we add our 
voices to those calling for immediate national attention to 
the supply of engineers.
The supply problem of robotics technicians may well turn 
out to be that of oversupply. We believe that the growth of 
the robotics industry will be very rapid, but it seems clear 
that student interest and the ability of the community college 
system to increase the supply is growing even more rapidly.
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A continuation of the expansion of the last year or so in 
course offerings and enrollments on a national scale will very 
quickly swamp the ability of the industry to absorb trained 
people. For that reason, we endorse careful attention to the 
breadth of training. A firm grounding in theory and general 
principles of electronics, controls, hydraulics, etc. will stand 
the graduates of such programs in good stead whether they 
actually work primarily with robots or not.
In addition, we became convinced during the course of the 
study that there is an unmet need for manufacturing 
technology generalists, both at the graduate engineer and 
technician levels. A number of experts familiar both with 
manufacturing technology and the capabilities of todays 
engineering graduates complained about the over- 
specialization of training provided. Rebuilding American in 
dustrial strength will require individuals trained to be 
familiar with manufacturing technology in a broad sense. It 
is asserted that both Japan and Germany have programs for 
training such people. This may be one of the keys to in 
creases in manufacturing productivity in these economies.
The last major issue to be addressed is "What comes after 
1990?" Clearly the implication of our assumption of ex 
ponential growth in the robot population is that the job 
displacement effects are growing exponentially as well. The 
examination of job displacement in the single year 1990 in 
chapter 3 illustrated this effectively. If robots could 
eliminate one job opening of eight projected for production 
workers in manufacturing in 1990, when does it reach one in 
two, or one in one?
While it is a simple matter to extend the calculations and 
generate an answer to this question, we think it is an exercise 
that should be done with extreme caution. Using the assump 
tions of this study, we could forecast a robot population of 
250,000 to 500,000 for the U.S. by the end of 1995. We also 
think it would be irresponsible to do so at this early date. The
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data base does not exist and we do not believe the potential 
policy responses to such implied levels of displacement re 
quire lead times of more than three or four years. Thus the 
wisest course would be to monitor robotics developments for 
the next few years, keeping our vision fixed on a target six to 
eight years ahead. This strategy provides sufficient decision- 
making time while simultaneously maximizing the quality of 
information available at the decision point.
Nonetheless, we think it is possible to anticipate some 
general trends that lie ahead for the manufacturing 
workforce. The evolution of manufacturing process 
technology will undoubtedly continue. Productivity enhanc 
ing investment in robots and other new technology will go 
ahead. Rising productivity in manufacturing will cause a 
continued decline in the proportion of American workers 
employed in the manufacturing sector, even if the challenge 
of foreign imports is met. We believe that the skill-twist 
demonstrated in this study can probably be generalized to 
other manufacturing technology developments. Thus we 
believe it is possible to predict a continued decline in manual, 
semi-skilled jobs while the new jobs created will be increas 
ingly technical and scientific.
It should also be reiterated that some of the substitution of 
machines for human labor can and will be regarded as a 
blessing. There are a great many dirty and dangerous jobs 
that robots or other machines could do effectively, thereby 
preventing human exposure to these situations. Provided 
meaningful alternative work can be found for the occupants 
of those jobs, there is no need to feel remorse at the loss. We 
should not be so blinded by our short term economic prob 
lems that we forget the connection between productivity, job 
displacement, and economic progress.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that the addition of 
robots to our factories is anything other than an evolu-
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denary change. Industrial robots are simply one more piece 
of automated industrial equipment, part of the long history 
of automation of production. Robots will displace workers 
in the same way that technological change has always 
displaced workers. There is a possibility that this job 
displacement will be a significant problem, particularly in a 
given occupation or industry or geographical area. There is 
also the certainty that robots will create new jobs. Most of 
these will be quite different from the kinds of jobs 
eliminated. Robotics may challenge our ability to manage 
our most valuable resource, but there is no reason for the job 
displacement or the skill-twist impacts to create tragic conse 
quences. It is not time to panic; it is time to begin rational 
planning for the human resource implications of robotics.
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Planners. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1978. 
Surveys and evaluates the "state of the art" in forecasting. It includes 
the Delphi method as a part of technological forecasting.
"A Year of Settling for Less - and Breaking Old Molds," Business 
Week, December 20, 1982, pp. 72-74.
Describes 1983 as a year that will continue the trend toward modest 
wage increases in collective bargaining agreements. Nonmonetary fac 
tors are being emphasized more often, such as job retraining and job 
security.
Ayres, Robert and Steven Miller. Understanding and Managing the 
Productivity, Human Resource and Societal Implications of Robotics
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and Advanced Information Systems. The Robotics Institute, 
Carnegie-Mellon University, April 1982a.
The author asserts that the application of robotics technology needs to 
be developed in such a way as to insure economic competitiveness and 
growth while providing employment opportunities for the labor force. 
In order to manage a successful transition the authors have identified 
a broad set of analytical concerns, potential impacts and policy issues 
to be addressed over the years.
-   . "Industrial Robots on the Line," Technology Review, May/ 
June 1982b, pp. 35-46.
This published paper is a shortened version of the unpublished paper, 
Impacts of Industrial Robots. (The Robotics Institute, Carnegie- 
Mellon University, November 1981.) The authors conclude that 
neither government nor private industry is adequately preparing 
workers whose jobs are most likely to be eliminated by robots. The 
authors suggest a number of avenues for retraining displaced workers.
-   . "Robotics, CAM, and Industrial Productivity," National 
Productivity Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1981-82, pp. 42-66. 
The authors conclude that the primary direct impact of robotics and 
CAM will be to significantly boost the output capacity of batch pro 
duction operations. Although it is unclear how long it will take to 
achieve the "unmanned factory of the future," demand will remain 
very high for at least a decade or more for robots and other computer- 
controlled machines.
    . The Impacts of Robotics on the Workforce and Workplace. 
Carnegie-Mellon University, Department of Engineering and Public 
Policy, June 198la.
Reports the results of the original student project in which Ayres and 
Miller were the principal investigators. Estimates of potential job 
displacement caused by robots were based on a survey of corporate 
users. Concludes that today's robots could theoretically replace 1 
million operatives in manufacturing and that the next generation of 
robots could potentially replace an additional 3 million operatives in 
manufacturing.
    . Preparing for the Growth of Industrial Robots. Carnegie- 
Mellon University, Department of Engineering and Public Policy, 
September 1981b.
Given the potential for robotization in metalworking occupations, this 
paper outlines the intervention necessary to prepare the affected
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workers and thereby prevent social trauma. In so doing the authors 
describe what they feel to be the roles of private industry, educational 
institutions, unions and government.
Ayres, Robert, Leonard Lynn and Steven Miller. Technology Transfer in 
Robotics: U.S./Japan. Carnegie-Mellon University, Department of 
Engineering and Public Policy, October 1981. 
Discusses differences between U.S. and Japan in development and in 
troduction of robotics technology. Japan provides more governmental 
support, Japanese industries tend to make their own robots in-house, 
and workers are provided lifetime security in major industries.
Backman, Jules, ed. Labor, Technology, and Productivity in the 
Seventies. New York University Press, New York, 1974. 
Issues discussed in this collection of papers include the trade union 
movement in the U.S., its relationships with business, and the momen 
tum and trends of technological progress.
Battelle-Columbus Laboratories. The Development of High Technology 
Industries in New York State, six special reports. New York State 
Science and Technology Foundation, Albany, 1982. 
This study assesses the environment in New York State for the attrac 
tion, expansion and retention of high technology industries. The 
analysis takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of the state, 
local manpower, and financial incentives as well as the major actors 
and programs necessary to implement an action-oriented strategy by 
all decisionmaking sectors in the state.
     . Development of the Robotics and Biotechnology Industries in 
the State of Michigan, Mimeographed. Michigan State Department of 
Commerce, November 1981.
This study was conducted to determine the factors that attract the 
robotics and biotechnology industries to locate in particular 
geographical areas. The results of interviews conducted with robotics 
and biotechnological firms indicate that Michigan has a well 
developed industrial base for both of these high technology industries. 
The state needs to set policies for centralizing R&D resources in addi 
tion to policies directed at improving the business climate in Michigan.
Behuniak, John A. Economic Analysis of Robot Applications. Society 
of Manufacturing Engineers, Technical Paper MS 79-777, 1979. 
Studies the economics of robot application analyzing the payback, 
return on investment, discounted rate of return and cash flow of three 
robot applications.
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     . "Planning the Successful Robot Installation," in Robotics 
Today, Summer 1981, reprinted in Robotics Today '82 Annual Edi 
tion, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, MI, 1982, pp. 
23-24.
Stresses that careful planning is necessary to successfully integrate 
robots into the workplace. This includes human considerations as well 
as economic costs.
Birch, David L. "Presentation to Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin 
Symposium on Small Business." Green Bay, WI, March 1982. 
Discusses the growth of the service sector as opposed to the manufac 
turing sector. Suggests that our economy is becoming one which is 
largely knowledge based. Concludes that Michigan is an attractive site 
for high-technology industries.
     . The Job Generation Process. MIT Program on Neighborhood 
and Regional Change, Cambridge, MA, 1979. 
Using Dun & Bradstreet data, Birch concludes that all regions tend to 
experience the same rate of job loss about 8 percent per year but 
regions differ in the number of new firms, births and expansions. Fur 
thermore, the bulk of net new jobs about 60 percent are created by 
small, independent firms with less than 20 employees.
Bowen, Howard R. and Garth L. Mangum, eds. Automation and 
Economic Progress. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966. 
Excellent overview of the work of the National Commission on 
Technology, Automation and Economic Progress. It includes an 
abridged version of the Commission report plus selections from 10 of 
the 41 supplementary studies.
Brown, Lynn E. "A Quality Labor Supply," New England Economic 
Review, July/August 1981, pp. 19-36.
Suggests that the quality of the New England workforce may have 
been significant in that region's resurgence in the 1970s, especially in 
the area of high-technology industry.
Buckingham, Walter. Automation: Its Impact on Business and People. 
Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1961. 
Assesses the impact of automation (labor-saving technology) on firms 
and employment. Presents a somewhat pessimistic analysis of the 
future.
Burford, Roger L. and Joseph L. Katz. "A Method for Estimation of 
Input-Output Type Output Multipliers When No 1-0 Exists," Journal
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of Regional Science, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1981, pp. 151-161. 
Establishes a statistical technique to estimate the effect of a given in 
dustry on other industries in a region (the interindustry effect) when 
only a minimum of information is available. Information is required 
for the average material purchases of all firms in the region and for 
the particular industry of interest to utilize the technique.
"Business Outlays To Rise Modestly in '83 First Half," Wall Street 
Journal, December 10, 1982.
Survey results indicate slight increase in capital spending for 
businesses for first half of 1983. However, when adjusted for infla 
tion, capital spending is expected to continue to decline.
"Capital Spending's Sickening Fall," Business Week, November 15, 
1982, pp. 36-37.
Reports results of the 29th annual survey of plant and equipment con 
ducted by McGraw-Hill publications indicating that capital spending 
is expected to drop at a real rate of 8.5 percent for 1983.
Carey, Max L. "Evaluating the 1975 Projections of Occupational 
Employment," Monthly Labor Review, June 1980, pp. 10-21. 
This article compares BLS projected 1975 occupational employment 
with actual employment estimated from CPS data. Error rates for 
specific occupations were quite large. Hope was expressed that the 
new OES data base would improve the quality of the occupational 
projections.
     .. "Occupational Employment Growth Through 1990," 
Monthly Labor Review, August 1981, pp. 42-55. 
Summarizes for the first time occupational growth to 1990 using the 
OES data base rather than census based data.
Carey, Max L. and Kevin Kasunic. "Evaluating the 1980 Projections of 
Occupational Employment," Monthly Labor Review, July 1982, pp. 
20-30.
This article compares the 1980 occupational employment projections 
(made in 1970) with 1980 actual levels (estimated from CPS data). The 
average error for 64 detailed occupations was 22 percent in absolute 
levels of employment. Includes an interesting discussion of the dif 
ficulties of making such projections.
Cetron, Marvin and Thomas O'Toole. "Careers With a Future: Where 
the Jobs Will Be in the 1990s," The Futurist, June 1982a, pp. 11-19. 
Predicts that the world's job markets will change dramatically in the
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next 20 years. The major new jobs in the 1990s are predicted to be in 
robot technology, computer technology, laser technology, energy 
technology, waste technology, and housing rehabilitation.
     . Encounters with the Future: A Forecast of Life into the 21st 
Century. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1982b. 
This wide ranging forecast describes trends in economics, politics, 
social affairs, health, science and technology for the next twenty 
years. The forecasts provide advice on all aspects of life for the 21st 
century, including the jobs of the future.
Choate, Pat. Retooling the American Work Force. Northeast-Midwest 
Institute, Washington, DC, July 1982.
This largely descriptive monograph concludes that a national strategy 
for retraining is mandatory in the 1980s. Millions of workers will be 
displaced by technological change and other factors, while the transfer 
to new jobs requires new skills.
Committee for Economic Development. Stimulating Technological 
Progress. Heffernan Press, Inc., Washington, DC, January 1980. 
Concludes that the reason for lagging U.S. investment and 
technological progress are public policies which discourage new 
capital investment. The committee therefore recommends policy 
changes such as taxes which increase the return on investment, refor 
mation of patent policies, reducing regulatory controls and federal 
support of R&D.
Conigliaro, Laura. Robotics newsletter, Numbers 1-11. Prudential- 
Bache, Inc., New York, 1980-82.
A continuing newsletter which provides financial and investment ad 
visory information on the robotics industry.
Connole, Anthony W. Industrial Robots: A View of Future Social 
Implications. Eikonix Corporation, Burlington, MA, December 1976. 
Attempts to dispel the myth that unions oppose automation and 
technological change. Suggests that the introduction of robots will 
take place when the health of the general economy can best absorb the 
labor displacement.
Dizard, John W. "Giant Footsteps at Unimation's Back,' Fortune, May 
17, 1982, pp. 94-99.
Hints that Unimation may have difficulty maintaining its dominant 
position in the robotics industry in the face of entry by such firms as 
IBM, Bendix, GE and United Technologies.
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Doan, Herbert D. "The Development of Technology-Based Businesses 
in Michigan." Presented to the 3rd Annual Growth Capital Sym 
posium. Ann Arbor, MI, March 1982.
Describes the activities in the state aimed at the development of 
technology-based business, including the funding foundations, 
research and training institutions and corporations.
Donovan, Raymond. "Remarks of the Secretary of Labor on Improving 
Productivity Growth." Presented to the Productivity Advisory Com 
mittee, Washington, DC, January 1982.
Discusses the factors contributing to the decline of productivity 
growth in the U.S. and the need for improving both the efficiency and 
growth of productivity. Indicates that the advent of high technology 
will create changes in both the supply and demand for labor, especial 
ly in skill requirements.
Drucker, Peter F. "The Next American Work Force: Demographics and 
U.S. Economic Policy," Commentary, October 1981, pp. 3-10. 
The U.S. will experience an irreversible decline in the manpower 
necessary to maintain its blue-collar labor force. The new labor force 
entrants will be fewer (one-third of the supply available in the last two 
decades) and better educated. The challenge is to capitalize on a highly 
educated labor force.
Engleberger, Joseph L. Robotics in Practice. American Management 
Association, AMACOM Press, New York, 1980. 
This book is described as the first handbook for managers and 
engineers on the use of robots in industry. Case studies are provided 
detailing the use of robotics in several applications such as die casting, 
welding and forging. Provides assistance to the manager and engineer 
in judging whether robots are suitable for specific jobs.
Etzioni, Amitai. An Immodest Agenda: Rebuilding America Before the 
Twenty-First Century. McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 
1983.
Analyzes the next 20 years in terms of social, cultural and economic 
policy in the U.S. Reaganomics and its likely impact on the infrastruc 
ture, capital formation, R&D, energy and human capital are discussed 
among other topics.
Fechter, Alan. Forecasting the Impact of Technological Change on 
Manpower Utilization and Displacement: An Analytic Summary. 
Contract Report No. 1215-1, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC, 
March 1974.
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Discusses the state-of-the-art in determining future employment im 
pacts of new technology. Finds very serious problems in forecasting 
technological change, in isolating technological change from other in 
fluences on the labor market, and in the lack of an adequate method 
for disaggregating labor input.
Fishkind, Henry and R. Blaine Roberts. "Two Methods of Projecting 
Occupational Employment," Monthly Labor Review, May 1978, pp. 
57-58.
Compares the OES occupational employment projection method with 
a fully structured econometric model of the State of Florida. Conclu 
sions are that the econometric model performs slightly better, but not 
enough to justify the additional cost and effort in maintaining the 
model.
Fisk, John D. Industrial Robots in the United States: Issues and Per 
spectives. Report No. 81-78 E, United States Congressional Research 
Service, March 1981.
Discusses industrial robots, their present and future use in American 
industry and the range of possible effects this technology may have on 
industry and the workforce. Examines "adjustment mechanisms" for 
the potentially displaced workforce.
Flaim, Paul O. and Howard N. Fullerton, Jr. "Labor Force Projections 
to 1990: Three Possible Paths," Monthly Labor Review, December 
1978, pp. 25-35.
Summarizes the BLS projections of the labor force in 1985 and 1990. 
The three different growth scenarios differ primarily in their assump 
tions about the rates of change in participation rates for women and 
black men. All projections foresee a reduction in youth in both ab 
solute and relative terms.
Freeman, Richard B. The Over-Educated American. Academic Press, 
Inc., New York, 1976.
Analyzes the market for college graduates in the mid-1970s, the first 
time in many years that new college graduates were having difficulty 
in obtaining college-level jobs. Among other things, Freeman 
documents the historical volatility in engineering enrollments and sug 
gests that it is likely to continue.
Gerstenfeld, Arthur and Robert Brainard, eds. Technological Innova 
tion: Government/Industry Cooperation. John Wiley and Sons, New 
York, 1979. 
A collection of papers by authors from nine countries which were
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presented to an international conference. The basic research question 
was: Can industry and government cooperate to guide and stimulate 
technological innovation?
Gevarter, William B. An Overview of Artificial Intelligence and Ro 
botics, Volume II, Robotics. U.S. Department of Commerce, Na 
tional Bureau of Standards, Washington, DC, March 1982. 
Describes and classifies different industrial robots and their functions. 
Discusses the present as well as the likely future direction of robotics.
Gold, Bela. Productivity, Technology, and Capital. D.C. Heath and 
Company, Lexington, MA, 1979.
Presents analyses of productivity and technological change at the firm 
and industry level based upon the author's more than 25 years of 
research experience. Key conclusions include (1) the need for a more 
comprehensive framework to analyze productivity changes, (2) the 
heterogeneous nature of industries cannot be ignored, and (3) actual 
productivity gains tend to be at wide variance with expectations.
     . Improving Managerial Evaluations of Computer-Aided 
Manufacturing. National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 198la. 
Part of a project to develop a model for managerial evaluation of 
CAD/CAM systems. that will be effective in assessing the distinct 
capabilities and requirements of these systems. The model is designed 
to more efficiently estimate the benefits of CAD/CAM as opposed to 
the standardized budgeting procedures typically used for evaluating 
the acquisition of new equipment.
     . "Robotics, Programmable Automation and Increasing 
Competitiveness," in Exploratory Workshop on the Social Impacts of 
Robotics: Summary and Issues. Congress of the United States, Office 
of Technology Assessment, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC, 1981b, pp. 91-117.
Concludes that the actual economic impact of major technological 
changes have usually been less than expected due to an over- 
concentration on the change itself which neglects the total production 
framework and its many interactions. Robotics should be evaluated as 
part of a system of programmable automation for manufacturing. 
The failure to adopt new technologies has already decreased the inter 
national cost competitiveness and production efficiency of U.S. in 
dustry, thus causing unemployment.
Gold, Bela, Gerhard Rosegger and Myles G. Boylan, Jr. Evaluating 
Technological Innovations. D.C. Heath and Company, Toronto, 
Canada, 1980.
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The authors attempt to establish an improved analytical foundation 
for firms to evaluate new technologies. The empirical data is taken 
from the iron and steel industry. One of the authors' many conclu 
sions is that successful technological innovation by one firm in an in 
dustry is not evidence that other firms in the same industry should or 
will promptly adopt the same innovation.
Goldstein, Harvey. Occupational Employment Projections for Labor 
Market Areas: An Analysis of Alternative Approaches. U.S. Depart 
ment of Labor, R&D Monograph 80, U.S. Government Printing Of 
fice, Washington, DC, 1981.
This monograph describes the general features of the OES approach 
to occupational employment projections and examines the potential 
of econometric models and input-output models for improving pro 
jections. Local occupational forecasting requires improved local labor 
market data and analysis.
Gordus, Jeanne P., Paul Jarley and Louis A. Ferman. Plant Closings 
and Economic Dislocation. The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employ 
ment Research, Kalamazoo, MI, 1981.
Presents an overview of 20 plant closing studies published in the last 
two decades. Emphasizes what we know about plant closings and 
what research remains to be done.
Grabbe, Eugene M. and Donald L. Pyke. "An Evaluation of the Fore 
casting of Information Processing Technology and Applications," 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 4, 1972, pp. 
143-150.
The Delphi method of forecasting is described and evaluated by com 
paring events forecasted with actual dates of occurrence. Although the 
data provided is inconclusive, the indication is that information pro 
cessing technology and application are advancing more rapidly than 
expected.
"Growth Industries of the Future," Newsweek, October 12, 1982, p. 82. 
Discusses the different forecasts of the future job markets. Robotics 
will be one of the major growth areas.
Haber, William, Louis A. Ferman and James R. Hudson. The Impact of 
Technological Change. The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research, Kalamazoo, MI, 1963.
One of the early reviews of the empirical research on the impact of 
technological change. It specifically assesses the evidence of job 
displacement by reviewing 17 studies conducted between 1929 and 
1961.
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Hekman, J. S. "The Future of High Technology Industry in New 
England: A Case Study of Computers," New England Economic 
Review, January/February 1980, pp. 5-17.
Discusses the computer industry, including main manufacturing 
centers and branches of these centers. Suggests that the smaller 
branches are more mobile and will be indicators of growth and mobili 
ty in terms of geographical location. The South Atlantic, Southwest 
and Pacific regions tend to be most attractive for computer branch 
locations, while New England is a strong location for new firms with 
new products.
     . "Can New England Hold onto Its High Technology Indus 
try?" New England Economic Review, March/April 1980, pp. 35-44. 
The author examines the medical instrument industry and concludes 
that New England will retain its attraction for these firms.
Hollomon, Herbert J. Technical Change and American Enterprise. 
Report No. 9, National Planning Association, Washington, DC, 
1974.
Discusses the process of technological change and makes recommen 
dations for private and public policies. Factors considered include 
utilization of existing knowledge toward new technology, increased 
support of applied sciences and engineering, the need for collective 
R&D, business and the government's role in protecting the consumer, 
and policy changes necessary to insure that the negative impacts of 
technological change are not absorbed only by the individual workers 
and firms involved.
Hunt, H. Allan and Timothy L. Hunt. Robotics: Human Resource 
Implications for Michigan. The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employ 
ment Research, Kalamazoo, MI, 1982a.
Final report to the Michigan Occupational Information Coordinating 
Committee (MOICC) regarding the impacts of robotics on the State of 
Michigan.
     . Robotics: Human Resource Implications for Michigan, A 
Summary. Michigan Occupation Information Coordinating Commit 
tee, 1982b. 
Summarizes the findings of the full state report.
Industrial Technology Institute. The Program for the Industrial Tech 
nology Institute. Preliminary draft proposal, Industrial Technology 
Institute, Ann Arbor, MI, August 1982. Mimeographed. 
Outlines the goals and objectives of the Industrial Technology In 
stitute as well as the role it will play in research and development.
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Institute of Science and Technology, University of Michigan. Automatic 
Factory Opportunities in Michigan: I. Robotics. January 1982. 
Analyzes the robotics industry and its potential in the State of 
Michigan from an economic development perspective. Topics include 
robotics research and training programs in Michigan, short descrip 
tions of robotics manufacturers in Michigan, the Michigan business 
environment, and business services provided by the Office of 
Economic Development (OED), Michigan Department of Commerce.
Jablonowski, Joseph. "Robots: Looking Over the Specifications," 
American Machinist, Special Report 745, May 1982, pp. 163-178. 
Discusses the specifications, capabilities, and costs of industrial 
robots displayed at Robotics VI Conference (March 1982) by firm and 
model name.
Kendrick, John W. "The Coming Rebound in Productivity," 
Fortune, June 28, 1982, pp. 25-28.
Explains that productivity is partially based on the level of business 
activity. Productivity will improve over the next several years due to 
several forces including the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, increas 
ed awareness and confrontation of productivity problems, expanded 
investment in plants and equipment and foreign competition.
Krause, Jeffrey M. "Robotics Impact on Human Resources." Un 
published thesis presented to General Motors Institute. Detroit, MI, 
April 1982.
Given the goal at GM for increased use of advanced technology 
systems, especially robots, the author assesses the implications of 
robotics on human resources emphasizing that successful integration 
of robots at GM can lead to efficiency and productivity that will 
benefit GM, the workers and the community.
Leon, Carol Boyd. "Occupational Winners and Losers: Who They Were 
During 1972-80," Monthly Labor Review, June 1982, pp. 18-28. 
Reports changes in employment between 1972 and 1980 based on the 
Current Population Survey. Includes the occupations that experienced 
significant growth or decline.
Leontief, Wassily W. "The Distribution of Work and Income," 
Scientific American, September 1982, pp. 188-204. 
Discusses the likely impact of new technologies on employment and 
income in the American economy by the year 2000. Suggests work 
sharing and other measures to insure an equitable distribution of in 
come.
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Levitan, Sar A. and Clifford M. Johnson. Second Thoughts on Work. 
The W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Kalamazoo, 
MI, 1982.
Among other things, this monograph includes a section on the likely 
effects of robots on the workforce and workplace. Concludes that 
there are limits to the rate of technological change and also questions 
several popular perceptions about economic growth and technological 
change.
"Little Corporate Zest for Leading a Recovery," Business Week, 
December 13, 1982, p. 14.
Based on a survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, the ma 
jority of executives report that tactics to improve business activity in a 
flat economy include, among other things, increased output without 
significantly adding to the workforce, increased output without addi 
tional capital financing, and expanding inventories based only on de 
mand and output.
Lund, Robert T., Christopher J. Barnett and Richard M. Kutta. 
Numerically Controlled Machine Tools and Group Technology: A 
Study of U.S. Experience. Center for Policy Alternatives, MIT, Cam 
bridge, MA, January 1978.
This study examines the experience of N/C machine tools as the 
forerunner of new computer-based manufacturing and the effects of 
this technology on the discrete product manufacturing industry. The 
question this study seeks to answer is "whether new manufacturing 
technologies could bring the economics of batch manufacturing suffi 
ciently close to those of large-scale production to make smaller-scale 
manufacturing more attractive."
Luria, Daniel. "Technology, Employment and the Factory of the 
Future." Presented to the SME Autofact III Conference, Detroit, 
November 9, 1981.
This study suggests that the U.S. auto industry must automate, 
rebuild and retool or lose even more markets to the Japanese. 
However, the U.S. must plan for these changes. Luria suggests reduc 
ing the length of the workweek, increasing international communica 
tion and support among unions, requiring advance notification of 
plant closures, reevaluating traditional management-union relation 
ships, retraining of displaced workers and increasing job security for 
workers.
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Lustgarten, Eli S. "Robotics and Its Relationship to the Automated 
Factory," in Exploratory Workshop on the Social Impacts of 
Robotics: Summary and Issues. Office of Technology Assessment, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, February 1982, 
pp. 119-36.
Lustgarten, an investment analyst for Paine Webber Mitchell Hut- 
chins, Inc., projects a $2.0 billion U.S. market for the robotics in 
dustry by 1990. The adoption of robots will be spurred in part by the 
aging of U.S. plant and equipment and the expected mid-1980s drop 
in the entry level workforce.
Macut, John J. "New Technology in Metal working," Occupational 
Outlook Quarterly, February 1965, pp. 1-6.
Discusses the use of N/C machine tools compared to the conventional 
machine tools in terms of productivity, efficiency and quality control 
and the effects of this technology on the workforce.
Malecki, Edward. "Product Cycles, Innovation Cycles, and Regional 
Economic Change," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 
May 1981, pp. 309-323.
This review paper examines the implications of technological change 
for regional economic development and policy from the perspective of 
product cycles and innovation cycles. The review is fairly comprehen 
sive and includes a lengthy listing of references.
     . "Public and Private Sector Interrelationships, Technological 
Change, and Regional Development," Papers of The Regional 
Science Association, Volume 47, 1981, pp. 121-137. 
Reviews the available evidence of the influence of public and private 
sector research and development spending on regional economic 
development. The study concludes that private research and develop 
ment tends to lead rather than follow government and research activi 
ty.
Mansfield, Edwin. Industrial Research and Technological Innovation: 
An Econometric Analysis. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New 
York, 1968.
This book brings together some of the results of Mansfield's quan 
titative studies of technological change and innovation.
Mansfield, Edwin, et al. The Production and Application of New 
Industrial Technology. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York,
1977.
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Mansfield compares private and social rates of return for new 
technological innovations and concludes that in many cases the social 
returns are much higher than the private returns.
Mansfield, Edwin, et al. Research and Innovation in the Modern Cor 
poration. W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., New York, 197la. 
One of the pioneering efforts by Mansfield and his students. It is im 
possible to adequately summarize this work, but one of the major in 
sights is that it took a decade or more for a majority of the firms to 
adopt a specific new process technology.
Mansfield, Edwin. Technological Change. W.W. Norton and Company, 
Inc., New York, 1971b.
Surveys the literature of technological change. This book provides a 
concise introduction to Mansfield's voluminous work as well as 
others. The review is relatively nontechnical and written specifically 
for a general audience. There is also a balanced presentation of the 
relevant policy issues.
Martin, Gail M. "Industrial Robots Join the Workforce," Occupational 
Outlook Quarterly, Fall 1982a, pp. 2-11.
Describes the types and uses of robots currently and addresses con 
cerns over present and future trends in the robotics industry, par 
ticularly those related to the effects this industry will have on the 
workforce and society.
     . "Manufacturing Engineering," Occupational Outlook Quar 
terly, Fall 1982b, pp. 22-26.
Describes the changing role of the manufacturing engineer due to the 
introduction of robotics and CAD/CAM and new concerns such as 
energy costs, competition of foreign manufacturers and lagging pro 
ductivity.
Meisner, Charlotte. High Technology Employment: Massachusetts and 
Selected States 1975-1981. Massachusetts Division of Employment 
Security, Job Market Research, 1982.
High technology industries are characterized by a high ratio of 
research and development to sales, high value-added products, high 
ratio of scientists and engineers, and high growth rates. This 
somewhat broad definition is operationalized by selecting 20 in 
dustries at the 3-digit level from the SIC system. The study then 
presents comparative data for the states and industries selected.
Michigan Employment Security Commission, Occupational Employ 
ment Statistics Unit. Michigan Occupational Employment Statistics
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for Manufacturing Industries. Michigan Employment Security Com 
mission, Detroit, April 198la.
Reports results of the Occupational Employment Survey (OES) for 
Michigan manufacturing industries in 1977 at the 2-digit SIC code 
level of industrial detail.
Michigan Employment Security Commission, Bureau of Research and 
Statistics. Motor Vehicle and Related Industries in Michigan. 
Michigan Employment Security Commission, Detroit, Summer 
1981b.
The results of a survey of all manufacturing industries directly involv 
ed in supplying parts, materials and special tool and dies for the 
automobile industry are discussed revealing that 55 percent of 
Michigan's manufacturing sector is employed in the automobile or 
automobile-related industries.
     . Occupational Supply and Demand in Michigan. Michigan 
Employment Security Commission, Detroit, Winter 1982. 
This pioneering effort funded by the Michigan Occupational Informa 
tion Coordinating Committee is a first attempt to bring together the 
information available about the demand and supply for various oc 
cupations in the State of Michigan. It includes analyses of 60 occupa 
tional clusters primarily accessed through the vocational education 
system.
Milliken, William G. A Plan to Increase the High Technology Com 
ponent of Michigan's Economy. September 198 la. 
Outlines goals and objectives to increase the high technology compo 
nent of Michigan's economy describing the accomplishments of the 
High Technology Task Force and recommendations for future ac 
tivities.
     . Special Message to the Michigan Legislature on Economic 
Development. September 17, 1981b.
Presents Governor Milliken's plan for the future economic develop 
ment of the State of Michigan.
"Motor Vehicles, Model Year 1982," Survey of Current Business, 
October 1982, pp. 20-23.
Describes 1982 as the worst year since 1961 for the motor vehicle in 
dustry. The economic and financial conditions of the major auto 
manufacturers continued to deteriorate.
Nabseth, Lars and George F. Ray, eds. The Diffusion of New Indus 
trial Processes. Cambridge University Press, London, 1974.
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An international study of technological diffusion that spans six years 
and six research institutes. The processes analyzed included 
numerically controlled machine tools. Even though numerical control 
appeared appropriate for smaller firms which produce small batch 
jobs, it was not adopted to any significant degree because of the large 
initial financial cost.
National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life. New 
Technologies and Training in Metalworking. Washington, DC, 1978. 
Analyzes the development of numerical control and other 
technologies in metal working.
National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life. 
Productivity and Job Security: Retraining to Adapt to Technological 
Change. Washington, DC, 1977.
Presents five case studies on worker retraining to determine the advan 
tages and disadvantages of each and their effectiveness in protecting 
job security. Policy implications are discussed regarding 
management's role in incorporating new technology to achieve higher 
productivity and maintain competitiveness while insuring the job 
security of its workers through retraining.
National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic 
Progress. Technology and the American Economy. Volume 1. 
Prepared for the U.S. Congress, 1966.
This national commission assesses the impacts of technological change 
and policy challenges resulting from it. While the Commission found 
that fears of widespread unemployment due to automation were not 
well founded, they did find reason to be concerned about adjustments 
to technological change and its impact on particular groups and sec 
tors of the economy. Contains a set of recommendations for a com 
prehensive program addressing the needs of those workers displaced 
by technological change.
National Science Foundation. Science and Engineering Degrees: 
1950-80. National Science Foundation, Special Report NSF-32-307, 
Washington, DC, 1982a.
A statistical data source that provides detailed estimates of science and 
engineering degree production.
     . "Labor Markets for New Science and Engineering graduates 
in Private Industry," Science Resource Studies Highlights, NSF 
82-310, Washington, DC, June 9, 1982b, pp. 1-5.
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Presents data on labor market conditions for science and engineering 
graduates based on a survey of 255 firms in 1981.
—————. "Engineering Colleges Report 10% of Faculty Positions 
Vacant in Fall of 1980," Science Resource Studies Highlights, Na 
tional Science Foundation, NSF 81-322, Washington, DC, November 
1981a, pp. 1-4. 
Reports on the results of a survey of 181 engineering colleges.
—————. "Science and Engineering Faculty with Recent Doctorates 
Fell to One-fifth of Total in 1980," Science Resource Studies 
Highlights, National Science Foundation, NSF 81-318, Washington 
DC, October 1981b, pp. 1-4.
Reports the findings of a 1980 survey supported by the National 
Science Foundation.
—————. National Patterns of Science and Technology Resources 1981. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, NSF 81-311, Washington, DC, 
April 1981c.
A statistical compilation of U.S. research and development resources. 
Includes an evaluation of labor market conditions for science and 
engineering personnel.
—————. Science and Engineering Employment: 1970-80. National 
Science Foundation, Special Report NSF 81-310, Washington, DC, 
March 1981.
Charts growth in science and engineering employment levels over the 
decade of the 70s. Includes data on distribution of scientists and 
engineers by sector and specialty. Also reports indices for research and 
development employment and total funding 1970 to 1980.
—————. Problems of Small High-Technology Firms. National Science 
Foundation, Special Report NSF 81-305, Washington, DC, December 
1981.
Results of a survey of 1232 high-tech firms with less than 500 
employees. Major problems are identified in the financial, personnel 
and government relations areas. No policy implications are offered.
Nelson, Richard R., Merton J. Peck and Edward D. Kalacheck. 
Technology, Economic Growth and Public Policy. The Brookings In 
stitution, Washington, DC, 1967.
This work draws together most of the previous research on 
technological progress. Topics include the way in which the economy 
adjusts to technological change and possible public policy concerns.
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The authors propose a framework for delineating the roles of private, 
public and governmental financing of R&D.
Obrzut, John A. "Robotics Extends A Helping Hand," Iron Age, 
March 19, 1982, pp. 59-83.
Suggests that the robot industry finds itself popularized in the media 
but relatively short on orders in 1982.
Porter & Novelli Associates. Targeted Industry Marketing Program: 
Advanced Manufacturing Systems Report. Mimeographed. Michigan 
State Department of Commerce, 1981.
Assesses the level of interest as well as the locational factors that at 
tract business to Michigan by interviewing firms in and out of state.
Prab Robots, Inc. Annual Report, 1981. Kalamazoo, Michigan.
Presents complete operating results for this firm for the fiscal year 
ending October 31, 1981.
Putnam, George P. "Why More NC Isn't Being Used," Machine and 
Tool Blue Book, September, 1978, pp. 98-107. 
Reports results of a survey of small machine tool firms who were con 
sidered candidates for use of numerical control. Found that 72 percent 
of the firms had not formally evaluated the applicability of numerical 
control for their firms.
Rees, John. "Technological Change and Regional Shifts in American 
Manufacturing," Professional Geographer, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1979, pp. 
45-54.
Discusses the changes taking place in the American economic system 
and the effects that these changes are having on the industrial 
geography of the United States.
Riche, W. Richard. "Impact of Technological Change." Mimeo 
graphed. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Labor for presentation 
at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's 
Second Special Session on Information Technologies, Productivity, 
and Employment in Paris, France, October 1981. 
Suggests that American business, workers, and consumers have 
shared the benefits of technological change and will likely continue to 
do so in the future. Adoption of new technologies has not resulted in 
layoffs of workers because the private sector has retrained and 
reassigned displaced workers or accomplished employment reductions 
through normal attrition. A short section about robotics notes that 
widespread adoption likely awaits the development of satisfactory 
sensing devices.
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"Robotics Class Looks Ahead," The Detroit News, March 10, 1982. 
Reports on the Warren, Michigan robotics technician training pro 
gram conducted under the Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act (CETA).
Robot Institute of America. RIA Worldwide Survey and Directory on 
Industrial Robots. Robot Institute of America, Dearborn, MI, 1981. 
Reports the results of a survey on the use of robots in 18 countries. 
The survey answers questions regarding the various applications of 
robots, current population, financial information and future trends of 
robotics. Includes a directory of the leading manufacturers, 
distributors, component suppliers and research and government 
organizations involved in the field.
"A Robotics Mecca in Michigan? Car Sales Must Rebound First," 
Detroit Free Press, October 11, 1982.
Reports that lagging auto sales have delayed some robot purchases by 
the auto firms and suggests that the future of the robot industry in 
Michigan depends in part on a recovery in auto sales. Reports also 
that many of the new entrants in the robot market have had little or no 
sales in 1982.
Rosenthal, Neal H. "Shortages of Machinists: An Evaluation of the 
Information," Monthly Labor Review, July 1982, pp. 31-36. 
Presents an interesting discussion of what can be gleaned from various 
data sources about the current situation and future outlook for 
machinists. The data are consistent with a shortage, but sufficient in 
formation is not available to quantify that shortage.
Ruben, George. "Developments in Industrial Relations," Monthly 
Labor Review, September 1982a, pp. 44-45.
Discusses the job security focus of the new collective bargaining agree 
ment at General Electric Company.
—————. "Developments in Industrial Relations," Monthly Labor 
Review, October 1982b, p. 44.
Discusses the new collective bargaining agreement for Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation.
Rumberger, Russell W. "The Changing Skill Requirements of Jobs in 
the U.S. Economy," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 34, 
No. 4, July 1981, pp. 578-590.
This study measures the shifts in job skill requirements in the U.S. 
economy from 1960 to 1976. Both changes in the distribution of
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employment among occupations and changes in the skill requirements 
of individual occupations are addressed.
Russo, G. Paul. "Robotics at Chrysler," in Robotics and the Factory of 
the Future, presented at the University of Michigan Management 
Briefing Seminars, Traverse City, MI, August 2, 1982. 
Chrysler is using 240 robots today, most in welding applications. By 
the end of 1988 Chrysler expects to have 987 robots installed in their 
plants, a growth rate of approximately 30 percent.
Russell, Jack. "Michigan's Ailing Economy: Is Robotics the Cure?" 
Mimeographed.
The potential for the emerging robotics industry in the State of 
Michigan is discussed. He concludes that robotics has little employ 
ment potential for the state. Russell goes on to provide an alternative 
possibility for economic growth—that of energy hardware—which he 
feels would better utilize the already existing metalworking industry 
and provide 100,000 industrial jobs.
Sahal, Devendra. Patterns of Technological Innovation. Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, MA, 1981. 
Sahal proposes (and supports with numerous case studies) an evolu 
tionary concept of technological innovation which is more eclectic 
than traditional economic approaches. In his own words, 
". . .technological innovation is too significant a process to be left to 
economists and engineers. What is needed is an independent science of 
technology. My attempt in this book has been to provide the essentials 
of this emerging science." Needless to say, the book is novel, complex 
and rather comprehensive.
Schreiber, Rita R. "Meeting the Demand for Robotics Technicians," in 
Robotics Today, Summer 1981, reprinted in Robotics Today '82 An 
nual Edition, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Dearborn, MI, 
1982, pp. 78-79.
Describes the development of the first robotics technician curricula in 
the U.S.: Macomb Community College, Warren, MI in 1978.
Smith, Donald N. and Richard C. Wilson. Industrial Robots: A Delphi 
Forecast of Markets and Technology. Society of Manufacturing 
Engineers, Dearborn, MI, 1982.
Reports results of a Delphi survey on many technical, marketing and 
sociological aspects of the development of industrial robots. Over 200 
questions were asked in round one, while rounds two and three
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repeated some questions of round one as well as adding supplemental 
questions suggested by the panel of experts.
Smith, Donald N., Peter G. Heytler and Murray D. Wikol. 
"Sociological Effects of the Introduction of Robots in U.S. Manufac 
turing Industry." Industrial Development Division, Institute of 
Science and Technology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
Paper presented at the CAMPRO '82 Conference on Computer Aided 
Manufacturing and Productivity, October 1982. 
Discusses the implications of robotics in terms of current and future 
developments. According to the authors, the market capacity for the 
industry is expected to "burgeon" into a multi-billion dollar industry 
by 1990. The potential displacement resulting from the growth of the 
industry is expected to be offset by retraining.
Sternlieb, George and James W. Hughes, eds. Post-Industrial America: 
Metropolitan Decline and Inter-Regional Job Shifts. Center for Ur 
ban Policy Research, Rutgers—The State University of New Jersey, 
New Brunswick, NJ, 1975. 
A collection of papers on the plight and future of America's cities.
Tanner, William R., ed. Industrial Robots Volume 2/Applications. 
Robotics International of SME, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, 
Dearborn, MI, 1981.
A collection of journal articles, technical papers and proceedings 
outlining the most recent technological advancements in robotics. The 
materials in this volume cover the use of robotics in the areas of 
Material Handling, Machine Loading, Die Casting, Press Loading, 
Forging and Heat Treating, Foundries, Plastics Molding, Welding, 
Assembly and other areas as well. The cost-effectiveness and produc 
tivity implications are discussed in each chapter.
Tanner, William R. and William F. Adolfson. Robotics Use in Motor 
Vehicle Manufacture. Report to the U.S. Department of Transporta 
tion, February 1982.
Discusses the expanding utilization of robots in the automobile in 
dustry predicting that by 1990 the robot population could be 35,000 or 
more. Robot use will expand because of their effectiveness in improv 
ing productivity and product quality.
Terleckyj, Nestor E. and Martin K. Holdrich. Sectoral Growth in Out 
put, Productivity and Employment, 1981-2000. National Planning 
Association, Report No. 81-N-2, Washington, DC, March 1982. 
Projects growth in output and employment for broad sectors of the
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U.S. economy. Forecasts that employment in manufacturing is ex 
pected to decline by 3.5 million in the 1980s and 1990s and continued 
growth is expected in employment in trades, finance and service sec 
tors.
United Auto Workers. Technology: Promises and Problems. A Policy 
Statement, October 1981.
Discusses new technology and the UAW's policies regarding worker 
protection and job security. It also assesses the role of public policy in 
the same context.
U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office. Dislocated Workers: 
Issues and Federal Options. U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC, July 1982.
Discusses the underlying causes and impacts of worker dislocation and 
analyzes the possibilities for federal aid to these workers.
—————. Location of High Technology Firms and Regional Economic 
Development. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 
1982.
A staff study prepared for the Subcommittee on Monetary and Fiscal 
Policy. Emphasizes the importance of high technology industry for 
economic growth in the U.S. The results are based on a survey of 691 
high technology firms in an attempt to gain more knowledge regarding 
the locational decision making factors of high technology firms. Fac 
tors identified in the study include availability of skilled labor, labor 
costs, state and local taxes and proximity of educational institutions. 
Relative growth of high technology industries will be fastest in the 
Midwest.
—————. U.S. Economic Growth from 1976 to 1986: Prospects, 
Problems and Patterns, Vol. 9, Technological Change. U.S. Govern 
ment Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1977. 
Indicates that a stagnant or slow growing economy with high levels of 
unemployment is not the appropriate environment in which in 
novative activity will flourish. The study cautions policymakers not to 
place excessive expectations on technological change as a solution for 
economic woes.
U.S. Congress. "Robotics: Economic and Social Implications." Con 
gressional Clearinghouse on the Future, 1981. 
Key individuals such as Mr. Stanley Polcyn, V.P., Unimation, Dr. 
Angel Jordan, Dean, Carnegie Institute of Technology, Richard 
Beecher, General Motors Corporation, William Spurgeon, National
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Science Foundation and Thomas Weekley from UAW, discuss 
robotics including its present and future implications for society and 
the economy.
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Exploratory 
Workshop on the Social Impacts of Robotics: Summary and Issues. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, July 1981. 
This background paper summarizes the results of an exploratory 
workshop designed to examine the state of robotic's technology and 
possible public policy issues. It also includes four separate papers that 
were used as starting points for the workshop participants. The papers 
by Albus, Aron, Gold, and Lustgarten are entered separately in this 
bibliography. The participants at the workshop agreed that robotics 
was only one part of the technological base designed to increase in 
dustrial automation; the robot market is in its infancy and there is a 
shortage of trained technical experts in robotics. Not surprisingly, 
there was less agreement on the social and economic impacts, 
although most experts argue that new technology creates more jobs 
than are eliminated, and historically that certainly has been the case.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1977 Census of 
Manufactures. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 
1981a.
This document is the most comprehensive source of data for U.S. 
manufacturing industries.
U.S. Department of Commerce. United States Automobile Industry 
Status Report. Submitted to the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, 
Subcommittee on International Trade, December 1, 1981b. 
The current slump in the automobile industry is more than cyclical. 
Poor sales also reflect a downward trend in demand for automobiles 
due to international competition and demographic factors. The result 
has been the erosion of financial strength for the U.S. auto industry.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Technology and 
Labor in Four Industries. Bulletin 2104, January 1982a. 
Reviews major technological changes among the following selected in 
dustries: meat products, foundries, metalworking machinery and elec 
trical and electronic equipment. Discusses the effects these changes 
will have on productivity and occupations during the next 5-10 years.
—————. Employment and Earnings, Vol. 29, No. 3, March 1982b. 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.
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A comprehensive source of earnings and employment data for the 
U.S. and the individual states.
————. Occupational Outlook Handbook, 1982-83 Edition. Bulletin 
2200, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, April 
1982c.
The primary source of information about specific occupations and the 
outlook for employment in those occupations. Very useful for voca 
tional guidance. The biennial volume is the major focus of BLS oc 
cupational forecasting efforts.
————. Projected Occupational Staffing Patterns of Industries. OES 
Technical Paper No. 2, March 198la.
This paper describes in considerable technical detail the methods 
developed by BLS to project future occupational employment by in 
dustry. Also provides a comparative analysis of different techniques 
for projecting future staffing patterns based on 1973, 1975 and 1978 
OES nonmanufacturing surveys.
————. Comparison of Occupational Employment in the 1978 
Census-Based and OES Survey-Based Matrices. Technical Paper No. 
1, April 1981b. Mimeographed.
This technical paper compares the levels of employment for 1978 from 
the census-based household survey and the OES employer survey. 
While the results are similar in the two surveys, there proved to be 
large variation in some specific occupations.
————. Productivity and the Economy: A Chartbook. Bulletin 2084, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, October 1981c. 
Presents data on various measures of U.S. productivity.
————. Occupational Employment in Manufacturing Industries, 
1977. Bulletin 2057, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
DC, March 1980.
Reports the results of the 1977 OES survey for manufacturing in 
dustries. A detailed occupational profile is provided for industries at 
the 2-digit level. Also shows changes in proportions of broad occupa 
tional groups since 1971.
————. Tomorrow's Manpower Needs. Vol. 1-4, Bulletin 1606, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1969. 
This four volume set reports on the initial BLS effort to develop con 
sistent and detailed projections of employment by occupation for the 
nation and local areas. It is the forerunner of the current OES projec 
tion system.
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—————. Occupational Employment Patterns for 1960 and 1975. 
Bulletin 1599, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 
1968.
This report projected the occupational employment patterns by in 
dustry to 1975. It was essentially based on the BLS Industry- 
Occupational Employment Matrix for 1960 and employment trends 
revealed from 1950 to 1960 in the Current Population Survey and the 
BLS Industry Employment Statistics series.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Advances in Automation Prompt 
Concerns Over Increased U.S. Unemployment. U.S. General Ac 
counting Office, Report No. AFMD-82-44, May 1982. 
Survey of attitudes on the employment impacts of automation. Ex 
plains the reasons for differing opinions on the long-run employment 
impact of automation. Points out that we know little about the short- 
term consequences of displacement.
Vedder, Richard. Robotics and the Economy. Prepared for the Sub 
committee on Monetary and Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic 
Committee, Congress of the United States, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, DC, 1982.
This study examines the growth of the robotics industry and its im 
pacts on employment. Robots will be introduced gradually, so the ma 
jority of displaced workers will be spared unemployment through 
retirement of some workers or retraining. In fact robots may have a 
positive net effect on employment because it will spur economic 
growth. Retraining issues will be addressed through collective bargain 
ing and modification and expansion of vocational education.
Verway, David I. "Michigan Outlook," in The Michigan Economy. Vol. 
1, No. 1, June 1982.
Presents an analysis of the current status of the Michigan economy 
and likely prospects for the future of the state.
Wisnosky, Dennis E. "On the Importance of Engineered Solutions," 
Robotics Today, June 1982, p. 22.
Assesses the future for robotics technology. Wisnosky concludes that 
the automatic factory is some years in the future because of a lack of 
data-based technology, among other factors.
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